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FOREWORD BY THE CHAIRMAN
Over the past six months, we have seen the risks for a prolonged low yield environment 
intensify. A combination of a weakening economic outlook, increased downside risks 
and ongoing uncertainties about trade disputes and Brexit have ushered in a new round 
of monetary easing by central banks, which has been accompanied by a sharp decline in 
longer-term yields. Interest rates reached record lows in August 2019 and an increasing 
number of EU countries now observe negative yields even at longer maturities. Market 
signals also suggest that interest rates will remain lower for longer than anticipated at 
the beginning of the year. This low for long environment has significant consequences for 
the business models of insurers and pension funds, putting pressure on both the capital 
position and long-term profitability. 
On the one hand, the low long-term interest rates directly affect the capital position of 
insurers and pension funds with nominally guaranteed liabilities and the low yield envi-
ronment makes it increasingly challenging for insurers and pension funds to meet the 
promises and guarantees made in the past. In this regard, we continue to see the clear 
benefits of Solvency II, as the market-consistent and risk-based regulatory framework 
has helped price in the risk, build resilience and enhance the risk management practices 
of insurers. At the same time, it is important that the regulatory framework continues to 
remain robust in the future and adequately reflects the risks faced by insurers in a low for 
long environment. As such, it is crucial that these elements are addressed in the currently 
ongoing Solvency II review to ensure that promises can continue to be met in the future.
The low yield environment also has important implications for the business model of in-
surers and pension funds going forward, as we see a gradual shift away from guaranteed 
products towards unit-linked and defined contribution products, where the investment 
risks are borne by the policyholder or beneficiary. While this shift may reduce direct 
financial risks for insurers and pension funds, it requires increased supervisory attention 
for potential conduct issues in the provisions of these products, which may carry signif-
icant reputational risks.  
Finally, cyber and climate change risks continue to demand attention from insurers, pen-
sion funds and supervisors alike. Regarding the former, we see that insurers and pension 
funds are increasingly susceptible to cyber risks as the digital transformation continues, 
while also bringing new opportunities for insurers in the form of cyber underwriting. 
In fact, a well developed and mature cyber insurance market can be a crucial enabler 
of the digital economy and make a valuable contribution to enhancing cyber resilience 
of individuals, businesses and organisations. However, ensuring the sound provision of 
cyber insurance in Europe requires good quality data on cyber incidents and appropriate 
cyber risks management tools. From supervisors, this also requires increased attention 
for potential non-affirmative coverages, accumulation risk and the potential system-wide 
impact of cyber incidents.
Regarding climate change risks, insurers and pension funds can play a key role in the 
transition towards a low carbon economy as major institutional investors, but this trans-
formation carries significant investment risks as well. It is therefore crucial that both 
insurers and pension funds actively incorporate climate change risks in their own risk 
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management frameworks. At the same time, climate change can also have a significant 
impact on the liabilities of non-life insurers and reinsurers, as extreme weather related 
events become more frequent and severe. 
At EIOPA, we have taken several initiatives to pro-actively tackle the climate challenge. 
We have analysed potential climate-sensitive exposures in insurance investment port-
folios in previous Financial Stability Reports, while the stress test for IORPs conducted 
this year also included an assessment of potential transition risks for pension funds. Fur-
thermore, in September 2019, we published an Opinion on integrating sustainability and 
climate change risks into the Solvency II framework. Next year, we will build on this work 
and perform a sensitivity analysis on the investments of European insurers to assess 
transition risks and potential misalignment with the Paris agreement climate goals and 
continue to work on methodologies for climate change stress testing to be used in future 
stress test exercises. Analysing the potential impact of climate change is challenging and 
requires close cooperation between different fields of academia, economics, policymak-
ers and financial regulators. In this respect, the thematic article on the impact of climate 
change on the sovereign bonds portfolio of insurers included in this report provides a 
great example of this cooperation and we look forward to enhancing this cooperation 
even more going forward to ensure that new emerging risks are incorporated into super-
visory frameworks. 
.
Gabriel Bernardino
FINANCIAL STABILIT Y REPORT
5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The global and European economic outlook has deteriorated in the past months with 
weakening industrial production and business sentiment and ongoing uncertainties 
about trade disputes and Brexit. In particular, the “low for long” risk has resurfaced in 
the EU, as interest rates reached record lows in August 2019 and an increasing number of 
countries move into negative yield territory for their sovereign bonds even at longer ma-
turities in anticipation of a further round of monetary easing by central banks and a gen-
eral flight to safety. Bond yields and swap rates have since slightly recovered again, but 
protracted low interest rates form the key risk for both insurers and pension funds and 
put pressure on both the capital position and long-term profitability. Large declines in 
interest rates can also create further incentives for insurers and pension funds to search 
for yield, which could add to the build-up of vulnerabilities in the financial sector if not 
properly managed.
Despite the challenging environment, the European insurance sector remains overall well 
capitalized with a median SCR ratio of 212% as of Q2 2019. However, a slight deteriora-
tion could be observed for life insurers in the first half of 2019 and the low interest rate 
environment is expected to put further pressures on the capital positions of life insurers 
in the second half of 2019. At the same time, profitability improved in the first half of 
2019, mainly due to valuation gains in the equity and bond portfolios of insurers. Never-
theless, the low yield environment is expected to put additional strains on the medium 
to long term profitability of insurers as higher yielding bonds will have to be replaced by 
lower yielding bonds, which may make it increasingly difficult for insurers to make invest-
ment returns in excess of guaranteed returns issued in the past, which are still prevalent 
in many countries.
Regarding the reinsurance sector, the first half of 2019 has been marked by relatively be-
nign catastrophe activity, with global insured losses significantly below long-term levels 
and the record losses observed in the last two years. Coupled with the improved stock 
market performance in the beginning of 2019, this has benefited the profitability and 
solvency position of the European reinsurance sector. Growth in global reinsurance cap-
ital has been supported mostly by traditional capital, and, to a lesser extent, alternative 
reinsurance. While outstanding volumes of ILS instruments have continued to increase 
in 2019, new issuance volumes appear more moderate compared to the previous two 
years reflecting the impact of recent natural disasters and potential future implications 
of climate change.
Finally, the European pension fund sector was significantly affected by the worsening 
economic environment in 2018, taking its toll on both the financial situation of DB pen-
sion funds and on the accumulated savings of members and beneficiaries in DC funds. In 
particular, the persistently low interest rates has kept the market values of DB pension 
obligations high due to the low discount rates. In almost all Member States cover ratios 
(ratio of assets covering the pension obligations) decreased and in some cases fell below 
100%, with the outlook continuing to look challenging in light of the slowdown in the 
global economy and the pressure on the interest rates. Asset values were also significant-
ly impaired towards the end of 2018, in particular for investments in equities.
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PART I
PART I
1. KEY DEVELOPMENTS
The global and European economic outlook has dete-
riorated in the past months with weakening industrial 
production and business sentiment in key sectors and in-
creasing uncertainties about trade disputes, political de-
velopments and Brexit. Coupled with continued subdued 
inflation in both the Eurozone and the EU, this has trig-
gered a new round of monetary easening in September 
2019 which has been accompanied by a sharp decline in 
(long-term) interest rates reaching record low levels.
The “low for long” risk has resurfaced in the EU, with an 
increasing number of countries moving into negative yield 
territory for their sovereign bonds even at longer matur-
ities. Protracted low interest rates form the key risk for 
both insurers and pension funds and put pressure on both 
the capital position and long-term profitability. Large de-
clines in interest rates can also create further incentives 
for insurers and pension funds to search for yield, which 
could add to the build-up of vulnerabilities in the financial 
sector if not properly managed and lead to stretched val-
uations in asset markets.
Overall, equity markets have rebounded strongly follow-
ing the correction in the US market in December 2018, 
albeit with increase volatility in recent months, reflecting 
the uncertainties on trade negotiations, political devel-
opments, Brexit and concerns about the global economy. 
Credit spreads also remain low by historical standards and 
increased lending to highly leveraged households, corpo-
rates and sovereigns fuels potential financial imbalances. 
A sudden tightening of financial conditions could there-
fore trigger substantial investment losses for insurers 
and pension, especially for exposures to highly indebted 
corporates and sovereigns. The risk of a sudden reassess-
ment of risk premia therefore remains, despite the inten-
sification of the low for long scenario.
Furthermore, climate risks remain one of the focal points 
for the insurance industry. Environmental, Social and Gov-
ernance (ESG) factors are increasingly shaping investment 
decisions of insurers and pension funds and an alliance of 
worldwide relevant pension funds and insurers was re-
cently announced at the UN Secretary-General’s Climate 
Action Summit, committing to transition their investment 
portfolios to net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. 
At the same time, transition and physical risks remain 
for investments in climate-sensitive sectors, in particular 
in the case of a disorderly transition to a carbon-neutral 
economy, whereas increased physical risks could trigger 
additional underwriting losses for non-life insurers.
Finally, amid increasing frequency and sophistication of 
cyber-attacks, fast digital transformation and increased 
use of big data and cloud computing, a  sound cyber 
resilience framework for insurers is crucial to ensure 
a well-functioning financial system. On top of that, devel-
oping a sound, mature European cyber insurance market 
could enable the transition towards the digital economy 
and enhance overall cyber resilience in the economy. 
For that, two elements are essential: the definition of 
a consistent and harmonised taxonomy that enables the 
compilation of information on cyber incidents and the 
associated losses and sound underwriting practices and 
cyber risk management, including the proper treatment 
of non-affirmative risks and potential accumulation risk.
1.1. MARKET RISKS
The dynamics of the euro area economy remain chal-
lenging amid weakening industrial production and 
increasing global and domestic uncertainties. GDP 
growth in the euro area decreased from 0.4% in the first 
quarter of the year to 0.2% in the second quarter of 2019. 
In the European Union, GDP growth contracted from 
0.5% to 0.2% in the same period, which is the weakest 
growth rate since the first quarter of 2013 (Figure 1.1). The 
slowdown in the economy has started already from the 
beginning of 2018 onwards, when a general trend towards 
a  sluggish economy became more evident across many 
European countries (Figure 1.2).
Weakening industrial production and business sentiment 
in key sectors due to lower external demand are import-
ant contributing factors to the recent slowdown in the 
euro area economy, which is exacerbated by increasing 
uncertainties around trade policies and political devel-
opments (Figure 1.3). Despite the challenging overall eco-
nomic outlook, domestic demand remains resilient and 
labour market conditions are solid, with overall unem-
ployment rates steadily declining in the euro area and the 
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EU. Nonetheless, the level of unemployment is still high 
in some countries. (Figure 1.4).
Against the backdrop of slowing economic growth and 
persistently low inflation, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) has loosened monetary policy again in Septem-
ber 2019. Inflation rates for the EU and for the euro area 
were similar during 2018 with average rates of 1.8% and 
1.9%, respectively (HCIP rates). However, since then, HICP 
rates have been diverging, as the decrease of the inflation 
rate in the euro area has been more prominent. Despite 
the recent decrease, inflation remained stable at 1.0% in 
the euro area and at 1.4% in the European Union in July and 
August (Figure 1.5). In response to the slowing economy 
and subdued inflation outlook, the ECB announced a new 
round of policy measures aimed at monetary easening in 
September 2019 (Box 1.1). The ECB also highlighted the 
relevance of other economic policies to complement and 
enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy, in particular 
fiscal policy and structural reform in EU member states.
Figure 1.1: Real GDP growth (%) QoQ Figure 1.2: Real GDP growth by country (20017Q1=100)
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Figure 1.3: Uncertainty Indexes Figure 1.4: Unemployment rates (% of labour force)
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BOX 1.1: THE ECB PACKAGE OF MONETARY POLICY MEASURES AND ITS TRANSMISSION 
CHANNELS TO THE ECONOMY
On 12th September 2019, the ECB announced a new stimulus package aiming at maintaining favourable financial 
conditions and the sustained convergence of inflation towards its medium-term target.
The proposed measures are summarized below:
(1) Decrease of the interest rate on the deposit facility from -0.40% to -0.50%, which is expected to remain at 
their present or lower levels until inflation outlook converges to the target within its projection horizon and 
is reflected in underlying inflation dynamics.
(2) Restart of the net purchases under the asset purchase programme (APP) at a monthly pace of €20 billion as 
from 1 November, which is expected to end shortly before it starts raising the key ECB interest rates.
(3) Continuation of the reinvestments of the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the 
asset purchase programme (APP) for an extended period of time after the Governing Council starts raising 
the key ECB interest rates, and for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an 
ample degree of monetary accommodation. The additional net asset purchases and the revised reinvestment 
horizon are considered an important complement to interest rate policy. This affects mainly longer-term 
rates, providing further support to the funding costs to businesses and households. The prolonged reinvest-
ment horizon might also mitigate the passive tightening in the monetary policy stance, which is a natural 
development as the APP portfolio ages.
Figure 1.5: Average inflation rates: Euro area and EU (in %) Figure 1.6: HICP main components (annual % changes)
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The rekindling of accommodative monetary policy 
has raised the risk of a “low for long”2 scenario, which 
has significant impact on insurers and pension funds. 
Interest rates declined sharply over the summer in antici-
pation of the new stimulus package and the deteriorating 
economic outlook. Interest rate swap curves for the euro 
reached a new low historical level in August, well below 
the previous lowest level observed in June 2016 (Figure 
2 The “low for long” scenario is defined as a situation when short and 
long-term nominal interest rates are assumed to remain low over the 
next decade, combined with a period of low economic growth. The ratio-
nale behind this scenario is that structural factors, such as demographic 
trends, total factor productivity or an increased preference for scarce 
safe assets, along with cyclical factors, have pushed interest rates down 
to low levels. See more on Macroprudential policy issues arising from low 
interest rates and structural changes in the EU financial system, ESRB 
(2016).
1.7), which significantly affects the values of long-term lia-
bilities of insurers and pension funds using market-based 
valuation frameworks. Another implication is the increase 
in the gap between the Solvency II Ultimate Forward 
Rate (UFR), and the current level of swap rates at 20, 30 
or 50 years, resulting in a higher difference between the 
observed level of swap rates and the extrapolated rates 
under the Solvency II framework. This fosters the supervi-
sory concern that the technical provisions are underesti-
mated as interest rates for long-term maturities (and thus 
long-term liabilities) are discounted with too optimistic 
interest rate assumptions (see Box 1.2).
Government bond yields have also decreasedly substan-
tially over 2019, with borrowing rates moving further 
into negative territory, before slightly recovering again 
Figure 1.7: Swap curves Figure 1.8: 10-year government bond yields (in %)
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(4) The interest rate in each operation of quarterly targeted longer-term refinancing operations1 (TLTRO III) are 
now set at the level of the average rate applied in the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations over the 
life of the respective TLTRO. For banks whose eligible net lending exceeds a benchmark, the rate applied 
in TLTRO III operations will be lower, and can be as low as the average interest rate on the deposit facility 
prevailing over the life of the operation. The maturity of the operations will be extended from two to three 
years.
(5) Introduction of a two-tier system for reserve remuneration, in which part of banks’ holdings of excess liquidi-
ty will be exempt from the negative deposit facility rate.
1 TLTRO-III aims at preserving favourable bank lending con ditions by providing long-term loans to banks and offering them an incentive to 
increase their lending to businesses and consumers in the euro area
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following the postponement of Brexit and a  slight eas-
ing of trade tensions in October (Figure 1.8). Most of the 
EU area sovereign bond yields are still negative however, 
even for longer maturities (Table 1.1). The same trend can 
also be observed for the US, which lowered interest rates 
by 0.25% for the first time since 2008, amid concerns 
about the global economy (Figure 1.8). Furthermore, the 
spread between the yields of countries considered safer 
and those considered riskier has been narrowing, while 
sovereign credit default swap remained relatively elevat-
ed in countries that face structural fiscal and debt chal-
lenges (Figures 1.9 and 1.10).
Table 1.1: Government bond yields for different maturities
1Y 2Y 5Y 10Y 15Y 20Y
EU- euro area Austria -0.435 -0.644 -0.419 -0.059 0.197 0.356
Belgium -0.647 -0.620 -0.401 -0.018 0.309 0.552
Finland -0.630 -0.628 -0.453 -0.074 0.164 0.293
France -0.612 -0.626 -0.439 -0.046 0.285 0.528
Germany -0.656 -0.665 -0.592 -0.355 -0.145 0.008
Greece 0.130 0.233 0.709 1.530 2.169 2.499
Ireland -0.541 -0.488 -0.266 0.127 0.444 0.668
Italy -0.175 -0.033 0.596 1.281 1.829 2.193
Netherlands -0.658 -0.656 -0.513 -0.196 0.021 0.147
Portugal -0.500 -0.401 -0.032 0.447 0.879 1.243
Slovakia -0.601 -0.490 -0.356 0.099 0.544 0.732
Spain -0.456 -0.376 -0.060 0.442 0.807 1.115
EU-non euro area United Kingdom 0.648 0.519 0.454 0.700 1.054 1.274
Bulgaria -0.381 -0.287 -0.062 0.316 - -
Croatia 0.071 0.083 0.243 0.675 1.151 1.559
Czech Republic 1.471 1.411 1.281 1.471 1.572 1.676
Denmark -0.769 -0.726 -0.590 -0.343 -0.162 -0.061
Hungary -0.037 0.128 0.816 1.853 2.525 -
Norway 1.211 1.229 1.245 1.405 - -
Poland 1.128 1.420 1.808 2.068 2.398 2.624
Sweden -0.423 -0.372 -0.306 -0.031 0.238 0.408
Others United States 1.660 1.640 1.641 1.775 1.921 2.170
Japan -0.191 -0.193 -0.208 -0.084 0.146 0.309
Switzerland -0.862 -0.817 -0.744 -0.561 -0.369 -0.284
Source: Refinitiv
Reference date: 25 November 2019
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BOX 1.2: LOW INTEREST RATES AND THE ULTIMATE FORWARD RATE
The Ultimate Forward Rate (UFR) is a central element in determining the regulatory risk-free rates used to dis-
count insurers’ liabilities for horizons beyond the Last Liquid Point (LLP), which is set at the 20-year swap for the 
euro. As it is essentially the sum of the expected real rate and the expected inflation rate, the UFR is affected 
by market developments.
Persistent lower interest rates broaden the difference between the level of swap rates at 20, 30 or 50 years and 
the UFR, which is at 3.9% since the beginning of 2019 for the euro.3 Large differences between the observed 
level of swap rates and the extrapolated rates may result in too optimistic interest rate assumptions, which leads 
to inadequate estimations of liabilities. Critical situations in which for example an undertaking no longer com-
plies with its SCR and/or MCR, a transfer of liabilities to another undertaking might be necessary. Inaccurate 
estimations might risk that technical provisions may not be sufficient to transfer these liabilities when priced at 
market values.
The underlying risks of the rates discrepancy would become even more concrete in the near future when un-
dertakings might actually start earning a lower rate than the interest rate used to calculate their technical pro-
visions (which includes the UFR under Solvency II). In that situation, undertakings would incur losses each year 
that reduce their own funds. Ultimately, persisting losses from inappropriate discounting (where extrapolated 
rates are persistently higher than market rates) may slowly deteriorate their financial situation and put policy-
holders and beneficiaries at risk.
3 The UFR is set each year by EIOPA according to the Methodology found here: https://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Standards/20180813_
Technical%20Documentation%20(RP%20methodology%20update).pdf
Figure 1.9: 10-year government bond yields (in %) Figure 1.10: Sovereign Credit Default Swap
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Protracted low interest rates affect both sides of in-
surers and pension funds balance sheets, with institu-
tions holding primarily long-term liabilities and short-
er-term assets most vulnerable to declining rates. Life 
insurers and some pension funds discount their long-term 
financial obligations towards policyholders or pension 
members based on a market-consistent interest rate term 
structure.5 Therefore, the value of liabilities will increase 
when the interest rates used to discount long-term liabil-
ities decrease. The impact is greater the longer the dura-
tion of the liabilities and the bigger the decrease in the 
long-term interest rates. On the asset side, decreasing 
interest rates typically lead to an increase in the market 
value of assets, as insurers and to a lesser extent, pension 
funds, heavily invest in government and corporate bonds 
(see Chapter 5). However, as the duration of assets for 
life insurers and pension funds is typically lower than the 
5 While Solvency II prescribes the risk-free-interest rate term struc-
ture to be used by EEA insurers for discounting liabilities, the prudential 
regimes and national valuation frameworks for IORPs and other pension 
funds diverge significantly within the EEA and do not necessarily require 
market-consistent valuations, and may allow for discount rates reflecting 
the expected returns on assets.
duration of liabilities (negative duration gap), the increase 
in the value of assets may not fully offset the increase in 
liabilities, leading to a worsening of the financial position. 
Ultimately, the overall effect and the magnitude of the 
impact of declining interest rate will depend on the type 
of entity, business lines offered, duration of assets and li-
abilities and the extent to which minimum guarantees are 
offered. Unless a well-defined hedging strategy has been 
implemented, a fall on interest rates combined with nomi-
nally guaranteed liabilities could lead to a deterioration of 
the financial position of these entities.
Another aggravating factor for balance sheets in which 
the duration of liabilities exceeds the duration of the as-
sets in the current low yield environment is the risk that 
maturing fixed-income securities can only be replaced by 
lower yielding securities (reinvestment risk). This dynam-
ic might gradually affect profitability and could be par-
ticularly worrisome for insurers and pension funds with 
relatively high nominally guaranteed liabilities and large 
exposures to fixed-income securities (see also Chapter 2).
Furthermore, differences between the extrapolated risk-free interest rates and market rates might impact risk 
management initiatives, as undertakings can choose to hedge the risk as reflected in their solvency balance 
sheet or the risk that actually exists in the financial markets. If the hedging is based on the extrapolated risk-free 
interest rates, it may reduce the volatility of Solvency II own funds, at least in the short term, but may leave the 
insurer exposed to the risks of financial markets in the long run. In contrast, if undertakings decide to hedge the 
risks of the financial market, it may increase the volatility of their Solvency II own funds. For that reason, the 
lower LLP may incentivise undertakings to base the hedging on the extrapolated risk-free interest rates instead 
of hedging the actual risk in financial markets.
Another related issue is the risk of procyclical investment behaviour when interest rates fall. The undertakings 
could buy long-term swaps in order to improve their matching and reduce their interest risk charge, which 
could put further pressure on the swap rates. The extent to which the volatility of interest rates translates to 
a volatility of technical provisions and own funds depends on the specifics of the risk profile of the undertaking 
concerned, on the term of the liabilities and in particular in the degree of matching between asset and liability 
cash flows.
The public consultation on the Opinion that sets out technical advice for the 2020 review of Solvency II assesses 
these issues more in detail.4 Among the EIOPA proposals are potential changes to the LLP and a recommen-
dation that insurance and reinsurance undertakings should disclose in their Solvency and Financial Condition 
Report (SFCR) the outcome of a sensitivity analysis for a fixed downward shift of the UFR. This would help in-
crease the transparency of the impact of the extrapolation of risk-free-rates on the financial position of insurers, 
including on the amount of technical provisions, the SCR, the MCR, the basic own funds and the amounts of 
own funds eligible to cover the SCR and the MCR.
4 See the public consultation paper on the Opinion on the 2020 review of Solvency II in the following link: https://eiopa.europa.eu/Pages/
News/EIOPA-consults-on-technical-advice-for-the-2020-review-of-Solvency-II.aspx
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Despite the intensification of the low for long sce-
nario, the risk of a  sudden reassessment of risk pre-
mia remains amid political risks, trade tensions and 
sovereign debt concerns in some European countries. 
Overall, asset valuations remain stretched, as investors 
have been seeking for more rewarding alternatives in an 
environment where the amount of bonds with negative 
yields has increased to about $15 trillion globally  - in-
cluding more than $7 trillion in government bonds from 
large advanced economies.7 Following the correction in 
December 2018, equity markets in the US and EA have 
rebounded strongly, albeit with notable ups and downs. 
In particular, US equity markets appear to be overvalued 
(Figure 1.11). The oscillation in equity markets is also re-
flected in slighly higher volatilities on financial markets, 
given the rise in equity values since 2009 (Figure 1.12).
7 Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report - October 2019, avail-
able in the following linkl: https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publica-
tions/GFSR/2019/October/English/text.ashx?la=en
BOX 1.3: OVERCOMING PERSISTENT LOW INTEREST RATE CHALLENGES AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY
The low interest rate environment exerts pressure on profitability and solvency positions of insurers and pen-
sion funds. A natural reaction of the entities is to look for alternatives to mitigate the adverse impact on their 
balance sheets. However, some market behaviours might introduce risks to overall financial stability, in particu-
lar when applied in a large scale by many or large and relevant entities.
The most concerning alternative from a financial stability point of view is when insurers and pension funds try 
to address the lower yields by diversifying their portfolios with riskier investments, including complex securities 
with limited liquidity, as entities may have greater incentives to invest in riskier assets leading to “searching for 
yield” behaviour.
That might occur either because of their business model, for example when offering return guarantees that are 
dependent on portfolios heavily allocated in fixed-income instruments, or because of the market environment 
in which they are operating, such as in a competitive context with compressed margins.
The main implication of search for yield for financial stability is the potential growing appetite for risk culmi-
nating in an intensification of asset price bubbles, which given the level of interconnectedness across sectors 
might affect different segments of the financial sector, potentially triggering fire sales and ultimately affecting 
the real economy.
Another option to hedge the risk of declining interest rates be to increase the duration of assets in order to 
ensure a better duration match between assets and liabilities. However, if this behaviour is adopted by a large 
segment of the market, that may trigger a feedback loop in which the high demand for certain types of bonds 
increase their prices, resulting in further downward pressure on interest rates.6
A more gradual solution is the adjustment of new contracts of insurers or pension promises of IORPs, by for 
example lowering or eliminating guaranteed rates and increasing unit-linked products. Although less risky for 
insurers from a financial stability point of view, this option would demand time and transfers more risks to pol-
icyholders, which may reduce incentives for insurers to properly manage investment risk. This could ultimately 
give rise to potential conduct and reputational risks to the insurance sector in case returns turn out lower than 
anticipated. Clear communication towards policyholders and transparency of product features are therefore 
needed.
6 For empirical evidence of this mechanism, see Domanski, Shin and Sushko (2017): The hunt for duration: not waving but drowning? Avail-
able at: https://www.bis.org/publ/work519.htm 
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A weak economic outlook combined with the material-
ization of key political risks such as the intensification 
of trade sanctions could trigger a  sharp reversal of the 
risk premia leading to potential downgrades and higher 
default rates, as the repayment of debts becomes more 
expensive. This could lead to sudden increases in credit 
spreads, in particular for lower-quality assets, causing im-
mediate losses in the investment portfolios that are main-
ly composed of fixed-income instruments. Moreover, as 
the investments of the insurance sector are characterized 
by strong home bias and interconnectedness with banks 
(see Chapter 5), insurers in affected countries are likely to 
Figure 1.11: Equity market performance Figure 1.12: Market volatilities
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Figure 1.13: Selected markets performance (year-to-
date)
Figure 1.14: Insurance CDS spreads
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suffer more severe losses, with potential spillover effects 
from the banking sector as well.
Despite the decrease in interest rates and the chal-
lenging economic environment, European insurers 
have so far outperformed the general market in 2019. 
The market performance of the insurance sector was the 
slightly ahead of the general market in Europe on a year-
to-date period in October (+21.6% versus +20.2%, see 
Figure 1.13). The positive market performance is in line 
with the general strong performance of equity markets in 
2019. Corporate CDS spreads for insurers have also been 
decreasing since the beginning 2019, in particular for life 
insurers (Figure 1.14). That might reflect the fact that cer-
tain risks are most likely not yet properly priced by the 
market.
1.2. CLIMATE RISK AND 
SUSTAINABLE FINANCE
Preliminary global figures for 2019 show a  high con-
centration of natural disasters in poorer countries, 
where insurance coverage is very scarce. Total natural 
catastrophes and weather related losses amounted to ap-
proximately USD 42 bn globally in the first half of 2019, 
from which only USD 15 bn were insured, compared re-
spectively to USD 62 bn and USD 23 bn in the first half of 
2018.8 In Europe, so far, the most costly events were the 
winter storm Eberhard in March and severe storms and 
hail in June, which in total caused losses of USD 2.2 bn 
(see also Chapter 3).
Extreme weather events continue to put significant 
pressure on non-life insurers and are expected to be-
come more frequent and severe due to climate change. 
The last European summer was characterized by very high 
temperatures, with a third of the all-time records of high 
temperatures happening in Germany, France, Nether-
lands and UK. The period between June and August was 
the second warmest period in the 140-year record at 
0.93°C above the 20th century average of 15.6°C. This is 
only behind the same period in 2016 by 0.02°C.9
In response to climate related risks, the EU established 
several targets and actions through a combination of 
8 Source: Munich Re NatCatSERVICE available at https://www.mu-
nichre.com/en/media-relations/publications/press-releases/2019/2019-
07-30-press-release/index.html
9 Source: NOAA National Centers for Environmenal Information.
financial support and regulation within the EU climate 
action. This initiative includes packages with sets of bind-
ing legislations with climate and energy targets to be met 
in 2020 and 2030, which are the first steps to achieve the 
long-term goal of transforming the EU economy towards 
low carbon utilization by 2050. The key EU targets are in 
the table below:
Table 1.2: Key EU targets - Climate Action
Key EU Targets 2020 2030
Greenhouse gas emissions (compared to 1990) -20% -40%
Energy consumption from renewable energy 20% 32%
Increase in energy efficiency 20% 32.5%
Source: Fourth report on the State of the Energy Union
While the EU is on track to meet its 2020 greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction target, efforts should be in-
creased to reach both energy efficiency and renew-
ables targets to ensure a smooth transition in line with 
the Paris Climate Agreement. Regarding emissions, the 
2020 target of the reduction of 20% since 1990 was al-
ready achieved in 2013. Between 1990 and 2017, emissions 
decreased by 22% (Figure 1.15). However, the pace of in-
crease in the share of renewable energy has been slow-
ing since 2014, despite the increasing support of Member 
States in providing incentives to the market. Clearly, more 
efforts should be done to ensure that the future targets 
will be met (Figure 1.16). The same holds for the energy 
efficiency target, as energy consumption has started to 
increase in recent years after a gradual decrease between 
2007 and 2014, mainly due to weather variations and low 
oil prices. Achieving the goals set in the Paris Climate 
Agreement in a  timely manner would help mitigate the 
onset of more extreme physical risks, while an orderly 
transition process would also reduce potential transition 
risks.
Insurance companies have a high potential to contrib-
ute to a  substantial acceleration to the transition to 
a low-carbon economy. As risk managers and investors, 
they play an essential role in driving investments towards 
particular sectors and long-term projects. Insurers are 
increasingly incorporating climate-related risks in their 
underwriting and investment activities as part of an en-
hanced approach towards so-called Environmental, Social 
and Governance (ESG) factors. Another overall growing 
trend in the market is investments in green bonds, which 
is estimated to reach USD 250 bn by the end of this year, 
EUROPEAN INSUR ANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS AUTHORIT Y
18
an increase of 46% compared to 2018.10 These bonds aim 
to fund projects that have positive environmental and/or 
climate benefits.
Furthermore, on 23 September, the “Net-Zero Asset 
Owner Alliance”, composed of worldwide relevant pen-
sion funds and insurers was announced at the UN Sec-
retary-General’s Climate Action Summit. These entities, 
which together hold approximately USD 2.4 trillion in in-
vestments, has committed to transition their investment 
portfolios to net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. 
The members of the Alliance also committed to immedi-
ately start to engage with the companies in which they 
are investing to ensure they decarbonise their business 
models.
Despite these initiatives, there are still challenges 
in monitoring and mitigating climate-related risks in 
both underwriting and investment activities. Overall, 
insurers and pension funds remain exposed to consider-
able climate-related transition risk11 in their investment 
portfolios, which are still challenging to properly quantify. 
The industry still lacks a standardized reporting on green 
10 Source: Climate Bonds Initiative, available at: https://www.climate-
bonds.net/
11 Transition risks arise in the transition to a more carbon-neutral econ-
omy, with potentially significant and disorderly write-downs in certain fi-
nancial assets, in particular for exposures to carbon-intensive industries.
investments, emission metrics and climate impact of ex-
posures which would help to enhance the use of scenar-
io analysis in risk modelling and portfolio management. 
EIOPA therefore welcomes and actively contributes to 
the EC Action Plan on Sustainable Finance, which aims at 
developing a European Taxonomy for green investments, 
among others. At the same time, EIOPA is currently work-
ing on enhancing its insurance stress testing framework 
to incorporate climate-related risks, while a Thematic Ar-
ticle accompanying this report presents an initial analysis 
on potential transition risk for government bond holdings 
(see Part II).
1.3. CYBER RISKS AND THE 
INSURANCE SECTOR
Amid increasing frequency and sophistication of cy-
ber-attacks, fast digital transformation and increased 
use of big data and cloud computing, a  sound cyber 
resilience framework for insurers is essential to en-
sure a well-functioning financial system. According to 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB)12, cyber resilience is 
defined as “the ability of an organisation to continue to 
12 The FSB Lexicon is available at the following link: https://www.fsb.
org/2018/11/cyber-lexicon/
Figure 1.15: Greenhouse gas emissions in the EU (index, 
1990=100)
Figure 1.16: Renewable energy shares
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carry out its mission by anticipating and adapting to cyber 
threats and other relevant changes in the environment 
and by withstanding, containing and rapidly recovering 
from cyber incidents.” Therefore, the primary idea behind 
of a cyber-resilient entity is that it has the competences to 
continue providing their services and deliverables despite 
adverse cyber risks.
Two aspects of cyber resilience are relevant in the 
context of the insurance sector: insurance companies 
as a  target of cyber-attacks insurance companies as 
providers of cyber insurance. The connection between 
the first aspect and cyber resilience is straightforward. In-
surance companies possess a  large amount of sensitive 
data, which is naturally appealing for hackers. If a major 
cyber incident happens to an insurance company that is 
unprepared operationally, that could immediately prevent 
the continuation of their activities. Indeed, according to 
a new report “Cyber risk for insurers: challenges and op-
portunities” published by EIOPA13 in September, business 
interruption is the most frequent consequence of cyber 
incidents, followed by material costs for policyholders 
and third parties. Ultimately, the company might face not 
only revenue losses but also reputational damages and 
consequently might not be able to continue providing 
their services. Furthermore, the report shows that there 
is a lack of harmonization in many dimensions, from the 
definition of cyber risks itself to what characterizes a cy-
ber event and a cyber incident.
The second aspect, which concerns insurance companies 
as providers of cyber insurance, has a more indirect but 
still relevant link with cyber resilience. In this case, the in-
surance company does not necessarily have to suffer a di-
rect cyber incident to have the continuation of its business 
threatened. Instead, accumulation risk in cyber coverages 
is the key factor for potential disruptions. For example, it 
could be that many policyholders of cyber insurance de-
mand claims for the same cyber incident at the same time. 
Depending on the scale of the incident and on the extent 
to which these policies are relevant for the company, this 
incident might cause a  substantial financial impact. This 
scenario can become even more alarming when consider-
13 The report Cyber risk for insurers: challenges and opportunities is 
available in the following link: https://eiopa.europa.eu/Pages/News/EIO-
PA-calls-for-a-sound-cyber-resilience-framework.aspx
ing non-affirmative risks. In that case, if some cyber perils 
are not explicitly excluded from traditional policies, a cy-
ber incident that is large enough can trigger unexpected 
accumulation of losses within other policies.
Therefore, considering these two aspects discussed and 
based on new evidence discussed in the EIOPA report, 
two key elements are fundamental to enhance of the cy-
ber insurance underwriting market in the EU.
The first element is the definition of a consistent and 
harmonised taxonomy that enables a  compilation of 
information on cyber incidents and the associated 
losses. Providing a consistent terminology would be the 
first step to enable a better assessment of the risks and 
exchange of information based on harmonized data cy-
ber incidents. Such a  taxonomy could also facilitate the 
creation of an anonymized cyber incident database. In 
particular, a cross-sectoral approach would be beneficial 
not only for insurance underwriting practices, but also to 
increase awareness of the whole financial system regard-
ing cyber threats.
The second element concerns the need for sound cy-
ber underwriting and risk management practices, in 
particular to address non-affirmative cyber risks and 
potential accumulation risk. While there are common 
efforts under way, evidence suggests that many insurers 
are not fully aware of their exposure to cyber risks. In that 
regard, there is not only a lack of explicit cyber exclusions, 
but also a  lack of quantitative approaches to estimate 
potential impacts of non-affirmative risks. Indeed, EIOPA 
found that a significant number of insurance groups cur-
rently have no action plan in place to review the portfo-
lios in the context of cyber exposures and rewording of 
contracts.14 Some groups reported that they have adopt-
ed a  ‘wait-and-see’ approach to address non-affirmative 
cyber risk, where the implementation of actions plans to 
address non-affirmative exposure depends on material-
ization of future events. Therefore, addressing non-affir-
mative risks would also be very beneficial to fight against 
accumulation risk and therefore increase the resilience of 
the sector as a whole.
14 See EIOPA report Cyber risk for insurers: challenges and opportuni-
ties available in the following link: https://eiopa.europa.eu/Pages/News/
EIOPA-calls-for-a-sound-cyber-resilience-framework.aspx
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2. THE EUROPEAN INSURANCE SECTOR
The challenging macroeconomic environment described 
in Chapter 1 is leading insurance undertakings to further 
adapt their business models. In order to address the chal-
lenges associated with the low yield environment and im-
prove profitability, life insurers are lowering guaranteed 
rates in traditional products and are increasingly focusing 
on unit-linked products. On the investment side, insurers 
are slowly moving towards more alternative investments 
and illiquid assets, such as unlisted equity, mortgages & 
loans, infrastructure and property. For non-life insurers, 
the challenge is mostly focused on managing increasing 
losses stemming from climate-related risks and cyber 
events, which may not be adequately reflected in risk 
models based on historical data, and continued compet-
itive pressures.
2.1. MARKET SHARE AND GROWTH
Despite the challenging environment, the Europe-
an insurance sector overall gross written premiums 
slightly grew by 1.6% on an annual basis in Q2 2019. 
This growth is particularly driven by the increase in non-
life GWP (3.7%), in comparison to a slightly decrease in life 
(-0.5%). This reduction growth rate in life GWP is associ-
ated to the slowdown in the economic growth; however 
this does not seem to have affected the growth of non-life 
GWP to the same extent. Overall GWP as a percentage of 
GDP slightly increased from 9% to 11% for the European 
insurance market, likewise total assets as a share of GDP 
improved from 70% to 74%.
On a country level, the highest GWP growth in Q2 2019 
(y-o-y) considering both life and non-life business was 
recorded in Luxembourg (68% and 27% – see Figure 2.1). 
A significant increase in Non-life GWP can be observed in 
Belgium and Malta (48% and 37%). The growth in non-life 
GWP for the two major insurance markets has declined 
instead.
The share of unit-linked business has slightly declined 
notwithstanding the growth expectations. Even 
though insurers are increasingly trying to shift towards 
unit-linked business in the current low yield environment, 
the total share of unit-linked business in life GWP has 
slightly decreased from 42% in Q2 2018 to 40% in Q2 
2019, likewise the share for the median insurance com-
pany declined from 34% in Q2 2018 to 31% in Q2 2019 
Figure 2.1: Total Life and Non-Life GWP growth in H2 2019 (in %, year-on-year)
GWP life % change GWP non-life % change
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Source: EIOPA QRS 
Reporting reference date: Q2 2018 and Q2 2019 
Note: Growth rates calculated as difference between Q2 2018 and Q2 2019 GWP and based on local/reporting currency.
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(Figure 2.2). This is in line with the general decline seen 
in the country analysis, particulary for (Figure 2.3) for UK, 
CZ & LU, with some exceptions for BG, RO & LV. Moro-
ever, considerable differences remain across countries, 
with some countries still being plagued by low trust due 
to misselling issues in the past. Overall, the trend towards 
unit-lead business means that investment risks are in-
creasingly transferred to policyholders with potential rep-
utational risks to the insurance sector in case investment 
returns turn out lower than anticipated.
The liquid asset ratio slightly deteriorated in the first 
half of 2019. The median value for liquid asset increased 
by 1.5% from 63.3% in 2018 Q2 to 64.8% in 2018 Q4, and 
after slightly decreased to 63.8% in Q2 2019. Furthermore, 
the distribution moved down (10th percentile reduced in 
the past year by 6 p.p. to 47.9%). Liquid assets are nec-
essary in order to meet payment obligations when they 
are due. Furthermore, a potential increase in interest rate 
yields might directly impact the liquidity needs of insurers 
due to a  significant increase in the lapse rate as policy-
holders might look for more attractive alternative invest-
ments.
The liquid asset ratio varies considerable across EEA 
countries. Malta, Finland and Cyprus have liquidity asset 
ratio below 50%, while Lithuania, Hungary and Croatia 
have high liquidity asset ratios in comparison with the 
median, 57% (Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.2: GWP-Life business: Unit-linked share (in %; median, interquartile range and 10th and 90th percentile)
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Source: EIOPA QRS
Note: Sample sized on insurance companies which have reported unit-linked business (life and life part of composite insurance companies)
Figure 2.3: GWP-Life business: Unit-linked share across countries (in %)
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Lapse rates in the life business remained stable slight-
ly increased in the first half of 2019. The median val-
ue increased from 1.34% in Q2 2018 to 1.38% in Q2 2019. 
Moreover, a potential sudden reversal of risk premia and 
abruptly rising yields could trigger an increase in lapse 
rates and surrender ratios as policyholders might look 
for more attractive investments. Although several con-
tractual and fiscal implications could limit the impact of 
lapses and surrenders in some countries, potential lapses 
by policyholders could add additional strains on insurers’ 
financial position once yields start increasing.
Figure 2.4: Liquid assets ratio (in %; median, interquartile range and 10th and 90th percentile)
2018-Q2 2018-Q3 2018-Q4 2019-Q1 2019-Q2
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Source: EIOPA QRS
Note: The liquid assets ratio shows the proportion of liquid assets on total assets (excluding assets held for unit-linked). The ratio is calculated by applying 
different weights (ranging from 100% for cash to 0% for intangible assets) to different assets, according to the liquidity profile).
Figure 2.5: Liquid assets ratio by country (in %; median, interquartile range and 10th and 90th percentile)
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2.2. PROFITABILITY
The return on investment has substantially declined 
further over 2018. The investment returns have sig-
nificantly deteriorated for the main investment classes 
(bonds, equity and collective instruments). The median 
return on investment decreased to only 0.31% in 2018, 
compared to 2.83% in 2016 and 1.95% in 2017 (Figure 2.7). 
In particular the four main investment options (govern-
ment and corporate bonds, equity instruments and col-
lective investment undertakings) – which approximately 
account for two-thirds of insurers’ total investment port-
folios – have generated considerably lower or even neg-
ative returns in 2018 (Figure 2.8). As a consequence, in-
surers may increasingly look for alternative investments, 
such as unlisted equities, mortgages and infrastructure 
to improve investment returns. This potential search for 
yield behaviour might differ per country and warrants 
close monitoring by supervisory authorities as insur-
ers may suffer substantial losses on these more illiquid 
investments when markets turn sour (see Chapter 5 for 
further analysis on the impact of low yield environment).
Despite the challenging investment climate, overall 
insurer profitability improved in the first half of 2019. 
The median return on assets (ROA) increased from 0.24% 
in Q2 2018 to 0.32% in Q2 2019, whereas the median re-
turn on excess of assets over liabilities (used as a proxy of 
return on equity), increased from 2.8% in Q2 2018 to 4.9 
% in Q2 2019 (Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10). The improve-
ment in overall profitability seems to stem mainly from 
valuation gains in the investment portolio of insurers 
driven by a  strong rebound in equity prices and declin-
ing yields (and hence increasing values of bond holdings) 
throughout the first half of 2019, while profitability could 
be further supported by strong underwriting results and 
insurers’ continued focus on cost optimisation. However, 
decreased expected profits in future premiums (EPIFP) 
from 11% in Q1 2019 to 10.3% in Q2 2019 suggest expecta-
tions of deteriorating profitability looking ahead.
Figure 2.6: Lapse rates (in %) Figure 2.7: Return on Investments (in %; median, inter-
quartile range and 10th and 90th percentile)
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Source: EIOPA QFG Source: EIOPA ARS
Reference date: 31/12/2018
Note: Investment returns are taken from template s.09.01 and incude divi-
dends, interest, rent, net gains and losses and unrealized gains and losses.
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The low yield environment also makes it increasingly 
hard for insurers to make investment returns in ex-
cess of guaranteed returns issued in the past, which 
are still prevalent in many countries. Many insurers, 
especially in the life segment, have offered guaranteed 
returns on their insurance policies in the past. These in-
vestment guarantees have become comparatively high in 
the current low yield environment and it is increasingly 
difficult for insurers to cover the offered guaranteed rates 
in certain countries (Figure 2.11). While most insurance un-
dertakings have stopped offering investment guarantees 
on new insurance policies and increasingly focus on unit-
linked products, the legacy products with investment 
guarantees still make up the majority of technical provi-
Figure 2.8: Return on Investments per asset class (in %)
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Figure 2.9: Return on Assets (in %; median, interquar-
tile range and 10th and 90th percentile)
Figure 2.10: Return on Excess of Assets over Liabilities 
(in %; median, interquartile range and 10th and 90th 
percentile)
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Figure 2.11: Spread of investment return over guaranteed interest rate for life insurers (in %; median, interquartile 
range and 25th and 75th percentile)
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Source: EIOPA ARS
Reference date: 31/12/2018
Note: Only countries with a combination of material guaranteed rates and sufficient observations are shown. Weighted average guaranteed rate (using the best 
estimate at homogeneous risk group as weight) and investment return for solo life insurers are based on Solvency II reporting (s.14.01 and s.09.01) and may 
differ from statutory accounts. Life business from composite insurers is not considered in this figure, which may be relevant in some Member States, in particular 
in Italy and France.
Figure 2.12: Gross Combined Ratio across lines of business (in %; median, interquartile range and 10th and 90th 
percentile) as of Q2 2019
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sions in the EEA (approximately two-thirds of the total life 
best estimate in the EEA have some form of guaranteed 
rate). This continues to put a significant strain on the prof-
itability of insurers.
15 Nominator S.05.01.02 ([R0310+ R0550, C0010-C0160]); Denomina-
tor S.05.01.02 [R0210, C0010-C0160]
Underwriting profitability remained stable and over-
all positive in the first half of 2019. The median Gross 
Combined Ratio for non-life business remained below 
100% in the first half of 2019 across all lines of business, 
indicating that most EEA insurers were able to generate 
positive underwriting results (excluding profits from in-
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vestments (Figure 2.12).16 However, significant outliers can 
still be observed across lines of business, in particular for 
credit and suretyship insurance, indicating that several in-
surers have experienced substantial underwriting losses 
in this line of business. Furthermore, concerns of under-
pricing and underreserving remain in the highly competi-
tive motor insurance markets.
2.3. SOLVENCY
Solvency positions slightly deteriorated in the first 
half of 2019 and the low interest rate environment is 
expected to put further pressures on the capital posi-
tions in the second half of the year, especially for life 
insurers (Figures 2.13  – 2.15). Furthermore, the number 
of life insurance undertakings with SCR ratios below the 
100% threshold increased in comparison with the previ-
ous year from 1 in Q2 2018 to 4 in Q2 2019 mainly due 
to the low interest rate environment, while the number 
of non-life insurance undertakings with SCR ratios below 
100% threshold decreased from 9 in Q2 2018 to 7 in Q2 
16 The Gross Combined Ratio is the gross loss ratio plus the gross ex-
pense ratio. 
2019 (Figure 2.14). The median SCR ratio for life insurers 
is still the highest compared to non-life insurers and com-
posite undertakings. However, the SCR ratio differs sub-
stantially among countries (Figure 2.15).
The impact of the LTG and transitional measures var-
ies considerably across insurers and countries. The 
long term guarantees (LTG) and transitional measures 
were introduced in the Solvency II Directive to ensure an 
appropriate treatment of insurance products that include 
long-term guarantees and facilitate a smooth transition of 
the new regime.17 These measures can have a significant 
impact on the SCR ratio by allowing insurance undertak-
ings, among others, to apply a premium to the risk free 
interest rate used for discounting technical provions. The 
impact of applying these measures is highest in DE and 
the UK, where the distribution of SCR ratios is signicantly 
lower without LTG and transitional measures (Figure 2.16). 
While it is important to take the effect of LTG measures 
and transitional measures into account when comparing 
across insurers and countries, the LTG measures do pro-
vide a  potential financial stability cushion by reducing 
overall volatility.
17 Please refer to the annual LTG report for more information on the 
LTG and transitional measures. 
Figure 2.13: SCR ratio (in %; median, interquartile range and 10th and 90th percentile) in 2018
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Figure 2.15: SCR ratio by country (in %; median, interquartile range and 10th and 90th percentile)
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Figure 2.14: Intervals of SCR ratios for solo undertakings as of Q2 2019 by type of undertakings
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2.4. REGULATORY 
DEVELOPMENTS
On October 15th 2019, EIOPA launched a public con-
sultation on an Opinion that sets out technical advice 
for the 2020 review of Solvency II. The Opinion will re-
spond to the call for advice of the European Commission 
of 11 February 2019 on the 2020 review of Solvency II.18 
The call for advice comprises 19 separate topics. Broadly 
speaking, these can be divided into three parts.
 › The review of the LTG measures, where a number of 
different options are being consulted on, notably on 
extrapolation and on the volatility adjustment.
 › The potential introduction of new regulatory tools 
in the Solvency II framework, notably on macro-pru-
dential issues, recovery and resolution, and insur-
ance guarantee schemes. These new regulatory tools 
are considered thoroughly in the consultation.
 › Revisions to the existing Solvency II framework in-
cluding in relation to freedom of services and estab-
lishment; reporting and disclosure; and the solvency 
capital requirement.
18 The consultation covers all areas of the call for advice except insur-
ance guarantee schemes and most topics on reporting and disclosure, 
which have been consulted upon at an earlier stage.
The main specific considerations and proposals of this 
consultation are as follows:
 › Considerations to choose a  later starting point for 
the extrapolation of risk-free interest rates for the 
euro or to change the extrapolation method to take 
into account market information beyond the starting 
point.
 › Considerations to change the calculation of the vola-
tility adjustment to risk-free interest rates, in particu-
lar to address overshooting effects and to reflect the 
illiquidity of insurance liabilities.
 › The proposal to increase the calibration of the inter-
est rate risk sub-module in line with empirical evi-
dence, in particular the existence of negative interest 
rates. The proposal is consistent with the technical 
advice EIOPA provided on the Solvency Capital Re-
quirement standard formula in 2018.
 › The proposal to include macro-prudential tools in 
the Solvency II Directive.
 › The proposal to establish a  minimum harmonised 
and comprehensive recovery and resolution frame-
work for insurance.
The European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) pub-
lished on the 4th October 2019 a Joint Opinion on the 
risks of money laundering and terrorist financing af-
fecting the European Union’s financial sector. In this 
Joint Opinion, the ESAs identify and analyse current and 
Figure 2.16: SCR ratio by country with and without LTG and transitional measures (in %; median, interquartile range 
and 10th and 90th percentile)
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emerging money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/
TF) risks to which the EU’s financial sector is exposed. 
In particular, the ESAs have identified that the main 
cross-cutting risks arise from the withdrawal of the Unit-
ed Kingdom (UK) from the EU, new technologies, virtual 
currencies, legislative divergence and divergent supervi-
sory practices, weaknesses in internal controls, terrorist 
financing and de-risking; in order to mitigate these risks, 
the ESAs have proposed a number of potential actions for 
the Competent Authorities.
Following its advice to the European Commission on 
the integration of sustainability risks in Solvency II 
and the Insurance Distribution Directive on April 
2019, EIOPA has published on 30th September 2019 
an Opinion on Sustainability within Solvency II, which 
addresses the integration of climate-related risks in Sol-
vency II Pillar I  requirements. EIOPA found no current 
evidence to support a change in the calibration of capital 
requirements for “green” or “brown” assets. In the opin-
ion, EIOPA calls insurance and reinsurance undertakings 
to implement measures linked with climate change-re-
lated risks, especially in view of a substantial impact to 
their business strategy; in that respect, the importance 
of scenario analysis in the undertakings’ risk manage-
ment is highlighted. To increase the European market 
and citizens’ resilience to climate change, undertakings 
are called to consider the impact of their underwriting 
practices on the environment. EIOPA also supports the 
development of new insurance products, adjustments in 
the design and pricing of the products and the engage-
ment with public authorities, as part of the industry’s 
stewardship activity.
On the 15th July 2019 EIOPA submitted to the Europe-
an Commission draft amendments to the Implement-
ing technical standards (ITS) on reporting and the ITS 
on public disclosure. The proposed amendments are 
mainly intended to reflect the changes in the Solvency 
II Delegated Regulation by the Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) 2019/981 and the Commission Delegated 
Regulation 2018/1221 as regards the calculation of regula-
tory capital requirements for securitisations and simple, 
transparent and standardised securitisations held by in-
surance and reinsurance undertakings. A  more detailed 
review of the reporting and disclosure requirements will 
be part of the 2020 review of Solvency II.
On 18th June 2019 the Commission Delegated Regu-
lation (EU) 2019/981 amending the Solvency II Dele-
gated Regulation with respect to the calculation of 
the SCR for standard formula users was published. 
The new regulation includes the majority of the chang-
es proposed by EIOPA in its advice to the Commission in 
February 2018 with the exception of the proposed change 
regarding interest rate risk19. Most of the changes are ap-
plicable since July 2019, although changes to the calcula-
tion of the loss-absorbing capacity of deferred taxes and 
non-life and health premium and reserve risk will apply 
from 1 January 2020.
19 See “Regulatory developments” in pages 33-34 of EIOPA’s Financial 
Stability Report – June 2018
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3. THE EUROPEAN REINSURANCE SECTOR
The first half of 2019 has been marked by very benign 
catastrophe activity, with global insurance losses signifi-
cantly below long-term levels and the record losses ob-
served in 2017 and 2018. Coupled with the overall posi-
tive stock market developments, this has benefited the 
profitability and solvency position of the reinsurance 
sector, including in the EEA. Growth in global reinsurance 
capital has been supported mostly by traditional capital, 
although outstanding alternative reinsurance capital has 
also continued to grow despite concerns related to the 
potential effect of climate change on the occurrence of 
natural disasters. The issuance of new ILS instruments 
appears to be more moderate in 2019 compared to the 
previous two years however.
3.1. MARKET SHARE AND 
GROWTH
The overall share of reinsurance gross written premi-
ums (GWP) in total GWP in the EEA remains at 15% 
(Figure 3.1). Non-life reinsurance accepted represented 
10% of total GWP in the first half of 2019, while life re-
insurance obligations accounted for only 5%. In terms of 
year-on-year developments, overall reinsurance premi-
ums increased by a mere 2 percentage points to EUR 121 
bn, owing mostly to an increase in non-life proportional 
reinsurance. The latter increased from EUR 54 bn in the 
first half of 2018 to EUR 59 bn in the same period of 2019 
(Figure 3.2). This was driven primarily by higher premiums 
written for the motor liability, general liability and medical 
expense insurance lines of business (Figure 3.3).
The importance of the reinsurance business varies 
both at the EEA level and within each Member State. 
In some Member States reinsurance premiums account 
for a higher share of total premiums written in the coun-
try, but only for a smaller share of total reinsurance pre-
miums written in the EEA. Reinsurance premiums written 
in Malta and Bulgaria, for example, account for between 
40% to 50% of total premiums written in those countries, 
but for less than 5% of total reinsurance premiums written 
in the EEA (Figure 3.4). The same holds for Luxembourg 
and Liechtenstein, though the importance of reinsur-
ance at national level is lower than in the two countries 
mentioned before (around 25%). The share of reinsurance 
Figure 3.1: Gross Written Premiums in the EEA (in EUR 
billion and %)
Figure 3.2: Reinsurance Gross Written Premiums in the 
EEA (in EUR billion)
Non-life direct 
business,  
€ 277 , 35%
Life direct 
business,  
€ 396 , 50%
 
Life reinsurance 
obligations, € 44 , 5%
Non-life 
reinsurance 
accepted, 
€ 77 , 10%
Q2 2019,  € 6 
Q2 2019,  € 38 
Q2 2019,  € 59 
Q2 2019,  € 18 
Q2 2018,  € 5 
Q2 2018,  € 40 
Q2 2018,  € 54 
Q2 2018,  € 18 , 
€ - € 20 € 40 € 60 € 80 
Health 
reinsurance
Life reinsurance
Non-life non-
proportional
reinsurance 
Billions
Non-life 
proportional
reinsurance
Source: EIOPA QRS
Reference date: Q2 2019
Note: Year-to-date amounts. Non-life reinsurance accepted includes proportional and non-proportional reinsurance. Life reinsurance obligations include 
life reinsurance and health reinsurance.
FINANCIAL STABILIT Y REPORT
31
premiums written in Member States such as the United 
Kingdom, Germany and France, is very high when consid-
ering the whole EEA reinsurance market (between 20% 
and 35%), but relatively smaller at national level.
Globally, total reinsurance capital increased since the 
end of last year, driven mostly by traditional reinsur-
ance.20 Accordingly, global reinsurance capital reached 
USD 610 bn by June 2019, an increase of 4% since end-
20 Based on AON Benfield “Reinsurance Market Outlook September 
2019” and ARTEMIS (www.artemis.bm).
2018. Traditional reinsurance capital rose by 6% impelled 
mainly by strong earnings, reaching USD 517 bn. Alter-
native capital declined by 4% to USD 93 bn, reflecting 
the payment of losses and investor redemptions. While 
significant capital, especially regarding collateralised rein-
surance, remains confined because of prior losses, new 
capital continues to flow into the industry. Total outstand-
ing insurance-linked securities (ILS) amounted to USD 41 
bn by mid-November 2019, an all-time high in comparison 
with the prior full-year totals (Box 3.1). The amount of ILS 
issued until mid-November 2019 reached USD 8.5 bn, still 
lower than the last two years’ totals, but a high level in 
Figure 3.3: Gross Written Premiums for non-life proportional reinsurance by Line of Business (in EUR billion)
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Figure 3.4: Reinsurance gross written premiums by EEA Member State
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historical terms. Nevertheless, collateralised reinsurance 
transactions still represent the bulk of alternative capital 
in the market.
Despite the losses related to the natural disasters of 
autumn 2017, capital flows into the ILS-market con-
tinued in 2018 and 2019. On one hand, the relatively 
high yields, as well as the diversifying nature of the ca-
tastrophe-exposed business, might continue to attract 
investors. On the other hand, concerns such as the po-
tential impact of climate change on the frequency of 
natural catastrophes might hold back the development 
of the ILS-market via reduced demand from investors or 
pressures for higher returns in compensation for the per-
ceived increase in risk.21
21 “Global Reinsurance Guide 2020”, Fitch Ratings, September 2019.
BOX 3.1: CATASTROPHE BONDS AND INSURANCE-LINKED SECURITIES22
Catastrophe bonds (cat-bonds) are a type of insurance-linked security (ILS) that transfers catastrophe and natural 
disaster risks from a sponsor to capital market investors. Since first issued in the mid 1990’s, issued volumes of 
cat-bonds and ILS have been on a rise, from roughly USD 786 million in 1997 to USD 14 billion in 2018 (Figure 
B3.1). In November 2019, outstanding volumes of ILS, including cat-bonds, reached approximately USD 41 billion.
Figure B3.1 - Issued and outstanding volumes of cat-bonds and ILS risk capital (in USD)
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Source: www.Artemis.bm Deal Directory.
Note: Data for 2019 includes catastrophe bond issuance up to mid-November.
Three main parties are involved in the issuance of a cat-bond:
Sponsors
Sponsors include (re)insurance companies, large multinational corporations and even governments looking to 
spread the risk of loss from natural disasters. For sponsors, cat-bonds are a complement to traditional reinsur-
22 References for the content of this box include: www.Artemis.bm and “Catastrophe Bonds: Investing with Impact”, Man Institute, Rzym 
A. and Abou Zeid T., October 2018.
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ance. The bonds function similarly to a reinsurance contract structured over several years or a single year: when 
the natural catastrophe occurs and specific pre-defined conditions are met, the bond kicks in to absorb the 
financial impact up to a stated limit.
Triggers and perils
Some bonds are pegged to parametric triggers such as an index of weather or disaster conditions (e.g. earth-
quake magnitude or wind speed) under which catastrophe events above a certain severity trigger a payment to 
the sponsor. Other bonds use indemnity triggers, which specify a sliding scale of actual losses experienced by 
the sponsor, or industry loss triggers, which are activated when industry wide losses from an event breach a cer-
tain threshold. Indemnity triggers are by far the most common, accounting for 68% of outstanding cat-bonds and 
ILS (Figure B3.2). Industry loss triggers and parametric triggers account for 17% and 4% of all outstanding deals, 
respectively. A cat-bond may provide coverage for exposures to single events or multiple events over the course 
of a pre-defined period. Also, it can cover losses originating in single or multiple geographical locations (Figure 
B3.2).
Figure B3.2 – Outstanding cat-bonds and ILS by type of trigger and peril
Indemnity
68%
Industry loss index
17%
Unknown
6%
Parametric
4%Other 5%
Sources: www.Artemis.bm Deal Directory and EIOPA calculations.
Note: Outstanding volume as of mid-November 2019.
Investors
Generally, investors are pension funds, hedge funds and other private investors. Typically, interest in this type of 
financial instrument is due to its portfolio diversification benefits and attractive rates of return. First, non-finan-
cial risks covered by cat-bonds are generally thought to be highly uncorrelated with broader financial markets. 
Second, cat-bond yields are usually higher than more traditional investments – the annualised rate of return for 
cat-bonds since 2002 was 7.1%, which compares to 6.6% for equity and 4.7% for fixed income securities (Figure 
B3.3). Investors face a loss on their investment when a natural disaster occurs or the trigger conditions are met. In 
this situation, sponsors use that amount to cover their losses.
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Figure B3.3 - Relative performance of cat-bonds
Swiss Re Global Cat Bond Performance Index MSCI World Net Total Return Index
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Sources: Man Institute, Bloomberg and EIOPA calculations.
Notes: Equity performance measured by MSCI World Net Total Return Index (M1WO Index) and fixed income market performance measured by 
Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Total Return Index (LEGATRUU Index). Cat bond performance index calculated by Swiss Re (SRGLTRR Index). 
Reference date is 11 November 2019 and 5 January 2002=100.
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)
Cat-bonds are issued through securitisation. A SPV enters into an agreement with a sponsor, receiving premiums 
in exchange for providing coverage in case a predefined event happens. The coverage is ensured via the issuance 
of cat-bonds, which are bought by investors for a principal amount. The SPV can then invest the proceeds of the 
sale into the financial markets, with the returns being used to pay the investors’ coupon in combination with 
the premiums received from the sponsor. Upon the occurrence of a qualifying event, the SPV uses the invested 
amount to pay the sponsor under the terms of the reinsurance agreement and the investors may lose the entire 
principal amount. When no qualifying event occurs, the investors are repaid upon the term of the bond.
Figure B3.4 - Illustration of a possible set-up
Insurer SPV Investor
Cover
One-oﬀ payment
Coupon payment
Loss payment
0-71&"+
Repayment 
of capital
Inception of contract Loss event End of treaty period (no loss event)
Insurance 
premium
Pricing
The pricing of cat-bonds is not different from other financial instruments as it should take into consideration the 
projected cash flow. As each individual cat-bond holds its own features, they are subject to pricing resembling 
its individual characteristics.
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3.2. PROFITABILITY
In the first half of 2019, the global insurance indus-
try catastrophe losses were considerably below the 
long-term average. Insured losses decreased to USD 15 
bn, from USD 23 bn in the same period of the previous 
year, and fell below the 30-year average (USD 18 bn). The 
overall economic losses fell from USD 62 bn in the first 
half of 2018 to USD 42 bn in the same period of 2019 and 
are considerably lower than the 30-year average (USD 69 
bn).23
Stormy weather was most prominent in terms of both 
economic and insured losses. The costliest natural di-
saster event was a series of tornados and thunderstorms 
in the USA, which took place in the second half of May. 
The overall economic losses from this event amounted to 
USD 3.3 bn, of which USD 2.5 bn was insured (Table 3.1). 
Despite a very active stormy weather season in the USA, 
losses during the first half of 2019 amounted to nearly 
USD 7.5 bn, well below the USD 10 bn average over the 
past decade.
In comparison with 2017, the hurricane season has 
been relatively benign during the first half of 2019. 
This is despite hurricane Dorian in September, whose 
losses are estimated to range from USD 4 bn to USD 8.5 
bn, including also the impact to the Caribbean, the USA 
and Canada. In Europe, winter storm Eberhard was the 
most damaging event, causing overall economic losses 
around USD 1.2 bn and insured losses of USD 0.9 bn.
After severe losses in 2017 and 2018, reinsurance rates 
increased only moderately, mostly in the regions and 
23 Munich Re, NatCatSERVICE.
lines of business affected by catastrophe events. In-
vestors have continued to show appetite for insurance 
risk, leading to a  still considerable capital supply in the 
reinsurance market, especially for alternative reinsurance. 
Therefore, stable or slightly increasing prices are expected 
in the renewals ahead.
The combination of the continued capital-inflows, 
lack of catastrophe losses affecting the market and 
the sustained low interest rate environment is likely 
to increase the pressure on the profitability of the EEA 
reinsurance sector. The last renewals revealed that the 
competitive pressure in the reinsurance sector remains 
high. Moreover, the ability to release reserve from previ-
ous years appears to have been diminished, whereas the 
long-term business is getting less profitable or even un-
profitable, as the high interest rates calculated in previous 
rates are difficult to earn. Against this background, getting 
risk-adequate prices at the upcoming renewals is crucial 
for the reinsurance companies.
The return on investments of EEA reinsurance under-
takings has declined in 2018. The return on investments 
has decreased across the whole distiribution with the 
median ratio reaching 0.2% in 2018 after 0.6% in the pre-
vious year (Figure 3.5). Moreover, more negative returns 
were observed for the lower tail of the distribution, with 
the 10th percentile dropping from  -0.1% in 2017 to  -1.6% 
in 2018.
There has been an improvement in the combined ra-
tio for non-life non-proportional reinsurance, possibly 
reflecting the lower catastrophe losses in the first half 
of the year. Median gross combined ratios for EEA rein-
surers across all lines of business have remained broadly 
Table 3.1: The five largest natural catastrophes in the first half of 2019, ranked by insured losses
Date Event Region Overall losses 
(USD bn)
Insured losses 
(USD bn)
17-31.5.2019 Tornado, severe storm USA 3.3 2.5
23-26.2.2019 Severe storm, Tornado USA, Canada 1.6 1.1
23-25.3.2019 Severe storm USA 1.3 1.0
26.1-10.2.2019 Flood Australia 1.9 0.9
9-11.3.2019 Winter Storm Eberhard Europe 1.2 0.9
Source: Munich Re, NatCatSERVICE.
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stable, but the upper tail of the distribution of the com-
bined ratio for non-proportional reinsurance declined 
by roughly 30 percentage points, to 121% (Figures 3.6 to 
3.8). This potentially reflects the lower amount of insured 
losses from natural catastrophes in the first half of 2019 
compared to the same period of 2018.
3.3. SOLVENCY
Median solvency positions of the reinsurance under-
takings operating in the EEA improved during the 
first half of 2019, standing at the highest level since 
Figure 3.5: Return on investments of EEA reinsurance 
undertakings (in %; median, interquartile range and 
10th and 90th percentile)
Figure 3.6: Gross Combined Ratio for non-life direct 
business and accepted proportional reinsurance of EEA 
reinsurance undertakings (in %; median, interquartile 
range and 10th and 90th percentile)
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Figure 3.7: Gross Combined Ratio for accepted 
non-proportional reinsurance of EEA reinsurance un-
dertakings (in %; median, interquartile range and 10th 
and 90th percentile)
Figure 3.8: Gross Combined Ratio for life reinsurance 
obligations of EEA reinsurance undertakings (in %; me-
dian, interquartile range and 10th and 90th percentile)
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end-2017. The median solvency ratio increased by 20 per-
centage points since Q4 2017 and by 10 percentage points 
since Q4 2018, to 229% in Q2 2019 (Figure 3.9). Overall, 
reinsurance companies seem to have remained resilient 
to the significant catastrophe losses observed in the last 
two years. Moreover, the interquartile range of the distri-
bution has expanded upwards, indicating a larger propor-
tion of reinsurance undertakings with higher SCR ratios. 
The lower level of catastrophe losses in the first half of 
the year coupled with positive developments in the stock 
markets should have contributed to the improvement in 
reinsurers’ capital positions.24
24 “Global Reinsurance Guide 2020”, Fitch Ratings, September 2019.
Figure 3.9: Solvency ratio of EEA reinsurance undertakings (in %; median, interquartile range and 10th and 90th per-
centile)
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4. THE EUROPEAN PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS 
SECTOR
In 2018, the private pension fund sector experienced 
a  constantly worsening economic environment, tak-
ing its toll on both the financial situation of DB pen-
sion funds and on the accumulated savings of mem-
bers and beneficiaries in DC funds. The persistently 
low interest environment affects the current values of DB 
pension obligations due to low discount rates. In almost 
all Member States, cover ratios (ratio of assets covering 
the pension obligations) decreased and in UK, IS and PT 
fell below the 100%, with the outlook continuing to look 
challenging in light of the slowdown in the global econo-
my and the pressure on the interest rates.
Asset values impaired significantly towards the end 
of 2018, wiping off substantial values in equity in-
vestments. Depending on the investment allocation, 
which has remained relatively stable over the last couple 
of years, Member States’ private pension funds were af-
fected in different ways: in some Member States almost 
one third of the investments are in equity, whereas in ag-
gregate EEA terms 52% of the investments are made in 
bonds – of which the vast majority is in sovereign bonds. 
An increase in asset values by +1.5% can be observed at 
aggregate EEA level. However, severe losses of -6%, -8% 
and up to one third of the total asset values can be seen 
in some Member States in 2018.
EIOPA can start to better monitor and more deeply 
assess potential negative impacts of macroeconomic 
developments on the IORP sector and financial stabil-
ity through its improved reporting data from 2020. In 
order to improve its capabilities to analyse the European 
private pension fund sector, in 2018 EIOPA decided on an 
improved, common set of reporting requirements.25 The 
new framework will allow EIOPA to effectively monitor 
market developments in the area of occupational pension 
funds as well as to undertake in-depth economic analyses.
4.1. MARKET GROWTH OF 
THE OCCUPATIONAL PRIVATE 
PENSION FUND SECTOR
The UK26 and the Netherlands continue to be the 
largest European private pension sectors with IORPs 
holding more than 80% of the assets under manage-
ment (EUR 3,141 bn) in the European occupational 
private pensions sector. (Table 4.1). The size of the na-
tional private pension sector is primarily determined by 
its relative role in the national social security and pension 
framework.
25 In April 2018, EIOPA published its decision at: (https://eiopa.euro-
pa.eu/Pages/News/EIOPA-is-significantly-enhancing-European-pen-
sions-statistics.aspx)
26 This covers only the DB sector of the UK IORPs, the percentage 
would be significantly higher if the DC sector could have been included.
Table 4.1: Total assets per country as a share of total assets reported for 2018
UK NL DE IT IE NO ES BE IS AT SE PT RO
46.2% 35.4% 6.3% 3.5% 2.7% 0.91% 0.90% 0.82% 0.74% 0.57% 0.49% 0.47% 0,28%
DK LI FI SI LU SK GR LV PL HR MT BG Total
0.21% 0,17% 0.11% 0.07% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04% 0,01 0.01% 0.003% 0.0005% 0.0002% 100%
Source: EIOPA
Note: Figure for UK excludes DC schemes
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With in total EUR 3,848 bn of assets under manage-
ment in the European private pension funds, total 
assets increased by only +1,5 per cent for the EEA in 
2018 – compared to an increase of +6 per cent in 2017 
(Figure 4.1). Whereas in most countries the increase was 
relatively moderate, for example: IT +2%, DE +4% or low: 
NL +0.2%, some were also very negative: IE -34.
The penetration rate27 remained broadly unchanged in 
2018, both for the EEA (23%) and the euro area (17%). 
This ratio gives an indication of the relative wealth ac-
cumulated by the sector. It has to be noted that there is 
large heterogeneity across countries (Figure 4.2), which is 
determined by the diverse size of private pension funds 
and corresponding savings in the Member States.
27 The size of the occupational pension fund sector with respect to the 
GDP
Figure 4.1: Total Assets (in EUR bn)
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Figure 4.1 is based on data received by 25 countries (EEA) and 15 countries (euro area) which provided total assets for 2017. The category “other” includes all 
countries except UK and NL.
Figure 4.2 Penetration rate for GR, HR, PL, MT and BG is lower than 1 per cent. For RO, the data refers to 1st Pillar bis and 3rd Pillar private pension 
schemes only
Source: EIOPA QRS
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4.2. INVESTMENT ALLOCATION 
AND PERFORMANCE
In aggregate terms, the investment allocation of pri-
vate pension funds remained almost unchanged in 
recent years (Figure 4.3). Debt instruments account 
for the biggest aggregate share (52% in 2018) in private 
pension funds’ investment assets. This share has further 
increased in 2018 compared to 2017 (50% in 2018), argu-
ably due to the significantly lower market values of equity 
investments experienced at the end of 2018. Looking at 
the types of debt investments of private pension funds 
in the EEA, the significant portion of 64% in sovereign 
bonds remained unchanged since 2016. The rest of 36% is 
almost equally split between corporate and other bonds. 
The aggregate equity exposure in the private pension sec-
tor is relatively high in some Member States, amounting 
to around one third of the investment portfolio (UK: 27%, 
NL: 34%, AT: 32%, SE: 34%; Figure 4.5). Impairments in the 
equity investments have brought down the relative share 
in equity investments by 2% in the EEA.
Investment allocations across countries remained 
very heterogeneous in 2018 (Figure 4.5). Whilst direct 
investments in bonds and equity cover almost 80% of 
the private pension funds’ investments on aggregate, the 
shares within the individual countries vary substantially 
across the countries of the sample. Interesting is the rel-
ative share of ‘other assets’ in the sample (around 20% 
in DE, IE, AT, DK; over 30% in IT, LU and MT). Within the 
category ‘other assets’ the highest proportions of invest-
ments can be found in loans and real estate as well as 
unallocated assets. The investments in derivatives is rela-
tively low in market values.28
The asset-weighted ROA for the EEA decreased sig-
nificantly in 2018 compared to the previous year. The 
average ROA (Figure 4.7) in 2018 (un-weighted  -1.0%, 
weighted 0.22%) substantially decreased compared to 
2017 (un-weighted 4.9%, weighted 3.4%). The ROA went 
negative in most countries, in particular those with rel-
atively high equity exposures, either directly or through 
UCITS (NL -1.22%, BE -2.7%, AT -5%, SK -4.7%).
28 It should be noted that the market value of derivatives is typical-
ly zero when the contract is entered into and changes in responses to 
changes in the underlying over time. EIOPA currently does not receive 
data on the notional amounts outstanding. 
Figure 4.3: Investment Allocation for 2016 to 2018  
(in %)
Figure 4.4: Bond investments breakdown for 2016 to 
2018 (in %)
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Note: UCITS stands for Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities. For all variable definitions, please refer to the statistical annex 
published at: https://eiopa.europa.eu/financial-stability-crisis-prevention/financial-stability/statistics.
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Figure 4.5: Investment Allocation per country for 2018 (in %)
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Note: “Other” includes: Derivatives, loans, reinsured technical provisions, other investments and other assets. For all variable definitions please refer to the 
statistical annex published at: https://eiopa.europa.eu/financial-stability-crisis-prevention/financial-stability/statistics. The UK figure used for the calculations of 
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Figure 4.6: Other investments breakdown per country for 2018 (in %)
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Source: EIOPA; Notes:
(1) ”Other investments” includes: Deposits with credit institutions, cash, other short term investments or derivatives. “Other assets” includes the assets that are 
not shown under investments. 
(2) Figure 4.6 does not include PL.
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4.3. FUNDING RATIOS AND 
MEMBERSHIP DEVELOPMENTS
The asset-weighted cover ratio for DB schemes slight-
ly increased in 2018.29 Overall, the asset-weighted aver-
age cover ratio increased from 101% in 2017 to 102% in 
2018, whereas the un-weighted average coverage ratio 
decreased from 113% in 2017 to 111% in 2018. The cover 
ratio shows to which extent the private pension funds’ 
technical provisions are covered by investment assets. 
The cover ratio can be based on market consistent val-
uations – and thus change in response to changes in the 
economic environment  - or other valuation metrics de-
pending on the national valuation framework and pruden-
29 Cover ratio (%) is defined as net assets covering technical provisions 
divided by technical provisions.
tial regime for private pension funds in each country. The 
cover ratio is also not a  measure of national prudential 
regimes or required funding ratios, and hence, do not 
necessarily require direct supervisory intervention when 
breached. Cover ratios close to or below 100 per cent re-
main a  concern for the sectors, as the ‘buffer’ for crisis 
or continued poor asset performance is small. If private 
pension funds reach the point of underfunding, there are 
national-specific mitigating tools. In some countries, for 
example the UK, the sponsoring undertaking will have to 
finance the shortfall and if that is insufficient, there are 
pension protection schemes. In other countries, the pri-
vate pension funds can cut their obligations by cutting 
the benefit payments to beneficiaries.
Figure 4.7: Rate of return on assets (ROA) in %
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(1) Figure 4.7 does not include HU.
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The total population of members of private pension 
funds in the EEA increased by 6 per cent, driven by 
a strong increase in active membership in DC schemes 
by in total 11%. (Figure 4.10) In terms of number of per-
sons contributing and covered by private pension funds in 
the EEA, the shift in significance from DB to DC pensions 
can be clearly evidenced. The overall increase in active 
membership in EEA DC pension funds is 11% compared 
to 2017, which is reflected in very high growth rates in 
some countries +18% for UK, +44% for SI and +33% for 
HR. At the same time, active membership in the DB sec-
tor slightly increased in 2018 (by 2% compared to 2017), 
which can be linked to a stable, small increase in NL and 
IS. For most other EEA countries, the overall membership 
and in particular the active membership in DB pension 
funds decreased significantly, due to DB schemes being 
closed to new members and/or new contributions: com-
pared to 2017 the active membership in DB schemes de-
creased, for example, in UK by  -18%, DK by  -11% and FI 
by  -10%. Whilst the DC sectors in most Member States 
are still relatively young with still limited values of assets 
under management, the direct exposure of members of 
DC funds to investment risks will increasingly require 
monitoring to understand better the effects of DC funds’ 
investment allocations and investment behaviour on fi-
nancial markets and financial stability.
Figure 4.8: Cover ratios (in %)
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(1) Cover ratios refer to DB schemes. Countries with predominant pure DC schemes are not included in the chart and in the average calculations.
(2) Both the weighted and un-weighted averages for the cover ratio were calculated on the basis of the 16 countries depicted in the chart. The weighting was 
based on total assets.
(3) Due to different calculation methods and legislation, the reported cover ratios are not comparable across jurisdictions.
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BOX 4.1: DEVELOPMENTS IN CROSS-BORDER IOPRS
Directive 2003/41/EC (IORP Directive) has enabled IORPs to take advantage of the internal market by accept-
ing sponsorship and managing an occupational pension scheme from a company located in another Member 
State since 2005. In absence of a  fully harmonised framework, such cross-border activities follow the Social 
and Labour Law (SLL) of the “host Member States” and the prudential rules of the “Home Member State” in 
which the IORP is established. Operating a cross-border activity may lead to achieve economies of scale by 
centralising the management of, for example, various occupational pension schemes of a company operating in 
several Member States in a single IORP (i.e. cross-border IORP). Prior to the IORP Directive, IORPs would tend 
to operate exclusively in the Member State in which they were established.
In line with the status quo over the last years30, one could not observe any significant changes in the number of 
active or authorised cross-border IORPs in 2018. Cross-border IORPs continue to remain clustered geographi-
cally, carrying out cross-border activities from eight31 home Member States to a total of 1632 host Member States.
Cross-border activities have to be fully funded at all times, see Article 16(3) of the IORP Directive33. EIOPA ob-
served that in the vast majority of Member States the fully funded requirement applies to the whole IORP rath-
30 Eiopa Market Development Report 2017 p.19
31 AT, BE, DE, IE, LU, LI, MT, UK
32 UK, IE, NL, DE, LU, BE, AT, CY, LI, ES, HU, LT, MT, PT, GR, and PL
33 Article 16 (3) of the IORP Directive requires that the technical provisions of a cross-border IORP to be fully funded at all times in respect 
of the total range of pension schemes operated. If these conditions are not met, the competent authorities of the home Member State shall 
intervene in accordance with Article 14 of the IORP Directive. Furthermore, to comply with the requirement of “fully funded at all times”, the 
home Member State may require ring-fencing of the assets and liabilities.
Figure 4.9: Active members (in thousands) Figure 4.10: DB/HY and DC breakdown of active mem-
bers (in per cent)
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Note: Figure 4.10 does not include SE and IS. BG, DK, FI, GR, HR, HU, LI, LU, MT and PL have below 100 thousand active members. Figure 4.9 does not 
include AT, IS, and SE.
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er than specifically to the cross-border activity. Further, in the majority of home Member States, a recovery plan 
for the cross-border IORP may be set up if the IORP does not meet the requirement of fully-funded at all times. 
Subject to the Member States’ specificities, the recovery period may range between 3 months and 10 years. 
Recovery measures to mitigate underfunding may include increasing contributions or reduction of benefits.
Overall cross-border DB assets over liabilities have remained relatively stable, although a significant decrease 
can be observed LI and LU in 2018. By contrast, a substantial increase can been seen for UK, in line with the drop 
in the cross border IORPs number of members (Table B.4.1.). 
Figure B.4.1: Cross border DB assets over liabilities (in %)
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111%
105%
114% 109%
72%
90%
113%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
Total BE DE IE LI LU UK
Source: EIOPA
Table B.4.1: Cross border IORPs - Total assets per 
country (in EUR mil)
2016 2017 2018
BE 5,080 8,865 8,902
DE 34,564 36,010 36,215
IE 13,969 14,567 14,443
LI 479 507 636
LU 815 856 849
MT 2.00 2.60 2.90
UK 10,263 8,770 8,175
Total 65,171 69,578 69,223
Source: EIOPA
Note: For BE, DE, LI and UK assets include domestic activities.
Table B.4.2: Cross border IORPs - Nr. of members 
2016 2017 2018
BE 20,198 25,045 25,455
DE 448,884 447,819 447,779
IE 56,360 56,360 56,360
LI 1,624 1,653 2,102
LU 10,041 11,202 11,477
MT 158.00 193.00 241.00
UK 120,278 61,559 55,520
Total 624,511 602,508 592,080
Source: EIOPA
Note: LU includes total number of members and beneficiaries & UK 
total scheme membership. 
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5. RISK ASSESSMENT
5.1. QUALITATIVE RISK 
ASSESSMENT
EIOPA conducts twice a year a bottom-up survey among 
national supervisors to determine the key risks and chal-
lenges for the European insurance and pension fund sec-
tors, based on their probability and potential impact.
The EIOPA qualitative Autumn 2019 Survey34 reveals 
that low interest rates remain the main risks for both 
34 The survey was carried out in August 2019 and only reflects market 
developments until then. Therefore, the survey does not reflect concerns 
over the recent market developments such as sovereign spreads widen-
ing for some countries.
the insurance and pension fund sectors (Figure 5.1 and 
Figure 5.2). Equity risks also remain prevalent, ranking as 
the 3rd and 2nd biggest risk for the insurance and pension 
funds sectors respectively. The cyber risk category is now 
rank as the 2nd biggest risk for the insurance sector, as 
insurers need to adapt their business models to this new 
type of risk both from an operational risk perspective and 
an underwriting perspective. Geopolitical risks have be-
come more significant for both markets, along with Mac-
ro risks, which continue to be present in the insurance 
and pension fund sectors, partially due to concerns over 
Figure 5.1: Risk assessment for the insurance sector Figure 5.2: Risk assessment for the pension funds 
sector
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Source: Qualitative EIOPA Autumn 2019 Survey
Note: Based on the responses received. Risks are ranked according to probability of materialisation (from 1 indicating low probability to 4 indicating high 
probability) and the impact (1 indicating low impact and 4 indicating high impact). The figure shows the aggregation (i.e. probability times impact) of the 
average scores assigned to each risk. The results were subsequently normalised on a scale from 0 to 100.
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protectionism, trade tensions, debt sustainability, sudden 
increase in risk premia and uncertainty relating to the po-
tential future post-Brexit landscape.
For the pension fund sector, ALM risks have remained un-
changed compared to Spring 2019. Cyber risks have risen 
to the 6th biggest risk facing pension funds now, while cred-
it risk (for both sovereigns and financials) and longetivity 
risk are ranked in lower positions compared to Spring 2019.
The survey further suggests that all the risks are ex-
pected to increase over the coming year (Figure 5.3). The 
increased risk of the low for long interest rate environment 
is in line with the observed market developments, particu-
lary after the ECB’s announcement of renewed monetary 
easing in September 2019. The significant expected raise of 
cyber, property, equity, macro and geopolitical risks in the 
following year is also in line with the observed market de-
velopments highlighted in Chapter 1, indicating increased 
geopolitical uncertainty, trade tensions, stretched valua-
tions in equity and real estate markets and more frequent 
and sophisticated cyber attacks which could all potentially 
affect the financial position of insurers and pension funds. 
On the other hand, ALM risks and Credit risk for financials 
are expected to increase in the coming year, while in the 
last survey in Spring 2019 the expectations were following 
the opposite direction.
Although cyber risk is ranking as one of the top risks 
and expected to increase in the following year, many 
jurisdictions also see cyber-related insurance activi-
ties as a growth opportunity. The rapid pace of techno-
logical innovation and digitalisation is a challenge for the 
insurance market and insurers need to be able to adapt 
their business models to this challenging environment, 
nonetheless from a  profitability perspective, increased 
digitalisation may offer significant cost-saving and reve-
nue-increasing opportunities for insurance companies. 
The increase of awareness of cyber-risk and higher vul-
nerability to cyber threats among undertakings due to 
the increased adoption of digital technologies could drive 
a growth in cyber insurance underwriting.
The survey shows the exposure of an sudden correc-
tion of the risk premia significantly differs across EU 
countries. In the event of a sudden correction in the risk 
premia, insurance undertakings and pension funds with 
ample exposure to bonds and real estate, could suffer sig-
nificant asset value variations that could lead to forced 
asset sales and potentially amplify the original shock to 
asset prices in less liquid markets. Some juridictions, how-
ever, confirm the limited exposure to this risk due to the 
low holding of fixed income instruments and well diversi-
fied portfolios.
The survey further indicates that national authorities 
expect the increase of investments in alternative as-
set classes and more illiquid assets. Conversely, hold-
ings of governement bonds are expected to decrease in 
favour of corporate bonds within the next 12 months. 
Overall this might indicate potential search for yield be-
haviour and a shift towards more illiquid assets continues 
throughout numerous EU jurisdictions (Figure 5.4). Prop-
erty investments – through for instance mortgages and 
Figure 5.3. Supervisory risk assessment for insurance and pension funds - expected future development
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Source: Qualitative EIOPA Autumn 2019 Survey
Note: Based on the responses received. EIOPA members indicated their expectation for the future development of these risks. Scores were provided in the 
range -2 indicating considerable decrease and +2 indicating considerable increase.
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infrastructure investment - are also expected to increase 
in some jurisdictions, for both insurers and pension funds. 
A potential downturn of real estate markets could there-
fore also affect the soundness of the insurance and pen-
sion fund sectors.
5.2. QUANTITATIVE RISK 
ASSESSMENT EUROPEAN 
INSURANCE SECTOR
This section further assesses the key risks and vulnerabil-
ities for the European insurance sector identified in this 
report. A detailed breakdown of the investment portfolio 
and asset allocation is provided with a  focus on specif-
ic country exposures and interconnectedness with the 
banking sector. The chapter also analyses in more detail 
the implications of the current low yield environment for 
insurers.
INVESTMENTS
Insurance companies’ investments remain broadly 
stable, with a  slight move towards less liquid invest-
ment. Government and corporate bonds continue to 
make up the majority of the investment portfolio, with 
only a  slight movement towards more non-tradition-
al investment instruments such as unlisted equity and 
mortgage and loans (Figure 5.5). Life insurers in partic-
ular rely on fixed-income assets, due to the importance 
of asset-liability matching of their long-term obligations 
(Figure 5.4 and 5.5). At the same time, the high shares of 
fixed-income investments could give rise to significant 
reinvestment risk in the current low yield environment, 
in case the maturing fixed-income securities can only be 
replaced by lower yielding fixed-income securities for the 
same credit quality.
Insurers’ investment portfolios at country level con-
tinue to be heterogeneous across countries (Figure 
5.6). Insurers from HU, LT and RO invest more than two 
thirds of their portfolio in government bonds while insur-
ers from IS, NO and SE hold other types of investments, 
such as equity and corporate bonds. SE insurers are the 
largest investors in equity, closely followed by IE and DK 
insurers, whereas NL insurers invest more than a quarter 
of their assets in mortgages and loans. Even though the 
total investment to corporate bonds have remained con-
stant over the last year, the three largest investors, EE, 
LU & NO have significantly increased their exposures to 
corporate bonds.
The overall credit quality of the bond portfolio is broad-
ly satisfactory, although slight changes are observed 
in 2018 (Figure 5.7). The vast majority of bonds held by 
European insurers are investment grade, with most rated 
as CQS1 (AA). However, the share of CQS2 has increased 
in the first half of 2019, and significant differences can be 
observed for insurers across countries (Figure 5.8).
Figure 5.4. Supervisory assessment on expected change on investment exposures in the coming 12 months
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Source: Qualitative EIOPA Autumn 2019 Survey
Note: Based on the responses received. EIOPA members indicated their expectation for the future movements of each exposure. The aggregate level is ranked 
from 0 indicating considerable decrease to 100 indicating considerable increase.
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Figure 5.5: Investment split in Q2 2019 compared to Q4 2018, Q4 2017 and Q4 2016
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Source: EIOPA Quarterly Solo
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Note: Look-through approach applied. Assets held for unit-linked business are excluded. Equities include holdings in related undertakings.
Figure 5.6: Investment split in Q2 2019 by type of undertaking
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Figure 5.7: Investment split at country level 
Government 
bonds
Corporate 
bonds
Equity
Cash and 
deposits
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and loans
Property Other
EU/EEA 31.4% 32.2% 15.1% 5.2% 5.7% 2.2% 8.2%
AUSTRIA 25.0% 31.3% 20.0% 4.1% 3.9% 7.1% 8.7%
BELGIUM 48.1% 22.3% 8.1% 2.7% 12.2% 2.7% 4.0%
BULGARIA 50.2% 15.3% 11.2% 10.8% 6.5% 2.5% 3.6%
CROATIA 64.1% 4.5% 8.3% 5.6% 7.2% 7.8% 2.5%
CYPRUS 18.5% 36.1% 11.8% 15.6% 2.9% 6.0% 9.1%
CZECH 
REPUBLIC
50.8% 17.6% 8.5% 7.6% 8.5% 0.4% 6.6%
DENMARK 18.0% 39.7% 27.0% 3.1% 3.8% 2.7% 5.6%
ESTONIA 27.0% 53.1% 1.5% 14.0% 0.7% 0.0% 3.7%
FINLAND 9.6% 33.3% 6.9% 7.5% 4.5% 5.6% 32.5%
FRANCE 33.4% 35.1% 12.3% 3.4% 1.9% 2.3% 11.6%
GERMANY 25.3% 35.8% 21.5% 4.1% 5.5% 2.1% 5.8%
GREECE 61.8% 20.6% 4.7% 6.6% 0.8% 1.9% 3.6%
HUNGARY 81.2% 3.0% 4.7% 4.8% 0.4% 0.1% 5.8%
ICELAND 26.2% 19.3% 28.8% 6.0% 2.7% 1.5% 15.4%
IRELAND 27.7% 32.6% 7.1% 19.3% 5.0% 1.3% 6.9%
ITALY 52.6% 21.1% 12.5% 2.1% 1.3% 1.0% 9.4%
LATVIA 59.9% 17.5% 2.5% 13.5% 2.1% 0.9% 3.5%
LIECHTENSTEIN 26.2% 39.5% 7.4% 19.3% 2.4% 0.1% 5.0%
LITHUANIA 70.8% 14.8% 1.6% 6.5% 1.1% 0.8% 4.2%
LUXEMBOURG 28.4% 41.5% 8.0% 11.8% 4.8% 0.8% 4.7%
MALTA 33.6% 20.9% 8.9% 18.5% 5.3% 1.8% 11.0%
NETHERLANDS 35.2% 17.2% 6.1% 4.5% 26.1% 1.8% 9.1%
NORWAY 13.0% 46.5% 22.9% 2.6% 10.2% 0.5% 4.3%
POLAND 56.6% 7.6% 20.9% 3.7% 3.9% 0.3% 7.1%
PORTUGAL 44.9% 27.7% 8.8% 11.9% 1.1% 2.2% 3.4%
ROMANIA 68.2% 7.7% 5.8% 14.7% 1.0% 1.8% 0.8%
SLOVAKIA 45.3% 35.9% 5.6% 6.9% 1.7% 0.5% 4.0%
SLOVENIA 37.5% 33.7% 18.2% 5.3% 0.9% 1.4% 3.0%
SPAIN 58.6% 20.7% 5.7% 7.7% 0.8% 2.4% 4.0%
SWEDEN 14.5% 31.9% 33.2% 4.3% 3.8% 3.1% 9.1%
UNITED 
KINGDOM
19.2% 36.0% 12.9% 10.4% 10.8% 2.3% 8.5%
Source: EIOPA Quarterly Solo
Reference date: Q2 2019
Note: Red - above 90th percentile, Blue - below 10th percentile; look-through approach applied, except for FI. Other investments include collective investment 
undertakings, structured notes, collateralised securities and other investments not classified in the mentioned categories. Assets held for unit-linked business 
are excluded. The high share of Other investments for FI is mainly driven by investments in collective investment undertakings for which look-through was not 
possible.
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Insurers also continue to show significant home bias 
for government bonds investments, while direct ex-
posures of the European insurance sector towards 
emerging markets are limited. In order to assess the risk 
of a sudden reassessment of risk premia, it is important to 
analyse investment exposures from a geographical point 
Figure 5.8: Credit quality of bond portfolio
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Note: Government and corporate bond portfolios combined. Assets held for unit-linked are included. NIG stands for Non-Investment Grade.
Figure 5.9: Credit quality of bond portfolio across countries
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of view. In particular, the government bonds holdings of 
insurers continue to show significant home bias and has 
slightly increased in the first half of 2019, which is par-
ticularly relevant should concerns over debt sustainability 
resurface in the EU (Figure 5.9-5.10). A significant home 
bias poses a higher concentration risk in affected coun-
tries, but could also help to contain potential contagion 
at EU level.
Additionally, insurers’ exposures towards emerging mar-
kets that are currently one of sources of a potential insta-
bility are relatively limited for most countries. However, 
the exposure to emerging markets has increased in the 
first half of 2019 and insurers from CY, NO and DK seem 
to have larger investments in this markets compared to 
insurers from other EU/EEA countries. In addition, inter-
connectedness with banks exposed to emerging markets 
and second-round effects could still have an impact on 
insurers with limited direct exposure towards emerging 
markets, in case of economic distress.
The overall corporate bonds exposures of the European 
insurers seems to be also oriented towards home bias be-
haviour but to a lesser extent when comparing to govern-
ment bonds (Figure 5.11 - 5.12). In this case, the exposures 
towards emerging markets is higher, with insurers from 
PT allocating almost a quarter of their corporates bonds 
portfolio to companies from emerging markets. On aver-
age, EU/EEA insurers have 6% of their corporate bonds 
portfolio allocated in emerging markets’ firms.
Despite limited exposures of European insurers to-
wards equity emerging markets (4.8%), the insurance 
sector may still be vulnerable to a potential pronounced 
equity market distress. Concerns of a  global economic 
slowdown following trade tensions between the US and 
China remain. This could serve as an additional transmis-
sion channel of risks from emerging markets to the Europe-
an insurance sector. Again, while direct exposures toward 
emerging markets are very limited for most countries as 
well as at a European level (Figure 5.13 and 5.14), uncertain-
ty, political instability and interconnectedness could have 
negative effects on equity prices. This would have a note-
worthy impact on insurance sectors in countries with sub-
stantial exposures to equities (Figure 5.6).
Figure 5.10: Home biased behaviour for insurers’ holdings of government bonds
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Source: EIOPA Quarterly Solo
Reference Date: Q2 2019
Note: Look-through approach applied. Assets held for unit-linked business are included.
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Figure 5.11: Overall government bonds exposures of the European insurers to different countries
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Source: EIOPA Quarterly Solo
Note: Look-through approach applied. Assets held for unit-linked business are included.
Figure 5.12: Home biased behaviour for insurers’ holdings of corporate bonds
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Source: EIOPA Quarterly Solo
Reference Date: Q2 2019
Note: Look-through approach applied. Assets held for unit-linked business are included.
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Figure 5.13: Overall corporate bonds exposures of the European insurers to different countries
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Source: EIOPA Quarterly Solo
Note: Look-through approach applied. Assets held for unit-linked business are included.
Figure 5.14: Home biased behaviour for insurers’ equity investments in Q2 2019
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
 Iceland
 Poland
 Romania
 Bulgaria
 Slovenia
 Slovakia
 Latvia
 France
 Greece
 Hungary
 Czechia
 Spain
 Austria
 Cyprus
 Germany
 Croatia
 Finland
 Netherlands
 Sweden
 Portugal
 Belgium
 Liechtenstein
 Denmark
 Italy
 Norway
 Estonia
 United Kingdom
 Malta
 Luxembourg
 Lithuania
 Ireland
 Home bias
Canada
Other EU/EEA countries
Japan
 EU institutions
Supranational issuers
USA
Emerging markets
Switzerland
Not reported
Source: EIOPA Quarterly Solo
Reference Date: Q2 2019
Note: Look-through approach applied. Assets held for unit-linked business are included.
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BOX 5.2: KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF INDEX LINKED AND UNIT-LINKED BUSINESS
Total assets managed under UL&IL business gradually increased at European level since 2016. Based on 
2019 Q2 data,the overall portfolio amount to EUR 2,773 bn. The management of the investments under the CIUs 
frequently goes beyond insurers’ remits; hence, it is logical to expect differences in the investment practices 
adopted for the direct investments. At European level, investment decisions related to 70 to 80 percent of the 
UL&IL assets portfolios are taken by investments funds managers with potentially different investment policies 
than insurers. UL&IL policyholders bear the investment risk and, to a certain extent, they are usually empowered 
to steer the investment policies; for this reason, their investment behaviour is likely to differ from the rest of 
policyholders. As suc, UL&IL policyholders’ preferences may influence the composition of the assets portfolios as 
well as the more or less long-term oriented management of the investments.
Evidence based on the QRT asset data shows that direct investments from UL&IL business differ in 
terms of asset class allocation and in terms of dynamism in rebalancing the assets portfolio. EIOPA seeks 
to understand how the characteristics of the UL&IL business affects the ability of insurers to hold assets to ma-
turity or to keep long-term oriented investment strategies or, to the contrary, they engage in more active trading. 
Analysing the rebalancing of direct investments in bonds and equities, based on quarter on quarter evolution 
of those portfolios rebalancing from the third quarter of 2016 until the second quarter of 201935, it emerges that 
life companies are trading more actively unit-linked than other portfolios. On average, each quarter 94% of the 
Non-UL&IL initial portfolio of direct investments is usually kept, while this share is lower for UL&IL portfolios 
(91%).
35 For further details on the methodology please refer to section 4.1.1 of the Feedback request for the illiquid liability project https://
eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Consultations/EIOPA-PSC-18_093_Request_for_Feedback_Illiquid%20Liabilities.pdf#search=REQUEST%20
FOR%20FEEDBACK%20ILLIQUID%20Liabilities 
Figure 5.15: Overall equity exposures of the European insurers to different countries
75.3%
74.9%
0.0%
0.0%
13.9%
14.4%
2.0%
2.0%
0.7%
0.8%
2.4%
2.4%
0.001%
0.001%
4.8%
4.8%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2018-Q4
2019-Q2
 EU/EEA countries
Japan
EU institutions
Supranational issuers
USA
Emerging markets
 CH
Not reported
Canada
Source: EIOPA Quarterly Solo
Note: Look-through approach applied. Assets held for unit-linked business are included.
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Overall, the assets class composition observed for UL&IL portfolios at European level is quite stable 
over time in terms of the assets classes and different from other business types. UL&IL portfolios exhibit 
a significantly larger share of participations in assets funds and much smaller proportion of direct investments, 
particularly in bonds (either corporate or government) than other insurance portfolios.
Collective investment undertakings (CIUs) represent more than 65 percent of the EEA Life UL&IL portfolios in 
contrast to less than 20 percent for all other insurance portfolio’s types. In the case of composite and reinsurers, 
CIU almost reach 80% of the UL&IL investment portfolios.
Looking through the actual assets classes underlying the investments in CIU helps to complete the picture of 
the profound differences in the portfolio composition. UL&IL more than double the exposure to equity of the 
Non-UL&IL portfolios, which in turn more than double the exposure to bonds. Applying a limited look through 
to the 2019 Q2 data at EEA level reveals that more than 60 percent of the UL&IL portfolios invest in equity and 
assets funds, while the largest share Non-UL&IL portfolios are bonds. In other words, the main difference in the 
asset allocation among these portfolio’s types is the inverse relevance of bonds and equity: while for Non-UL&IL 
portfolios the main exposure is towards bonds (63%) followed by equity investments (15%), UL&IL portfolios are 
characterised by a large share of equity (42%) and a smaller proportion of bonds (26%).
However, despite the homogeneous picture at European level, certain degree of heterogeneity in the UL&IL in-
vestment behaviours can be observed across countries36. Some examples of differentiated behaviours compared 
to the EEA aggregates are:
 › Half or more of the UL&IL assets in DE, IS, SE and UK are invested in equity, while in BG, PL, PT and RO 
close to or more than half of the portfolio is invested in bonds;
 › BE and EL hold more than 30 percent of their UL&IL investments in cash and deposits;
 › in CY and FR the share of property is equal to or exceed 4%.
2019 Q2 Without look through With look through
Neither 
unitlinked  
nor index-linked
Unit-linked  
or index-linked
Neither 
unitlinked  
nor index-linked
Unit-linked  
or index-linked
Bonds 54% 11% 63% 26%
of which: Government bonds 28% 6% 31% 12%
of which: Corporate bonds 26% 5% 32% 14%
Equity 12% 16% 15% 42%
Collective Investment Undertakings 20% 67% 6% 20%
Structured notes 1% 2% 1% 2%
Collateralised securities 1% 0% 1% 0%
Cash and deposits 4% 2% 5% 5%
Mortgages and loans 5% 0% 6% 0%
Property 2% 1% 2% 2%
Other investments 1% 1% 1% 3%
Source: EIOPA quarterly data, 2019 Q2.
Note: Investment allocation by type including and excluding look-through approach.
36 Especially among the top ten in terms of total assets managed for unit linked and index linked business: UK (accounts for more than 40 
of EEA total assets), FR, IE, IT, DK, LU, SE, DE, NL and BE.
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IMPACT OF THE LOW YIELD ENVIRONMENT
The ongoing low/negative yield environment continues 
to be one of the main challenges for insurers, in partic-
ular for life insurers with potential implications on the 
profitability and on the solvency of these companies. 
Insurers reinvest, continuously, earned coupons and re-
demption amounts from matured bonds at current market 
yields. With market yields at very low levels, this will have 
an impact on insurer’s profitability in the medium to long 
term. Figure 5.16 shows that 5.4% of the government bonds 
portfolio will reach maturity date in 1 year and that in 10 
years time insurers will replace approximately 60% of their 
government bonds portfolio. In Q2 2019, these bonds were 
yielding a  coupon of 3.3% assuming they were bought at 
issuance date and they will have to be replaced with bonds 
which will yield (YTM current market rates) on average ap-
proximately 0.45% across maturity buckets. This could be 
translated into the risk that investment yields fall below 
guarantees for insurers causing losses and decline in capital.
In the case of corporate bonds (Figure 5.17), 6.5% of the 
these will reach maturity date in 1 year. These bonds were 
yielding a  coupon of 2.7% assuming they were bought at 
issuance date and will have to be replaced with bonds which 
will yield (YTM current market rates) on average approxi-
mately 0.9% across maturity buckets.
On the other hand, even if current market rates are low, 
insurers were still realising gains on government and cor-
porate bond holdings, but these were significantly lower in 
2018. Figure 5.18 shows that across the three asset classes 
net gains and losses (capital gains/losses on sold bonds and 
equities) tend to be comparatively small, with respect to 
total gains and losses in the three years from 2016 to 2018. 
Net gain and losses fluctuate dramatically based on how 
market yields on actual insurers’ bonds holdings evolve. In 
2016 insurers reported substantial net gains on bonds as 
yields have been going down while in 2017 and 2018 as in-
surers reported some losses, yields have been going slightly 
up, relatively more for corporate bonds. It is very likely that 
insurers will have gains (which could be both unrealised or 
realised depending on whether assets will be liquidated) on 
fixed income positions in 2019 as the interest has been go-
ing down all year and is only slightly reverting back in the 
last quarter.
Figure 5.16: Government bonds: coupon and YTM (i.e. market yields) by maturity in Q2 2019
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Sources. SII QRTs data from EIOPA Central repository and CSDB
Note. YTM and Coupon rate of government and corporate bonds are taken from the CSDB (extract of 30 June 2019). Information on EU insurers’ government 
and corporate bonds holdings by maturity are from SII QRTs data – List of assets (S.06.02) Solo prudential data for Q2-2019. Weighted average YTM and Coupon 
by maturity buckets are calculated using SII amounts. Only bonds with fixed coupons are considered in the analysis therefore (also considering the merge 
between SII and CSDB and some data cleaning) the sample is left with approximately 80% of the total values of bonds in the SII EU sample.
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Figure 5.17: Corporate bonds: coupon and YTM (i.e. market yields) by maturity in Q2 2019
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and corporate bonds holdings by maturity are from SII QRTs data – List of assets (S.06.02) Solo prudential data for Q2-2019. Weighted average YTM and Coupon 
by maturity buckets are calculated using SII amounts. Only bonds with fixed coupons are considered in the analysis therefore (also considering the merge 
between SII and CSDB and some data cleaning) the sample is left with approximately 80% of the total values of bonds in the SII EU sample.
Figure 5.18: Return on Investments per asset class (in EUR amounts)
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Note: Data from SII QRTs from EIOPA Central repository are employed - annual prudential data for 2016 and 2017, template S.09.01 Income gain and losses 
(interest gains, net gain and losses and unrealized gains and losses), breakdown by government, corporate bonds and equities.
Another consequence of the the low yield environment 
could be the shift of investments towards more illiquid or 
more riskier types of assets. In this respect, over the last 
few years, the leveraged lending market and collateralised 
loans and mortgage (CLOs and CMOs) market have in-
creased significantly with volumes approximately 5 times 
bigger at the end of 2018.37 Figure 5.19 shows that the ex-
posures to CLOs and CMOs have slightly increased every 
quarter during 2018 and 2019 and amount to EUR 5.11 bn in 
Q2 2019 (17% increase compared to end of 2018).
37 See previous EIOPA June Finacial Stability Report, page 52
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INTERCONNECTEDNESS BETWEEN 
INSURERS AND BANKS
The overall exposures towards the banking sector 
remain significant for insurers in certain countries, 
which could be one potential transmission channel 
in case of a sudden reassessment of risk premia. The 
interconnectedness between insurers and banks could 
intensify contagion across the financial system through 
common risk exposures. A potential sudden reassessment 
of risk premia may not only affect insurers directly, but 
also indirectly through exposures to the banking sector. 
This is also a potential transmission channel of emerging 
markets distress, as banks have on average larger expo-
sures to emerging markets when compared to insurers. 
Another channel of risk transmission could be through 
different types of bank instruments bundled together and 
credited by institutional investors such as insurers and 
pension funds.
Insurers’ exposures towards banks are heterogeneous 
across the EU/EEA countries, with different levels of home 
bias as well (Figure 5.20-5.21). Hence, countries with pri-
mary banks exposed to emerging markets or weak bank-
ing sectors could be impacted more in case of economic 
distress. On average, 15.95% of the EU/EEA insurers’ as-
sets are issued by the banking sector through different 
types of instruments, mostly bank bonds. Insurers from 
EE, SE and CY have a larger exposure to banks with some 
of them with significant home biased behaviour.
Figure 5.19: EU/EEA insurers’ holdings of CLOs and CMOs
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Figure 5.20: European insurers’ exposures towards banks as a percentage of total investments
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Table 5.1: EU/EEA insurers’ exposures towards banks as a percentage of total investments at country level
Country  % Exposure to banks Country  % Exposure to banks 
EU/EEA average 15.95% ITALY 7.60%
AUSTRIA 17.95% LATVIA 16.98%
BELGIUM 8.47% LIECHTENSTEIN 24.98%
BULGARIA 17.72% LITHUANIA 13.82%
CROATIA 6.81% LUXEMBOURG 21.15%
CYPRUS 30.53% MALTA 24.28%
CZECHIA 21.45% NETHERLANDS 17.20%
DENMARK 26.11% NORWAY 20.60%
ESTONIA 40.87% POLAND 16.79%
FINLAND 11.97% PORTUGAL 19.11%
FRANCE 12.90% ROMANIA 16.56%
GERMANY 22.86% SLOVAKIA 21.15%
GREECE 11.65% SLOVENIA 15.00%
HUNGARY 5.26% SPAIN 12.28%
ICELAND 20.77% SWEDEN 31.06%
IRELAND 22.96% UNITED KINGDOM 10.25%
Source: EIOPA Quarterly Solo
Reference Date: Q2 2019
Note: the blue colour highlights the lowest exposures towards banks while the red colour highlights the highest exposures towards banks
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Intragroup exposures between insurers and banks 
could create vulnerabilities for the financial stabili-
ty in case there is a high concentration of the assets 
within the same group if a market distress were to ma-
terialize. In addition, if some EU/EEA insurers or banks 
that are part of financial conglomerates were to face fi-
nancial difficulties, these could seriously destabilise the 
financial system and affect individual depositors, insur-
ance policyholders and investors. In this regards, insurers 
in EU/EEA were on average exposed to their intragroup 
banks by approximately 1% of their total banking assets 
(approximately 0.1% of total investment assets) in the first 
half of 2019. This exposure comes mainly from equities 
and participations (71%), cash and deposits (13%) and bank 
bonds (16%). At country level, insurance sectors from PL, 
AT, UK and SE tend to have higher intragroup transactions 
due to holdings of equities and participations in the banks 
belonging to the same group.
Figure 5.21: Insurance sector exposure towards the banking sector, domestic versus cross-border in %
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INSURERS AND BANKS BAIL-IN BONDS
Risks from banking sectors could be transmitted to 
the insurance sector through specific financial instru-
ments holdings (Figure 5.22). Insurers’ exposures towards 
banks are mainly driven by holdings of bank bonds. Other 
significant exposures are through cash and deposits which 
are not effected by change in the market sentiment.
Furthermore, the insurer’s exposure to bank ‘bail-inable’ 
bonds, which considers subordinated bonds, hybrid bonds 
and convertible bonds has slightly increased to 7.8% of 
the total corporate bonds exposure (Figure 5.23). This is 
in line with what was expected, considering the concerns 
regarding the availability of enough preferred senior debt 
on the market as banks might issue more ‘bail-inable’ 
bonds to meet the MREL requirements. In the first half of 
2019, approximately 78% of the exposure towards banks 
of the EU insurers was driven by holdings of senior bank 
corporate bonds, 1% more than at Q4 2018.
Figure 5.22: Exposures to banks by type of instruments and type of business
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Figure 5.23: Breakdown of exposures to bank corporate bonds
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Figure 5.24: Breakdown of exposures to bank corporate bonds by country in Q2 2019
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Furthermore, a breakdown by country (Figure 5.24) of the 
bank corporate bonds held by EU/EEA insurers reveals 
that insurers from several countries hold significant expo-
sures to subordinated, hybrid and convertible bonds that 
could be bail-inable in case of a bank failure. Banks bail-in 
bonds could become attractive to insurers as they could 
offer a higher return without requiring additional capital 
charge as it depends on the group of credit quality steps 
where they are placed in when assigning a certain capital 
charge.
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6. BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND DATA 
DESCRIPTION
OVERVIEW AND DATA (RE)
INSURANCE SECTOR
EIOPA publishes statistics based on quantitative Solven-
cy II reporting from insurance undertakings and groups 
in the European Union and the European Economic Area 
(EEA). These statistics are published on a quarterly basis. 
Every publication is accompanied by a  note describing 
the key aspects of the statistics published. The tables 
and charts are available in PDF and Excel format and are 
based on information from the statistics at the publica-
tion date.38
The new supervisory regime Solvency II came into full 
force on 1 January 2016 as a result of timely preparation 
and appropriate transitional periods.
The Solvency II Directive (Directive 2009/138/EC) intro-
duces advanced solvency requirements for insurers based 
on a  holistic risk assessment, and imposes new assess-
ment rules for assets and liabilities, which must be as-
sessed at market values.
Currently the following type of information is available:
Indicators based on Individual insurance undertak-
ings (solo data)
 › Quarterly and annual publication of statistics based 
on solo prudential reporting data and available on 
a country-by-country basis. The number of insurance 
undertakings for the full reporting sample is consid-
ered as 2,631.
Indicators based on Insurance groups (group data)
 › Annual publication of key indicators based on group 
reporting and available at EEA level from Autumn 
2017.
38 https://eiopa.europa.eu/Pages/Financial-stability-and-crisis-preven-
tion/Insurance-Statistics.aspx
Indicators based on reporting for financial stability 
purposes
Pursuant to Art. 51 Solvency II Directive 2009/138/EC in-
surance companies have to publish annual Solvency and 
Financial Condition Reports (SFCR) for groups as well as 
solo reports for its Solvency II regulated legal entities 
since May 2017. The structure of this Financial Stability 
Report covers Q4 2018 and focuses on European (re) 
insurance undertakings and groups that report regular-
ly under Solvency II. EIOPA bases its analysis mainly on 
Quarterly Prudential Reporting Solo (QRS) for Q2 2019. 
But as not all templates and/or companies report under 
QRS, EIOPA also uses Annual Reporting Solo (ARS) and 
Quarterly Financial Stability Reporting Group (QFG) for 
some indicators.
Information is provided on different sample sizes as some 
(re)insurance companies are exempted from quarterly 
reporting in accordance with Art. 35 (6). Therefore, the 
sample of undertakings is not identical in the annual and 
quarterly publications. Each Figure EIOPA uses in this re-
port is hence accompanied by a  source mentioning the 
sample size and a note on data (if needed).
INSURANCE SECTOR
Solvency II has put in place long term guarantees (LTG) and 
transitional measures to ensure an appropriate treatment 
of insurance products that include long-term guarantees 
and facilitate a smooth transition of the new regulatory 
framework regime. The LTG measures are a  permanent 
feature of Solvency II, wheareas the transitional measures 
will be gradually phased out until 2032, by which time the 
balance sheet position of insurance companies will be ful-
ly estimated at market value. For a period of 16 years after 
the start of Solvency II (re)insurance undertakings may 
apply the transitional measure on the technical provisions 
and the risk-free interest rate.
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The use of LTG and transitional measures is transparent 
and insurance companies publish their solvency ratios 
with and without the application of these measures. LTG 
and transitional measures form an integral part of Solven-
cy II and are intended to limit the procyclicality of the reg-
ulatory changes and to facilitate the entry into the new 
regime by giving companies the time needed to adapt to 
the new solvency requirements.
The EIOPA Insurance Stress Test Report 2016 and the Re-
port on Long-Term Guarantees (LTG) 39 have shown that, 
in the absence of the easing effect of the LTG and trans-
tional measures, insurers might be induced to force sales 
and de-risk in order to lower their SCR and MCR, possibly 
pushing asset prices further down, adding to the market 
volatility and potentially affecting financial stability.
Pursuant to Art. 51 Solvency II Directive 2009/138/EC 
solo insurance companies were required to publish an-
nual Solvency and Financial Condition Reporting (SFCR) 
for the first time in May 2017, followed by groups at the 
end of June. Hence, this report uses a  huge amount of 
comprehensive information on Solvency II results for the 
first time.
The publication of SFCR reports gives access to Solven-
cy II results. Capital requirements under Solvency II are 
twofold. The Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) is the 
level above which there is no supervisory intervention for 
financial reasons. Supervisors will take measures once the 
SCR is breached and ultimate measures (loss of licence) 
once the MCR is breached.
While the quarterly templates do contain SCR and MCR 
information, the SCR is not necessarily recalculated for 
the quarterly templates which only require annual recal-
culation. Hence, the quarterly SCR ratios will represent 
a snapshot, but not necessarily the fully recalculated SCR 
ratios. Also, the MCR might be affected by this because 
the SCR is used to define a cap and a floor for the MCR 
value.
The SCR ratio is calculated either by using a prescribed 
formula, called the standard formula, or by employing an 
undertaking-specific partial or full internal model that 
has been approved by the supervisory authority. Being 
risk-sensitive the SCR ratio is subject to fluctuations and 
undertakings are required to monitor it continuously. 
A variety of degrees of freedom and options in the calcu-
39 Note EIOPA’s third LTG (long term guarantee) report was published 
in late 2018
lation of Solvency II results allows insurance companies to 
adjust the calculation of the SCR ratio to their risk profile.
According to Solvency II, insurers’ own funds are divided 
into three “Tier” classes. Tier 1 capital, such as equity, is 
divided into restricted and unrestricted capital and has 
the highest ranking. Items that are included in Tier 1 un-
der the transitional arrangement shall make up less than 
20% of the total amount of Tier 1 items. Tier 2 capital is 
mostly composed of hybrid debt while Tier 3 is composed 
mostly of deferred tax assets. The eligible amount of own 
funds to cover the SCR has several restrictions: the eligi-
ble amount of Tier 3 capital shall be less than 15% of the 
SCR, while the sum of the eligible amount of Tier 2 and 3 
capital shall not exceed 50% of the SCR. In order to ensure 
that the application of the limits does not create potential 
pro-cyclical effects, the limits on the eligible amounts of 
Tier 2 and Tier 3 items should apply in such a way that 
a loss in Tier 1 own funds does not result in a loss of total 
eligible own funds that is higher than that loss.
REINSURANCE SECTOR
The section is based on information from the Quarterly 
Reporting Templates (QRTs) where the reinsurance sam-
ple is calibrated with Q2 2019 data. A solo undertaking is 
listed as a reinsurer if it is listed as a reinsurance undertak-
ing on the EIOPA register. The global and European mar-
ket overview is also based on publicly available reports, 
forecasts and quarterly updates of rating agencies and 
other research and consulting studies.
PENSION FUND SECTOR
The section on pension funds outlines the main develop-
ments in the European occupational pension fund sector, 
based on information received from EIOPA’s members. 
It covers all EEA Member States with active IORPs (i.e. 
occupational pension funds falling under the scope of 
the EU IORP Directive). There are a few Member States 
with pension funds other than IORPs, on which NCAs re-
port on a voluntary basis, and/or where the main part of 
occupational retirement provisions is a  line of insurance 
business, respectively underwritten by life insurers, and 
is therefore not covered. The country coverage is 81% (25 
out of 31 countries).
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Data collected for 2018 was provided to EIOPA on a best 
effort basis to report the financial position of IORPs 
during the covered period. For Romania, the data refers 
to 1st Pillar bis and 3rd Pillar private pension schemes only.
Data availability and valuation approaches vary substan-
tially among the Member States, which hampers a thor-
ough analysis and comparison of the pension market de-
velopments between Member States. Due to differences 
in objective, scope, coverage and reporting period or tim-
ing of the data received by EIOPA, information reported 
in the different EIOPA reports may differ.
Country abbreviations
AT Austria IT Italy
BE Belgium LI Liechtenstein
BG Bulgaria LT Lithuania
CY Cyprus LU Luxembourg
CZ Czech Republic LV Latvia
DE Germany MT Malta
DK Denmark NL Netherlands
EE Estonia NO Norway
ES Spain PL Poland
FI Finland PT Portugal
FR France RO Romania
GR Greece SE Sweden
HR Croatia SI Slovenia
HU Hungary SK Slovakia
IE Ireland UK United Kingdom
IS Iceland CH Switzerland
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CLIMATE RISK ASSESSMENT 
OF THE SOVEREIGN BOND 
PORTFOLIO OF EUROPEAN 
INSURERS40
Stefano Battiston41, Petr Jakubik42, Irene Monasterolo43, Keywan 
Riahi44, Bas van Ruijven44
ABSTRACT
In the first collaboration between climate economists, climate financial risk modellers and fi-
nancial regulators, we apply the CLIMAFIN framework described in Battiston at al. (2019) to 
provide a forward-looking climate transition risk assessment of the sovereign bonds’ portfoli-
os of solo insurance companies in Europe. We consider a scenario of a disorderly introduction 
of climate policies that cannot be fully anticipated and priced in by investors. First, we anal-
yse the shock on the market share and profitability of carbon-intensive and low-carbon activ-
ities under climate transition risk scenarios. Second, we define the climate risk management 
strategy under uncertainty for a risk averse investor that aims to minimise her largest losses. 
Third, we price the climate policies scenarios in the probability of default of the individual 
sovereign bonds and in the bonds’ climate spread. Finally, we estimate the largest gains/losses 
on the insurance companies’ portfolios conditioned to the climate scenarios. We find that 
the potential impact of a disorderly transition to low-carbon economy on insurers portfolios 
of sovereign bonds is moderate in terms of its magnitude. However, it is non-negligible in 
several scenarios. Thus, it should be regularly monitored and assessed given the importance 
of sovereign bonds in insurers’ investment portfolios.
1. INTRODUCTION
The topic of sustainable finance has gained attention among European insurers and the 
financial supervisory community alike. This is fuelled by recent initiatives promoted by 
40 The authors are grateful to Alan Roncoroni and Alejandra Salazar Romo from the UZH FINEXUS Center for 
Financial Networks and Sustainability for their support in the pricing model and in the empirical analysis as well 
as Alessandro Fontana from the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority for the provided data 
support. In addition, Stefano Battiston acknowledges the support of the Schwyzer-Winiker foundation, while 
Irene Monasterolo acknowledges the support of the RiskFinPorto ACRP 10th call project. Irene Monasterolo and 
Stefano Battiston acknowledge the support of the EU FET Innovation Launchpad CLIMEX and of the INSPIRE 
grant.
41 Dept. of Banking and Finance, FINEXUS Center, University of Zurich (UZH) and Swiss Finance Foundation.
42 European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA)
43 Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU) and Boston University (BU)
44 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
FINANCIAL STABILIT Y REPORT
69
financial supervisors, central banks and policy makers to align finance to sustainability. 
For instance, in 2018 several international central banks and financial regulators launched 
the Central Banks and Financial Regulators’ Network for Greening the Financial System 
(NGSF 2018). In 2019, the European Commission (EC) launched the “Action Plan on 
Sustainable Finance” to tackle climate related risks and achieve the long-term goal of 
economic transformation towards a low-carbon economy. These initiatives are aimed to 
mitigate the potential financial risks stemming from a disorderly low-carbon transition, 
by supporting the alignment of investments to the climate targets.
Limiting the global temperature increase to 2°C above pre-industrial levels (i.e. consis-
tently with Paris Agreement, UNFCCC 2016) requires the timely and coordinated intro-
duction of climate policies, e.g. a global carbon tax (Stiglitz et al., 2017; IMF, 2019) aimed 
to drastically decrease the CO2 emissions produced by the combustion of fossil fuels in 
the economy.
However, governments are delaying in the introduction of climate policies, leading po-
tentially to a disorderly transition, where the introduction of climate policies is sudden 
and cannot be fully anticipated and priced in by investors (Battiston et al., 2017). In this 
context, firms whose revenues depend directly or indirectly on use of fossil fuels ener-
gy and electricity could face significant losses (the so-called “carbon stranded assets”, 
Leaton et al. 2012). These losses will affect the value of the financial contracts issued 
by such firms and cascade onto their investors (Battiston et al., 2017), with implications 
on price volatility if large and correlated asset classes are involved (Monasterolo et al., 
2017), and on firms and countries’ financial stability (Battiston and Monasterolo, 2019). 
In this respect, not only climate related exposures of insurance firms towards the corpo-
rate sector but also towards the sovereigns in which those activities take place could be 
negatively affected. Given the role of the insurance sector in the economy and finance, 
the exposure of insurance firms to climate-related financial risks deserve to be monitored 
and assessed.
A main obstacle for insurers to embed climate in their portfolios’ risk management strat-
egies is represented by the lack of appropriate methodologies to price forward-looking 
climate risks and opportunities in the value of individual financial contracts and in the 
probabilities of default of investors portfolios. The reason is that climate risks are for-
ward-looking (because they refer to future occurrences), characterised by deep uncer-
tainty (thus leading to fat tailed distributions, Weitzman, 2009), non-linearity (Ackerman, 
2017), and endogeneity that could give rise to multiple equilibria (Battiston et al., 2017). 
These characteristics makes the reliance on historical data much less relevant for risk 
assessment. This means that climate transition risks cannot be priced based on historical 
market data (e.g. to calculate volatility measures), but require to use the information on 
future climate policy shocks produced by climate economic models (e.g. Integrated As-
sessment Models - IAMs), and to introduce climate ambiguity.
Nevertheless, traditional financial pricing models (e.g. Merton, 1974; Black and Scholes, 
1973; Black and Cox, 1976; Duffie and Singleton, 1999) are not able by construction to em-
bed the characteristics of climate risks. Indeed, their financial risk assessment is based on 
past firms’ performance (e.g. the computation of volatility measures based on historical 
data). In addition, they are constrained by conditions of normal distributions, complete 
markets, and lack of arbitrage (Battiston and Monasterolo, 2019).
Thus, pricing climate in investors’ portfolio requires to move from the backward-look-
ing nature of traditional financial risk assessment and of investors’ benchmarks to a for-
ward-looking assessment of risk. In this paper, we develop an application of the CLIMA-
EUROPEAN INSUR ANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS AUTHORIT Y
70
FIN framework (Battiston et al., 2019) to calculate the probability of default of sovereign 
bonds, portfolio’s financial risk metrics (e.g. the Climate Spread), and the largest losses/
gains on insurers’ portfolios conditioned to future climate transition shocks. This analysis 
represents the first climate-financial risk assessment developed in collaboration between 
scientists of the climate economic community that informs the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), climate financial risk experts and a financial regulatory insti-
tution with a mandate to contribute to financial stability.
We build on CLIMAFIN, because it is the first approach to combine forward-looking cli-
mate transition risk shocks and associated economic trajectories based on We build on 
CLIMAFIN because it is the first approach to combine forward-looking climate transition 
risk scenarios and associated economic trajectories based on climate economic models, 
with financial pricing models and financial risk metrics. In addition, CLIMAFIN provides 
a transparent and robust methodology for climate financial risk assessment under deep 
uncertainty, by considering the characteristics of climate risks and of financial risks. 
In this application, we build on the LIMITS45 database of climate policy scenarios (Kriegler 
et al., 2013). These models are the reference for scientific community and the IPCC, with 
climate financial risk metrics and methods that are now a reference in both the academic 
and practitioners’ community, i.e. the Climate Spread, the Climate VaR, climate financial 
pricing models and financial network-based Climate Stress-tests (Battiston et al., 2017). 
In the context of potentially destabilizing financial impact of a disorderly climate transi-
tion and of unmitigated climate change, transparent and robust methodologies can sup-
port financial supervisors’ policy decisions to align finance to sustainability and climate 
targets while preventing financial instability.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the relevant literature. Sec-
tion 3 provides a description of the data sample used and the section 4 describes the 
CLIMAFIN methodology for pricing forward-looking climate transition risks in the value 
of sovereign bonds and in investors’ portfolios. The results of empirical analysis conduct-
ed on the portfolios of EU insurance companies are presented in section 5, while section 
6 concludes discussing the linkages with the next steps of this research into the Climate 
Stress-test.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Recent research suggest that climate risks (and opportunities) are not properly priced 
yet in the value of financial contracts and thus, in investor portfolios’ risk management 
strategies. This means that investors might, on the one hand, increase (and trade) their 
exposure to climate risks, and on the other hand, they might delay the scaling-up of 
green investments.
The literature has mostly covered corporate debt contracts, only recently the attention 
has focused on sovereign bonds and equity holdings. Alessi et al. (2019), Zerbib (2019) 
and Karpf and Mandel (2018) assessed if a green bonds’ premium exists in the bond mar-
ket, but found very different results, based on the type of bonds contract analysed and 
the “green” definition used. In the catastrophe bonds (CAT) market, Morana and Sbrana 
45 See the LIMITS database documentation for more details https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/LIMITSDB/static/down-
load/LIMITS_overview_SOM_Study_Protocol_Final.pdf
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(2019) found that despite climate-led disasters have steadily increased from year 2000, 
the “multiple” (i.e. the return per unity of risk) of the CAT bonds has decreased.
Monasterolo and de Angelis analysed the US, EU and global stock market’s reaction 
to the announcement of the Paris Agreement. They found that the overall systematic 
risk for the low-carbon indices decreases consistently, while stock markets’ reaction is 
mild for most of carbon-intensive indices. Ramelli et al. (2018) and Wagner et al. (2018) 
analysed the stock market’s reaction to the election of Trump as President of the United 
States, and the appointment of the climate skeptic Scott Pruitt as a head of the US En-
vironmental Protection Agency, and found opposite results, i.e. that investors rewarded 
companies in high-emissions industries/companies demonstrating more responsible cli-
mate strategies.
With regard to sovereign bonds, Crifo et al. (2017) find that high country’s Environmental 
Social Governance (ESG) ratings are associated with low borrowing costs (spread) for 
short-maturity sovereign bonds in advanced economics. In the contest of low-income 
countries, Kling et al. (2018) focus on the most climate vulnerable low-income countries 
(V20) exposed to climate physical risk occurred in the past. They find a slightly higher 
cost of debt for a few countries, but they also point out the caveats that apply, such as 
the peculiarity of sovereign bonds’ markets in low- income countries and the nature of 
risks (e.g. geopolitical) to consider in the sovereign valuation.
All these analyses, despite focusing on different types of financial contracts and climate 
risks analyse climate shocks that occurred in the past, and that could have represented 
a  structural break in the series of prices and performance. In contrast, Battiston and 
Monasterolo (2019) developed the first approach to price forward-looking climate tran-
sition risks in the value of individual sovereign bonds, by including the characteristics of 
climate risks (i.e. uncertainty, non-linearity and endogeneity of risk) in financial valuation. 
They applied the model to the sovereign bonds of the OECD countries included in the 
Austrian National Bank (OeNB)’s non-monetary policy portfolio. They found that the 
(mis)alignment of an economy could already be reflected in the sovereign bonds’ spread 
(i.e. the climate spread) and change the fiscal and financial risk position of a country.
Since financial investors take decisions based on what they can measure, and their deci-
sions do influence (and are influenced by) the benchmark in their respective markets, as-
sessing climate risks in financial contracts is crucial from an investors’ risk management 
perspective, and for financial supervisors whose mandate is about preserving financial 
stability. To our knowledge, this article is the first study assessing climate-related finan-
cial risks stemming from insurance companies’ exposures to sovereign bonds.
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3. DATA SAMPLE
We utilized Quarterly Solvency II Reporting Template on List of Assets (SII QRT)46 and 
Centralized Security Database (CSDB). Solo data of insurers from 31 countries in EU/EEA 
that reported Solvency II data at the end of 2018 are employed. Our dataset includes all 
insurers’ investments into sovereign bonds (CIC code equal 1). This data is complemented 
by information on the characteristics of the bonds available from the CSDB. The final 
dataset contains 1576 insurance companies, 142 bond issuers and 10746 bonds. The total 
amount of the insurance government portfolio considered is 2.1 trillion EUR. The full de-
scription of the data set utilized in this study is provided in the table below.
46 S.06.02 template.
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Table A1.1: List of variables utilized
Variable name Description
Insurance identifier Unique identifier of solo insurance company (SII QRT)
Home country Country of authorization of the insurer (SII QRT)
ISIN code ISIN conde of the sovereign bond (SII QRT)
Issuer’s country Country that issued the bond (SII QRT)
Duration Residual duration of the bond (SII QRT)
Maturity Maturity date of the bond (SII QRT)
Term Difference in years between the date of bond’s maturity and 
the date of bond issuance (SII QRT)
Price Market value of the bond (SII QRT)
Nominal value Nominal value of the bond (SII QRT)
Coupon Coupon of the bond (CSDB)
Coupon type Type of the bond’s coupon (fix, zero coupon) (CSDB)
Coupon frequency Coupon frequency of the bond (monthly, bi-monthly, 
quarterly, semi-annually, annually, zero coupon) (CSDB)
Note: All variables refer to 2018Q4.
4. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we introduce the concepts of climate physical and transition risks. 
Then, we define the climate policy shocks that we analyse in the context of a  disor-
derly low-carbon transition. Finally, we present the CLIMAFIN tool that we apply to 
price forward-looking climate transition risk in the value of individual sovereign bonds 
(introducing the climate sovereign spread) under deep uncertainty, and to assess the 
largest gains/losses on investors’ portfolios. CLIMAFIN includes climate scenarios ad-
justed financial pricing models (for equity holdings, sovereign and corporate bonds, and 
loans) and climate scenarios conditioned risk metrics (such as the Climate Spread and 
the Climate VaR). These allow us to embed forward-looking climate risk scenarios in the 
valuation of counterparty risk, in the probability of default of securities and in the largest 
losses on investors’ portfolios (Battiston et al., 2019).
We opted for CLIMAFIN for two reasons. First, it is the first approach that combines for-
ward-looking climate transition risk shocks and associated economic trajectories based 
on climate economic models (in this application, the LIMITS IAMs), which are the refer-
ence for the scientific community and the IPCC, with climate financial risk metrics and 
methods that are now a reference in both the academic and practitioners’ community 
(Battiston et al., 2019). Second, CLIMAFIN provides a transparent and robust methodol-
ogy for climate financial risk assessment under deep uncertainty. Importantly, this rep-
resents the first climate-financial risk assessment developed in collaboration between 
scientists of the climate economic community, climate financial risk experts and a finan-
cial regulatory institution with a financial stability mandate.
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4.1.  CLIMATE CHANGE AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: TRANSITION 
RISKS
Two main channels of risk transmissions from climate change to finance have been iden-
tified and analyzed so far, i.e. climate physical risks and climate transition risks. In our 
analysis we focus on climate transition risk because while climate physical risks are ex-
pected to be more visible in the mid to long-term period, triggering potentially irrevers-
ible socio-economic and environmental impacts (see IPCC 1.5°C 2018 Allen et al. 2018, 
Steffen et al. 2018), climate transition risks could happen sooner and be more financially 
relevant (V. de Gaulhau (2018))47.
Climate transition risk refers to the economic and financial risk arising from a  sudden 
revaluation of carbon-intensive and low-carbon assets and that cannot be fully antici-
pated by financial actors. This risk can be driven by (i) Technological shocks (e.g. the fast 
decrease of renewable energy production costs and fast increase in their performance, 
or the change in minimum technology standards); (ii) Policy and regulatory shocks (e.g. 
the disordered introduction of a global carbon tax IMF, 2019) or a change in prudential 
regulation such as the introduction of Green Supporting Factors (HLEG, 2018); (iii) the 
sudden changes in the climate sentiments of financial actors (Dunz et al., 2019), as a re-
sult of the expectations of market participants about the implementation of the climate 
policies.
Most important, climate risks differ from the type of risks that investors are used to 
consider in finance. In particular, the nature of climate risks introduces several conceptu-
al and methodological challenges for traditional economic and financial models, which 
then need to consider (Monasterolo, 2019):
 › Non-linearity of impacts. The probability of forward-looking climate shocks can’t be 
inferred from historical data being non-linear and not normally distributed (Acker-
man, 2017);
 › Forward-looking nature of risk. The impacts of climate change are on the time scale 
of two decades or longer1. However, the time horizon of financial markets is much 
shorter. Investors’ decisions follow a much shorter time horizon (e.g. three months 
for fund managers) and are based on a  market benchmark (performance) that is 
backward-looking because estimated on past companies’ performance.
 › Deep uncertainties that characterize climate impacts and their costs, due to the na-
ture of the earth system that leads to the presence of tail events (Weitzman 2009), 
tipping points and domino effects (Steffen et al., 2018), which are associated to large 
uncertainty (Kriegler et al., 2009). Tipping points mean that the estimates of the 
costs and benefits of (in)action may vary substantially across climate scenarios with 
the assumptions on agents’ utility function, future productivity growth rate, and 
intertemporal discount rate (Stern, 2008, Pyndick, 2013).
 › Endogeneity and circularity of climate risk. The likelihood of achieving the global cli-
mate targets depends on the orderly introduction of climate policies, and their antic-
ipation by financial actors in their investment decisions. However, climate policies’ 
uncertainty affects investors’ expectations on the financial risk deriving from the 
very same policies, and thus their investment decision. In turn, the lack of climate 
aligned investments makes it impossible to achieve the climate policy targets. This 
generates the possibility of multiple equilibria, a situation where a  rational agent 
cannot identify a preferred investment strategy (Battiston and Monasterolo, 2018).
47 https://www.bis.org/review/r180419b.htm
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4.2. THE CLIMAFIN CLIMATE FINANCIAL RISK PRICING MODEL
4.2.1. Climate policy scenarios
We consider the climate policy scenarios developed by the International Scientific Com-
munity and reviewed by the IPCC. In particular, we select all the climate policy scenarios 
aligned to the 2°C target made available from the LIMITS project, which includes six 
IAMs. We use the LIMITS project database (Kriegler et al., 2013) to compute the trajec-
tories of the shocks in the market shares for several variables, including the output of 
all the economic activities in primary and secondary energy (e.g. primary energy from 
fossil fuels, electricity produced by solar panels, etc.) conditioned to climate policies’ 
introduction (i.e. a carbon tax). The two emissions concentration targets chosen under 
milder and tighter climate policy scenarios (i.e. 500 parts per million (ppm) and 450 ppm) 
refer to the stabilization concentration of CO2 at the end of century consistently with 
the 2°C aligned scenarios, and are associated to two different policy implementation 
scenarios, i.e. the
Reference Policy (RefPol) and the Strong Policy (StrPol) (IPCC, 2014). RefPol assumes 
a weak near-term target by 2020 with fragmented countries’ action, while StrPol assumes 
a stringent near-term target by 2020 with fragmented countries’ action, to achieve emis-
sions reduction by 2050. The 500 and 450 ppm scenarios are associated to a probabil-
ity of exceeding the 2°C target by 35-59% and 20-41% respectively (Menishausen et al., 
2009). Thus, the choice of specific emissions concentration targets could be considered 
as a proxy for the stringency of the global emission cap imposed by potential climate 
treaty. A change in climate policy (i.e. in the value of the carbon tax every 5 years’ time 
step) implies a change in the sectors’ macroeconomic trajectory, and thus a change in the 
market share of primary and secondary energy sources based on their energy technology 
(fossil/renewable).
4.2.2. Climate policy shocks
In the context of climate transition risks, climate policy shocks are defined as the transi-
tion from a business as usual scenario of no climate policy, to a policy scenario charac-
terised by the introduction of a climate policy (e.g. a carbon tax, or a Green Supporting 
Factor). Climate policy shocks arise from a disorderly transition, i.e. when the introduc-
tion of climate-aligned policies is carried out at a  schedule that is not predictable by 
investors. These, in turn, cannot fully anticipate (and price) it in their portfolios’ risk man-
agement strategies (Battiston et al., 2017; NGSF, 2019). In the current scenario where 
governments have not coordinated yet to introduce stable climate policies, we might 
end up in a disorderly transition scenario (Battiston, 2019). The transition entails a jump 
from one equilibrium state of the economy (e.g. the current state) to another equilibrium 
state where the composition of the economy and the weight of the economic activities 
(carbon-intensive, low-carbon) could consistently change.
In a disorderly transition, assets price adjustments would directly or indirectly negatively 
impact the value of fossil fuels and related assets. The lack of investors’ anticipation of 
the climate policy shock could have relevant and long-lasting consequences for the fi-
nancial conditions of a private investor and of a sovereign, and eventually it would affect 
the achievement of the 2°C aligned climate mitigation scenarios. As several recent policy 
events show (e.g. the US withdrawal from Paris Agreement, the outcome of 2018 Italian 
elections), the assessment of the future policy shock could be incorrect even on average 
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across market participants, and yet can have severe long-term effects on the financial 
conditions of a country (Battiston, 2019).
4.2.3. Investors’ information set
Here we present the information set that a rational risk averse investor should use to 
assess financial risk under climate transition scenarios. We consider a risk averse investor 
that aims to assess the exposure of her portfolio to forward-looking climate transition 
risk. This information set can accommodate the presence of incomplete information and 
deep uncertainty (Keynes, 1973; Knight, 1921; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986). The informa-
tion set covers a time-horizons that is relevant both for investment strategies and for the 
low-carbon transition from 2020 to 2050, and is composed of:
 › Climate policy scenarios corresponding to Greenhouse Gases (GHG) emission 
reduction target across regions (B = Business-as-Usual), provided e.g. by the IPCC 
reports;
 › The future economic trajectories for carbon-intensive and low-carbon activities, 
provided by climate economic models (e.g. IAMs);
 › A set of forward-looking Climate Policy Shock Scenarios intended as a disorderly 
transition from B (Business as Usual) to P (a given climate policy scenario);
 › A set of Climate Policy Shocks on the economic output of low-carbon/carbon-in-
tensive activities, on their Gross Value Added (GVA) and on their contribution to 
the fiscal revenues of the sovereign. The policy shocks are conditioned to transition 
scenarios and, to a specific climate economic model.
4.2.4. Investors’ risk management strategy
The investor’s risk management strategy is based on the minimization of the worst-case 
losses of the portfolio under different forward-looking climate transition scenarios. The 
definition of the risk management strategy accounts for (i) the investor’s specific risk 
aversion levels, (ii) the counterparty risk adjusted for climate policy shock scenarios (e.g. 
Probability of Default (PD)), (iii) metrics relevant for financial regulation (e.g. risk mea-
sures such as the Climate Spread and VaR). The Climate VaR Management Strategy can 
be written as:ClimVaRStr = minPortfolio{maxShock{VaR(Portfolio,Adj.PD│Policy Shock)}}
In this context, future asset prices are subject to shocks that depend on the issuer’s 
future economic performance, the risk premia demanded by the market, as well as the 
implementation of the climate policy and the outcome of the energy transition of indi-
vidual firms and countries. The investor considers different feasible climate policy sce-
narios (but has no information on the probability associated) for which she can calculate 
the impacts (negative or positive) on the market share of carbon-intensive or low-carbon 
economic activities and firms. The investor is subject to incomplete information on her 
(and competitors’) exposure to risk stemming from a disordered transition from a climate 
policy scenario to another one, uncertainty on the outcome of the firms and country’s 
energy transition, and no information on the probability distribution. Thus, her risk man-
agement strategy is to consider a  set of feasible climate transition scenarios that her 
portfolio should withstand, and then compute the VaR conditional to those scenarios.
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4.2.5. Composition of the economy
We consider n countries j whose economy is composed of m economic sectors S. Eco-
nomic activities included in S are based on a refined classification of the Climate Policy 
Relevant Sectors (CPRS Rev 2), which identify the main sectors that are relevant for cli-
mate transition risk (fossil-fuel, electricity (from fossil or renewable sources), energy-in-
tensive, transportation (low/high-carbon), buildings), and were originally introduced in 
Battiston et al. (2017). As a difference from the NACE classification of economic sectors, 
CPRS Rev 2 capture the energy and electricity technology embedded in the econom-
ic activity (e.g. utility|electricity|wind, solar, gas). Firms that compose economic sectors 
S are considered as a portfolio of cash-flows. The classification of countries and regions 
affected by the climate shock is based on the LIMITS aggregation48, see Kriegler et al. 
(2013).
4.2.6. Impact of climate policy shock on economic activities’ GVA and profitability
We consider the contribution of issuer j to the sector S GVA and fiscal assets and how 
this can be affected by changes in its economic performance, either negatively or pos-
itively. We then relate the performance of the economic activity to the change in its 
market share as a result of a climate transition scenario.
In a disorderly transition, a climate policy shock affects the performance of issuers in 
sectors S via a change in economic activities’ market share, cash flows and profitability, 
eventually affecting the GVA of the sector. The climate policy shock is calculated at the 
sector, country and regional level. The country’s GVA composition is available at NACE 
2-digit level from official statistics (e.g. from Eurostat). Negative shocks result from the 
policy impact on the GVA of sectors based on carbon-intensive (i.e. fossil fuels) tech-
nologies, while positive shocks result from the impact on the GVA of sectors based on 
low-carbon (i.e. renewable energy) technologies.
We assume that a percentage shock on output to a percentage shock on GVA, 𝑢𝑢"
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B) 
is the share of GVA of sector S. We then define the net fiscal assets related to sector S, 
Aj(S),as the difference between accrued fiscal revenues from sector S and public invest-
ments and subsidies granted by j  to the same sector. The impact of the market share 
shock (resulting from the policy shock P) on net fiscal assets of sector S is thus assumed 
to imply a change Aj(S, P, M) as follows:
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 denotes the elasticity of sector S profitability with respect to the market share. 
While the policy shock could affect at the same time several sectors in the economy 
of the issuer j, here we consider the total net effect on the issuer’s net fiscal assets as 
follows:
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load/LIMITS_overview_SOM_Study_Protocol_Final.pdf
𝑢𝑢"
#$%(P)	=	
#$%+	(,)	-	#$%+	(.)
#$%+	(.)
	=	∑ 𝑢𝑢",1
#$%(𝑃𝑃)	𝑤𝑤",1
#$%(𝐵𝐵)5 	
	
∆%+(5, ,7)
%+(5)
	=	𝜒𝜒1	𝑢𝑢"(𝑆𝑆, 𝑃𝑃,𝑀𝑀)		
	
∆%+(,,7)
%+
	=	∑ (
∆%+(5, ,7)
%+(5)
1 		
%+(5)
%+
)	=	∑ 𝜒𝜒11 	𝑢𝑢"(𝑆𝑆, 𝑃𝑃,𝑀𝑀)	
%+(5)
%+
	
	𝑢𝑢"
#$%(P)	=	
#$%+	(,)	-	#$%+	(.)
#$%+	(.)
	=	∑ 𝑢𝑢",1
#$%(𝑃𝑃)	𝑤𝑤",1
#$%(𝐵𝐵)5 	
	
∆%+(5, ,7)
%+(5)
	=	𝜒𝜒1	𝑢𝑢"(𝑆𝑆, 𝑃𝑃,𝑀𝑀)		
	
∆%+(,,7)
%+
	=	∑ (
∆%+(5, ,7)
%+(5)
1 		
%+(5)
%+
)	=	∑ 𝜒𝜒11 	𝑢𝑢"(𝑆𝑆, 𝑃𝑃,𝑀𝑀)	
%+(5)
%+
	
	
EUROPEAN INSUR ANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS AUTHORIT Y
78
𝑢𝑢"
#$%(P)	=	
#$%+	(,)	-	#$%+	(.)
#$%+	(.)
	=	∑ 𝑢𝑢",1
#$%(𝑃𝑃)	𝑤𝑤",1
#$%(𝐵𝐵)5 	
	
∆%+(5, ,7)
%+(5)
	=	𝜒𝜒1	𝑢𝑢"(𝑆𝑆, 𝑃𝑃,𝑀𝑀)		
	
∆%+(,,7)
%+
	=	∑ (
∆%+(5, ,7)
%+(5)
1 		
%+(5)
%+
)	=	∑ 𝜒𝜒11 	𝑢𝑢"(𝑆𝑆, 𝑃𝑃,𝑀𝑀)	
%+(5)
%+
	
	
The elasticity coefficient could be estimated empirically for the specific sectors of the 
sovereign issuers in the portfolio. However, in our application, the data to carry out this 
estimation was not available. Thus, for estimating the elasticity we consider a mild and 
adverse scenario with values equal to equal to 0.2 and 0.5, respectively (see also Battis-
ton and Monasterolo, 2019). This allows us to provide an estimation of the magnitude of 
the shocks due to a given climate policy scenarios P, where the shock is transmitted to 
the value of the sovereign bond via the change in sectors’ market share, GDP and fiscal 
assets.
4.2.7. Model for sovereign bonds’ valuation
We consider a risky (defaultable) bond of a sovereign entity j, issued at t0 with maturity 
T. The value of the sovereign bond at time T, with R being the Recovery Rate of the bond 
(i.e. the percentage of notional recovered upon default), and LGD Loss-Given-Default 
(i.e. the percentage loss) can be written as:
The unitary price Pj(t) of the sovereign bond at time t<T and t>t0 follows the usual defini-
tion of discounted expected value at the maturity,
where rf is the risk-free rate and the expectation is taken under the risk neutral measure. 
Moreover, the cumulative probability of default Q, is related to the annual probability 
of default as follows: Q = 1 – (1 – q)(T – t).The formula can be used to determine from the 
market price the value of the annual default probability q, called “q implied”, for a given 
risk free rate and LGD. In the case of a multi-coupon bond, the formula gets more compli-
cated since one has to sum over the expected value of the coupons but the logic remains 
the same. For each coupon k, the coupon amount is assumed to be paid only if j does 
not default before. The determination of the q implied requires then to solve numerically 
a polynomial equation.
4.2.8. Sovereign default conditions
Following a stream of literature (Gray et al., 2007), we model the payoff of the default-
able sovereign bond as dependent on the ability of the sovereign to repay the debt out 
of its fiscal revenues accrued until the maturity. Differently from Gray et al. (2007), we 
do not consider whether debt is issued in local or foreign currency, nor the exchange 
rate risk.
We can define the sovereign’s net fiscal assets at the present time of the valuation and at 
the maturity respectively as Aj(t) and Aj(T),and the liabilities at the maturity as Lj(T).Thus, 
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is the default threshold under scenario P, 𝐴𝐴"(𝑇𝑇)= 𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) (1+𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) + 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃))<	𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇) ⟺ 𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)  
= 𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇)/𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) – 1 - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑇𝑇, 𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝒫𝒫 (𝜂𝜂" < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙(5)(𝜂𝜂")𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
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9:;<
 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)= 𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)	- 𝑞𝑞"(𝐵𝐵) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙?98@𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
, with 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝜃𝜃"(𝐵𝐵) - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝜉𝜉" = 𝜒𝜒"𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P), 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
|𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P)|  
 
 
𝑢𝑢",C
DEF(P)<0 
 is the climate policy shock 
from B to P (can be positive or negative) that shifts the idiosyncratic shock 𝐴𝐴"(𝑇𝑇)= 𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) (1+𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) + 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃))<	𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇) ⟺ 𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)  
= 𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇)/𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) – 1 - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑇𝑇, 𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝒫𝒫 (𝜂𝜂" < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙(5)(𝜂𝜂")𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)= 𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)	- 𝑞𝑞"(𝐵𝐵) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙?98@𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
, with 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝜃𝜃"(𝐵𝐵) - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝜉𝜉" = 𝜒𝜒"𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P), 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
|𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P)|  
 
 
𝑢𝑢",C
DEF(P)<0 
, with 𝐴𝐴"(𝑇𝑇)= 𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) (1+𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) + 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃 )<	𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇)  𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)  
= 𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇)/𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) – 1 - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑇𝑇, 𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝒫𝒫 (𝜂𝜂" < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃 ) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙(5)(𝜂𝜂")𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)= 𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)	- 𝑞𝑞"(𝐵𝐵) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙?98@𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
, with 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝜃𝜃"(𝐵𝐵) - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝜉𝜉" = 𝜒𝜒"𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P), 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
|𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P)|  
 
 
𝑢𝑢",C
DEF(P)<0 
>1, 
possibly correlated across j.
4.2.9. Sovereign default probability
We can define the Probability of Default (PD) qj(P) of issuer j under Climate Policy Sce-
nario  as:
where 
𝐴𝐴"(𝑇𝑇)= 𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) (1+𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) + 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃))<	𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇) ⟺ 𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)  
= 𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇)/𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) – 1 - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑇𝑇, 𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝒫𝒫 (𝜂𝜂" < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙(5)(𝜂𝜂")𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)= 𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)	- 𝑞𝑞"(𝐵𝐵) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙?98@𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
, with 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝜃𝜃"(𝐵𝐵) - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝜉𝜉" = 𝜒𝜒"𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P), 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
|𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P)|  
 
 
𝑢𝑢",C
DEF(P)<0 
 is the probability distribution of idiosyncratic shock 
𝐴𝐴"(𝑇𝑇)= 𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) (1+𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) + 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃))<	𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇) ⟺ 𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)  
= 𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇)/𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) – 1 - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑇𝑇, 𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝒫𝒫 (𝜂𝜂" < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙(5)(𝜂𝜂")𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)= 𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)	- 𝑞𝑞"(𝐵𝐵) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙?98@𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
, with 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝜃𝜃"(𝐵𝐵) - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝜉𝜉" = 𝜒𝜒"𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P), 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
|𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P)|  
 
 
𝑢𝑢",C
DEF(P)<0 
, 
𝐴𝐴"(𝑇𝑇)= 𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) (1+𝜂𝜂 (𝑇𝑇) + 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃))<	𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇) ⟺ 𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)  
= 𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇)/𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) – 1 - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑇𝑇, 𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝒫𝒫 (𝜂𝜂" < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙(5)(𝜂𝜂")𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)= 𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)	- 𝑞𝑞"(𝐵𝐵) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙?98@𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
, with 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝜃𝜃"(𝐵𝐵) - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝜉𝜉" = 𝜒𝜒"𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P), 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
|𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P)|  
 
 
𝑢𝑢",C
DEF(P)<0 
 is the lower 
bound of distribution support.
In principle, frequent small productivity shocks across time and firms occur in a similar 
way, with or without the climate policy shock. We introduce now a proposition of the 
PD adjustment 
𝐴𝐴"(𝑇𝑇)= 𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) (1+𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) + 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃))<	𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇) ⟺ 𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)  
= 𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇)/𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) – 1 - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑇𝑇, 𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝒫𝒫 (𝜂𝜂" < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙(5)(𝜂𝜂")𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)= 𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)	- 𝑞𝑞"(𝐵𝐵) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙?98@𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
, with 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝜃𝜃"(𝐵𝐵) - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝜉𝜉" = 𝜒𝜒"𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P), 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
|𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P)|  
 
 
𝑢𝑢",C
DEF(P)<0 
 conditioned to the climate policy s ock, which shifts the probability 
distribution of the small productivity shocks and thus the default probability of issuer j:
Thus, assuming that the climate policy shock on fiscal asset is proportional to shock 
on GVA of low-carbon and carbon-intensive sectors i.e. 
𝐴𝐴"(𝑇𝑇)= 𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) (1+𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) + 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃))<	𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇) ⟺ 𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)  
= 𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇)/𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) – 1 - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑇𝑇, 𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝒫𝒫 (𝜂𝜂" < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙(5)(𝜂𝜂")𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)= 𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)	- 𝑞𝑞"(𝐵𝐵) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙?98@𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
, with 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝜃𝜃"(𝐵𝐵) - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝜉𝜉" = 𝜒𝜒"𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P), 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
|𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P)|  
 
 
𝑢𝑢",C
DEF(P)<0 
 (P), with elasticity 
the adjustment 
𝐴𝐴"(𝑇𝑇)= 𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) 1+𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) + 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃))<	𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇) ⟺ 𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)  
= 𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇)/𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) – 1 - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑇𝑇, 𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝒫𝒫 (𝜂𝜂" < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙(5)(𝜂𝜂")𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)= 𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)	- 𝑞𝑞"(𝐵𝐵) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙?98@𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
, with 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝜃𝜃"(𝐵𝐵) - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝜉𝜉" = 𝜒𝜒"𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P), 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
|𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P)|  
 
 
𝑢𝑢",C
DEF(P)<0 
, the default probability of sovereign j under Climate Policy Shock 
Scenario:
 › Increases with GVA shock magnitude 
𝐴𝐴"(𝑇𝑇)= 𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) (1+𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) + 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃))<	𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇) ⟺ 𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)  
= 𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇)/𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) – 1 - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑇𝑇, 𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝒫𝒫 (𝜂𝜂" < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙(5)(𝜂𝜂")𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)= 𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)	- 𝑞𝑞"(𝐵𝐵) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙?98@𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
, with 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝜃𝜃"(𝐵𝐵) - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝜉𝜉" = 𝜒𝜒"𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P), 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
|𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P)|  
 
 
𝑢𝑢",C
DEF(P)<0 
 if 
𝐴𝐴"(𝑇𝑇)= 𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) (1+𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) + 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃))<	𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇) ⟺ 𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)  
= 𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇)/𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡  – 1 - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑇𝑇, 𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝒫𝒫 (𝜂𝜂" < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙(5)(𝜂𝜂")𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)= 𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)	- 𝑞𝑞"(𝐵𝐵) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙?9 @𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
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9:;<
, with 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝜃𝜃"(𝐵𝐵) - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝜉𝜉" = 𝜒𝜒"𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P), 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
|𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P)|  
 
 
𝑢𝑢",C
DEF(P)<0 , and decreases vice ver-
sa;
Is proportional to the GVA shocks on the CPRS (in the limit of small Climate Policy 
Shocks).
𝐴𝐴"(𝑇𝑇)= 𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) (1+𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) + 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃))<	𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇) ⟺ 𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)  
= 𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇)/𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) – 1 - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑇𝑇, 𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝒫𝒫 (𝜂𝜂" < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙(5)(𝜂𝜂")𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)= 𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)	- 𝑞𝑞"(𝐵𝐵) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙?98@𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
, with 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝜃𝜃"(𝐵𝐵) - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝜉𝜉" = 𝜒𝜒"𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P), 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
|𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P)|  
 
 
𝑢𝑢",C
DEF(P)<0 
𝐴𝐴"(𝑇𝑇)= 𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) (1+𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) + 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃)) 	𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇) ⟺ 𝜂𝜂"(𝑇𝑇) < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)  
= 𝐿𝐿"(𝑇𝑇)/𝐴𝐴"(𝑡𝑡) – 1 - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑇𝑇, 𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝒫𝒫 (𝜂𝜂" < 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃)) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙(5)(𝜂𝜂")𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞" 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃)	- 𝑞𝑞"(𝐵𝐵) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙?98@𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂"
78(5)
9:;<
, with 𝜃𝜃"(𝑃𝑃) = 𝜃𝜃"(𝐵𝐵) - 𝜉𝜉"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
𝜉𝜉" = 𝜒𝜒"𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P), 
 
 
∆𝑞𝑞"(𝑃𝑃) 
 
 
|𝑢𝑢",CDEF(P)|  
 
 
𝑢𝑢",C
DEF(P)<0 
EUROPEAN INSUR ANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS AUTHORIT Y
80
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Overall, we consider the combination of two market conditions scenarios with climate 
policy scenarios described in Section 4. The market condition scenarios are reflected in 
the different values of loss-given-default LGD and elasticity.In the mild scenario, LGD = 
0.2 and = 0.2. In the adverse scenario, LGD = 0.4 and = 0.5.
For each scenario combination and IAM, we compute the shock on the value of each 
bond in the holdings’ dataset. The description of the scenarios considered in this exercise 
are provided in the Appendix. We then compute the resulting aggregate shocks on the 
value of the portfolio of each European insurance company (“solo”). We define as port-
folio impact of the climate policy shock the ratio of the value of the portfolio after the 
shock over the initial value before the shock. In a series of boxplots, we study the distri-
bution of the values of the portfolio impact of climate policy shocks under varying levels 
of aggregation. The difference between the median impact and 100% is considered as 
the median shock on the portfolio values.
Notice that three dimensions drive the magnitude of portfolio impact. First, for each sov-
ereign bond negative shocks (e.g. on primary energy fossil sector) can be possibly com-
pensated by positive shocks (e.g. on secondary energy electricity based on renewable 
sources). Second, in a portfolio of sovereign bonds issued by several countries, negative 
aggregate shocks from a less climate-aligned sovereign can be possibly compensated by 
positive shocks from another more climate-aligned sovereign (see also Appendix Table 
A1.3). Third, in some of the figures the results from several models or several scenari-
os are pooled together in one distribution. These three dimensions concur to limit the 
magnitude of the median value of the portfolio impact in the following charts. Further, 
recall that in this application of the CLIMAFIN framework, we do not consider the mac-
ro-economic reverberations of a shock on a given sector. Therefore, the results are to be 
considered as conservative.   
Chart A1.1-2 show the box plots of the portfolio impact distribution across insurance 
holders and IAMs, for selected climate policy scenarios. Chart A1.1 and A1.2 refer, respec-
tively, to the mild and adverse scenario on market conditions. In the mild scenario, the 
first quartile of the distribution varies between 99.6% and 99.8%. In the adverse scenar-
io, the same quantity varies between 98.2% and 99.4%. The median shock in the adverse 
scenario is about 3 times larger than in the mild scenario.
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Figure A1.1: Distribution of impact on sovereign hold-
ings of European insurers across climate policy shock 
scenarios, under the mild scenario on market condi-
tions.
Figure A1.2: Distribution of impact on sovereign 
holdings of European insurers across climate policy 
shock scenarios, under the adverse scenario on market 
conditions.
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Note: Y-axis corresponds to the percentage of the original value of government portfolios (e.g. 100% expresses 0% impact, 97% corresponds to drop of 3%). The 
description of scenarios is provided in Appendix.
Chart A1.3-4 show the box plots of the portfolio impact distribution across holders, estimat-
ed by the model MESSAGE (Krey et al. 2016; Fricko et al. 2017), for selected climate policy 
scenarios. Chart A1.3 and A1.4 refer, respectively, to the mild and adverse scenario on market 
conditions. In the mild scenario, the first quartile of the distribution varies between 99.3% 
and 99.8%. In the adverse scenario, the same quantity varies between 97.4% and 99.0%. 
The median shock in the adverse scenario is again about three times larger than in the mild 
scenario.
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Figure A1.3: Distribution of impact on sovereign 
holdings of European insurers estimated by the model 
MESSAGE across climate policy shock scenarios, under 
the mild scenario on market conditions.
Figure A1.4: Distribution of impact on sovereign 
holdings of European insurers estimated by the model 
MESSAGE across climate policy shock scenarios, under 
the adverse scenario on market conditions.
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Note: Y-axis corresponds to the percentage of the original value of government portfolios (e.g. 100% expresses 0% impact, 97% corresponds to drop of 3%). The descrip-
tion of scenarios is provided in Appendix.
Chart A1.5-6 shows the box plots of the portfolio impact distribution across holders, 
conditioned to the country of the insurance holder, for a given selected climate policy 
scenario, and estimated across all the models in the LIMITS database (Kriegler et al. 2013). 
Chart A1.5 refers to the climate policy scenario RefPol500 and the mild market condition 
scenario. Chart A1.6 refers to the climate policy scenario StrPol450 and the adverse mar-
ket condition scenario. In the mild scenario, the first quartile of the distribution varies 
between 99.3% and 100.0%. In the adverse scenario, thefirst quartile varies between 
96.2% and 99.5%. The median shock in the adverse scenario is about 5 times larger than 
in the mild scenario. Note that we have excluded countries for which the number of ob-
servations did not allow to draw the box plot (i.e. Romania in A1.5, Romania and Iceland 
in A1.6).
Figure A1.5: Distribution of impact on sovereign holdings of European insurers conditioned to the country of the 
holder, across climate policy shock scenarios and under the mild scenario on market conditions.
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PL HU DE SK BE AT SI UK FI NL EE LV GR IT ES LT DK LU PT FR IE BG MT LI NO HR CZ CY SE IS
Source: EIOPA and own calculations
Note: Y-axis corresponds to the percentage of the original value of government portfolios (e.g. 100% expresses 0% impact, 97% corresponds to drop of 3%). The descrip-
tion of the scenarios is provided in Appendix.
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Figure A1.6: Distribution of impact on sovereign holdings of European insurers conditioned to the country of the 
holder, across climate policy shock scenarios and under the adverse scenario on market conditions.
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Source: EIOPA and own calculations
Note: Y-axis corresponds to the percentage of the original value of government portfolios (e.g. 100% expresses 0% impact, 97% corresponds to drop of 3%). The descrip-
tion of the scenarios is provided in Appendix.
The results of this analysis should be considered as conservative for the following rea-
sons. First, since global GHG emissions are still increasing (WMO 2019) and countries 
are not aligning their policies to their climate pledges, stricter climate policies might be 
introduced. Second, the IAMs’ policy scenarios that we considered were defined before 
the Paris Agreement. Thus, tighter policy scenarios are likely to be needed to achieve the 
2°C target. Further, it must be noticed that the energy technology shocks (both on fossil 
and renewable energy sources) vary considerably across the IAMs used, for the same 
regions and countries considered. Finally, we should consider investors’ sentiments, i.e. 
the expectations about changes in (even few decimal points) in GVA and GDP growth 
could impact sovereign bonds’ yields.
6.  CONCLUSION
In this analysis, we have developed the first climate transition risk assessment of the sov-
ereign bonds’ portfolios of solo insurance companies in Europe under deep uncertainty. 
This is the result of the first collaboration between, climate economics modellers, climate 
financial risk scholars and researchers from a public authority with a mandate to contrib-
ute to financial stability. We opted for the CLIMAFIN framework by Battiston et al. (2019) 
because it is the first and transparent approach that combines 1) forward-looking climate 
transition risk shocks obtained from climate economic models that are the reference for 
scientific community and the IPCC (in this context, the LIMITS IAMs) with; 2) climate 
financial risk metrics and methods that are now a reference in both the academic and 
practitioners’ community (Battiston et al., 2017). In particular, the CLIMAFIN approach 
allows to embed forward-looking climate transition risk scenarios (i.e. a disorderly intro-
duction of climate policies that cannot be fully anticipated and priced in by insurers) in 
the valuation of counterparty risk, in the probability of default of individual sovereign 
bonds and largest losses on investors’ portfolios (Battiston et al., 2019).
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In this application, we have considered a  simple financial pricing model for zero and 
multi-coupon sovereign bonds adjusted for climate policy shock scenarios. This allows 
to compute an adjusted value of bonds’ portfolios in order to assess how future climate 
transition risk could affect the probability of default of individual sovereign bonds, the 
financial solvability of the sovereign and the performance of European insurers who are 
exposed to those bonds. The analysis uses the solo data of insurers from 31 countries in 
EU/EEA that reported Solvency II data at the end of 2018, including all insurers’ invest-
ments into sovereign bonds, complemented by information on the characteristics of the 
bonds available from the CSDB.
Our results show that the potential impact of a disorderly low carbon transition on in-
surers portfolios of sovereign bonds is moderate in terms of its magnitude. However, it 
is non-negligible in several feasible scenarios. Overall, it emerges that the climate policy 
transition path chosen, and the role of fossil fuels and renewable energy technologies in 
the sovereign’s GVA and fiscal revenues, can considerably affect the fiscal and financial 
risk position of a country, via the change in the probability of default (PD) and in the val-
ue of the sovereign bonds and the Climate Spread. In general, countries that have already 
started to align their economy to the low-carbon transition (and thus where renewable 
energy technologies play a larger role on its GVA and fiscal revenues) face a decrease in 
the PD and in the Climate Spread, and thus better refinancing conditions. In contrast, 
countries whose GVA is carbon intensive would face an increase in the PD and in the 
Climate Spread.
This, in turn, could have relevant implications for the financial risk profile of the insurers 
who own sovereign bonds of countries that are misaligned to the low-carbon transition 
and the climate targets. Thus, it would be in the interest of insurers’ supervisors to ex-
tend this climate financial risk pricing exercise (ideally in a climate stress-test exercise, 
see e.g. Battiston et al., 2017) for financial risk monitoring and assessment purposes.
REFERENCES
Ackerman, F. (2017). Worst-Case Economics: Extreme Events in Climate and Finance. An-
them Press.
Alessi, L., Ossola, E., & Panzica, R. (2019). The Greenium Matters: Evidence on the Pricing 
of Climate
Risk. University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics 
Working
Paper, (418).
Battiston, S., Farmer, J. D., Flache, A., Garlaschelli, D., Haldane, A. G., Heesterbeek, H.,... 
& Scheffer, M. (2016). Complexity theory and financial regulation. Science, 351(6275), 818-
819.
Battiston, S. (2019). The importance of being forward-looking: managing financial sta-
bility in the face of climate risk. Banque de France’s Financial Stability Review, (23), 39-48.
FINANCIAL STABILIT Y REPORT
85
Battiston, S., Mandel, A., Monasterolo, I., Schütze, F., & Visentin, G. (2017). A  Climate 
Stress-test of
the Financial System. Nature Climate Change, 7(4), 283–288. https://doi.org/10.1038/ncli-
mate3255
Battiston, S. & Monasterolo, I. (2019). A Climate Risk Assessment of Sovereign Bonds’ 
Portfolio Working paper, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3376218
Black, F., Scholes, M. (1973). The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal of 
Political Economy, 81(3), 637-654.
Duffie, D., Singleton, K. J. (1999). Modeling term structures of defaultable bonds. The 
Review of Financial Studies, 12(4), 687-720.
Gray, D. F., Merton, R. C., Bodie, Z. (2007). New framework for measuring and manag-
ing macrofinancial risk and financial stability (No. w13607). National Bureau of Economic 
Research.
Greenwald, B. C., Stiglitz, J. E. (1986). Externalities in economies with imperfect informa-
tion and incomplete markets. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(2), 229-264.
Krey V, Havlik P, Fricko O, Zilliacus J, Gidden M, Strubegger M, Kartasasmita G, Ermo-
lieva T, Forsell N, Gusti M, Johnson N, Kindermann G, Kolp P, McCollum DL, Pachau-
ri S, Rao S, Rogelj J, Valin H, Obersteiner M, Riahi K  (2016) MESSAGE-GLOBIOM 1.0 
Documentation. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, 
Austria http://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/message-globiom/.
Fricko O, Havlik P, Rogelj J, Klimont Z, Gusti M, Johnson N, Kolp P, Strubegger M, Valin H, 
Amann M, Ermolieva T, Forsell N, Herrero M, Heyes C, Kindermann G, Krey V, McCollum 
DL, Obersteiner M, Pachauri S, Rao S, Schmid E, Schoepp W, Riahi K (2017) The marker 
quantification of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 2: A middle-of-the-road scenario for 
the 21st century. Global Environmental Change, Volume 42, Pages 251-26, DOI:10.1016/j.
gloenvcha.2016.06.004.
High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance (HLEG) (2018). Sustainable European 
Economy. Report to the European Commission, 1–100.
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes. Vol. 8 (A Treatise on 
Probability). London: MacMillan for the Royal Economic Society.
Knight, F. H. (1921). Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Boston: Houghton Miffin Co, 210-235.
Kriegler et al. (2013) What does the 2 C target imply for a global climate agreement in 
2020? The LIMITS study on Durban Platform scenarios. Climate Change Economics 4, 
1340008.
Karpf, A., & Mandel, A. (2018). The Changing Value of the ‘Green’ Label on the US Munic-
ipal Bond Market. Nature Climate Change, 8(2), 161.
Leaton, J. (2012). Unburnable Carbon—Are the World’s Financial Markets Carrying a Car-
bon Bubble?. Carbon Tracker Initiative.
EUROPEAN INSUR ANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS AUTHORIT Y
86
Monasterolo, I., Battiston, S., Janetos, A. C. A. C., Zheng, Z. (2017). Vulnerable yet rele-
vant: the two dimensions of climate-related financial disclosure. Climatic Change, 145(34), 
495507.
Monasterolo, I. (2019). Climate Change and the Financial System. Working paper, under 
review at the Annual Review of Resource Economics (vol 12). Available at SSRN.
Morana, C., and Sbrana, G. (2019). Climate change implications for the catastrophe bonds 
market: An empirical analysis. Economic Modelling.
Pindyck, R. S. (2013). Climate Change Policy: What Do the Models Tell Us? National Bu-
reau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, 51, 1–23.
Ramelli, S., Wagner, A. F., Zeckhauser, R. J., & Ziegler, A. (2018). Stock price rewards to cli-
mate saints and sinners: Evidence from the Trump election (No. w25310). National Bureau 
of Economic Research Working Paper Series.
Steffen, B. (2018). The importance of project finance for renewable energy projects. En-
ergy Economics, 69, 280-294.
Stern, N. (2008). The economics of climate change. The American Economic Review, 98(2), 
1-37.
Stiglitz, J., Stern, N., Duan, M., Edenhofer, O., Giraud, G., Heal, G., L` ebre la Rovere, E., 
Morris, A., Moyer, E., Pangestu, M., Shukla, P., Sokona, Y., & Winkler, H. (2017). Report of 
the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices. Technical Report Carbon Pricing Leader-
ship Coalition.
UNFCCC (2016). Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held 
in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by 
the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session. (No. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1). 
Paris: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Wagner, A. F., Zeckhauser, R. J. & A. l. Ziegler (2018). Company Stock Price Reactions to 
the 2016 Election Shock: Trump, Taxes, and Trade. Journal of Financial Economics 130: 
428-451.
WMO 2019, World Meteorological Organization, Greenhouse gas concentration in at-
mosphere reach yet another high, https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/green-
house-gas-concentrations-atmosphere-reach-yet-another-high
Zerbib, O. D. (2019), The Effect of Pro-Environmental Preferences on Bond Prices: Evi-
dence from green Bonds, Journal of Banking and Finance, 98, 39-60.
FINANCIAL STABILIT Y REPORT
87
APPENDIX
CLIMATE POLICIES SCENARIOS LIMITS. 
In this exercise we consider the scenarios elaborated by the international scientific con-
sortium LIMITS. This is a database of economic trajectories that are consistent with 10 
climate transition scenarios. The main features of climate mitigation are the following:
 › The level of ambition in emission reduction in the near-term (2020):
 ¡ reference policy ‘weak’ corresponds to unconditional Copenhagen Pledges; 
more ‘stringent’ based on conditional Copenhagen Pledges.
 › The level of ambition in emission reduction in the long-term (2100):
 ¡ either no target or concentrations targets of 450 and 500 ppm CO2-eq, corre-
sponding to high chances of achieving 2°C
 › The level of international cooperation until 2020 and 2030:
 ¡ no cooperation, fragmented action, coordinated action.
Table A1.2: LIMITS scenarios’ characteristics.
Scenario 
class
Scenario name Scenario 
type
Level of 
ambition 
(near term)
Level of 
ambition 
(long term)
Level of 
international 
cooperation
No policy Base Baseline None N/A None
Fragmented 
action
RefPol Reference Weak 2100 None
StrPol Reference Stringent 2100 None
Immediate 
action
450 Benchmark None N/A 450 ppm
500 Benchmark None N/A 500 ppm
Delayed 
Policy
RefPol-450 Climate 
Policy
Weak 2020 450 ppm
Delayed 
Policy
StrPol-450 Climate 
Policy
Stringent 2020 500 ppm
Delayed 
Policy
RefPol-500 Climate 
Policy
Weak 2020 500 ppm
Delayed 
Policy
StrPol-500 Climate 
Policy
Stringent 2020 500 ppm
Delayed 
Action
RefPol2030-500 Climate 
Policy
Weak 2030 501 ppm
Source: Table based on: E. Kriegler, M. Tavoni, T. Aboumahboub, G. Luderer, K. Calvin, G. De Maere, V. Krey, K. Riahi, H. 
Rosler, M. Schaeffer, D. van Vuuren (2013): Climate Change Economics 4(4), doi: 10.1142/S2010007813400083.
We consider the trajectories computed under 6 Integrated Assessment Models (AIM-En-
duse, GCAM, IMAGE, MESSAGE, REMIND, and WITCH). More information is available 
at: https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/LIMITSDB/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=about#tutorial
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CLIMATE POLICIES SCENARIO LIMITS REDPOL-450 MILD 
COMPUTED WITH THE IAM MESSAGE
The following table provides simple average of results of shock for the scenario LIMITS 
RedPol-450 mild computed with the IAM MESSAGE aggregated by bond issuers and 
their residual maturities. The sovereigns that were not sufficiently represented across dif-
ferent residual maturities were excluded from the table. As sovereign bonds that are held 
by insurers in their investment portfolios could have different parameters, the obtained 
results were smoothed out using estimated linear trends. In this way the results could 
be generated even for residual maturities that were not available in our data sample. The 
following table could be used as an illustrative example how to integrate forward-look-
ing climate transition in a bottom up insurance stress test. The climate shocks could be 
then combined with other shocks, e.g. market shocks prescribed in the given stress test 
scenario.
Table A1.3: Average impact of scenario LIMITS RedPol-450 mild computed by IAM 
MESSAGE for different sovereigns and residual maturities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20
Austria -0.31% -0.33% -0.35% -0.37% -0.38% -0.40% -0.42% -0.44% -0.46% -0.48% -0.57% -0.66%
Belgium -0.24% -0.27% -0.29% -0.31% -0.34% -0.36% -0.38% -0.41% -0.43% -0.45% -0.57% -0.68%
Denmark -0.07% -0.10% -0.13% -0.16% -0.19% -0.22% -0.25% -0.29% -0.32% -0.35% -0.50% -0.65%
Finland -0.07% -0.11% -0.15% -0.19% -0.23% -0.27% -0.31% -0.35% -0.39% -0.42% -0.62% -0.82%
France -0.32% -0.34% -0.37% -0.39% -0.42% -0.45% -0.47% -0.50% -0.52% -0.55% -0.67% -0.80%
Germany -0.12% -0.19% -0.25% -0.31% -0.38% -0.44% -0.50% -0.56% -0.63% -0.69% -1.00% -1.32%
Greece -0.26% -0.27% -0.27% -0.28% -0.28% -0.29% -0.30% -0.30% -0.31% -0.31% -0.34% -0.37%
lceland 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
lreland -0.01% -0.07% -0.13% -0.18% -0.24% -0.30% -0.36% -0.42% -0.48% -0.54% -0.83% -1.12%
ltaly -0.22% -0.2.3% -0.25% -0.26% -0.27% -0.29% -0.30% -0.31% -0.33% -0.34% -0.40% -0.47%
Luxembourg -0.02% -0.04% -0.07% -0.09% -0.12% -0.14% -0.16% -0.19% -0.21% -0.24% -0.36% -0.48%
Netherlands -0.10% -0.20% -0.30% -0.40% -0.50% -0.60% -0.70% -0.80% -0.90% -1.00% -1.49% -1.99%
Norway -0.01% -0.01% -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% -0.03% -0.03% -0.04% -0.04% -0.04% -0.06% -0.08%
Poland -0.74% -0.73% -0.72% -0.71% -0.70% -0.69% -0.68% -0.67% -0.66% -0.65% -0.60% -0.54%
Spain -0.18% -0.21% -0.25% -0.28% -0.32% -0.35% -0.39% -0.42% -0.46% -0.49% -0.67% -0.84%
Sweden -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
United Kingdom -0.33% -0.28% -0.23% -0.18% -0.12% -0.40% -0.44% -0.47% -0.50% -0.53% -0.69% -0.85%
Switzerland -0.24% -0.28% -0.31% -0.34% -0.37% -0.07% -0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.14% 0.40% 0.66%
United States -0.13% -0.13% -0.14% -0.14% -0.15% -0.16% -0.16% -0.17% -0.18% -0.18% -0.22% -0.25%
Source: EIOPA and own calculations
Note: The columns represent residual maturities. The obtained results were smoothed out cross residual maturities using 
estimated linear trends.
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IMPACT OF VARIATION 
MARGINING ON EU INSURERS’ 
LIQUIDITY: AN ANALYSIS 
OF INTEREST RATE SWAPS 
POSITIONS49 50
Alexandra de Jong51, Alin Draghiciu52, Linda Fache Rousová53, 
Alessandro Fontana52, Elisa Letizia53
ABSTRACT
Insures use derivatives to hedge risks from investments portfolios and underwriting, but this 
exposes them to liquidity risk. This study uses Solvency II reporting data to assess to what ex-
tent European (re-)insurers would be able to meet potential variation margin calls on interest 
rate swaps portfolios. Interest rate swaps pose the largest share of (re-)insurers derivatives’ 
portfolios. We consider several shifts to the yield curve, calculate the corresponding variation 
margin calls, compare them to liquid assets available to insurers and derive the potential 
liquidity shortfalls. Our results reveal that there may be a liquidity risk for (re-)insurers stem-
ming from the use of derivatives, in particular interest rate swaps (IRS). This reflects both 
high IRS exposure and insufficient holdings of cash and liquid assets. Based on the analysis 
presented in this article we conclude that some insurers have not yet adapted their asset allo-
cation and liquidity management practices to the (new) requirements on margining practices 
which have been introduced as part of the OTC derivatives reform.
49 An extended version of the underlying analysis and policy implications will appear in forthcoming ESRB 
publications.
50 The authors would like to thank Jakob Roager Jensen and Samuel Donald Achord for sharing their method-
ology for pricing IRS and estimating variation margin calls. Furthermore, we would like to thank Olaf Weeken, 
Giuseppe Insalaco (both ESRB Secretariat), members if the Work Stream of ESRB Insurance Expert Group (Lasse 
Hjortsballe, Alexander Ristig, Liliana Arias, Katia Specchia) for their valuable comments and input.
51 European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). The work was carried out during her 
secondment to the ESRB Secretariat.
52 European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA).
53 European Central Bank (ECB). Disclaimer: This paper should not be reported as representing the views of 
the European Central Bank (ECB). The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the ECB.
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INTRODUCTION
Derivatives exposures of insurance companies came into the spotlight after the near-fail-
ure of the global insurance conglomerate, American International Group (AIG). This 
group was rescued at the height of the financial crisis because of the significant losses on 
the credit default swap (CDS) portfolio held by its Financial Products Subsidiary. Beside 
the dramatic change in market value of the protection sold, one of the main aspects of 
the near-failure was a liquidity shortfall in managing collaterals. When AIG’s credit rating 
was lowered collateral provisions kicked in and AIG suddenly received massive margin 
calls54. Since then, derivatives exposures of insurers have been considered as a potential 
risk to financial stability.
Recent studies55 on European insurers have shown that their aggregate derivatives hold-
ings are small. Specifically, the market value of all derivatives positions amounts to only 
ca. 1% of total investments. Nevertheless, there are a number of companies with sizeable 
exposures. Moreover, the notional amount of interest rate swaps (IRS) – which represent 
the largest class in insurers’ derivatives portfolios – has been steadily rising since the 
beginning of 2018. In particular, the amount of IRS where insurers receive fixed rate has 
more than doubled since then, see Figure A2.1. While European insurers use derivatives 
to hedge risks from investments portfolios and underwriting, their derivative holdings 
can also expose them to higher liquidity risk, which is the focus of this study.
Figure A2.1: Notional amounts (EUR) of interest rate swaps and cash holdings of EEA insurers
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54 On September 15, 2008, the day all three major agencies downgraded AIG to a credit rating below AA-, calls 
for collateral on its credit default swaps raised to $32 billion a huge change from $8.6 billion in collateral calls just 
few days earlier.
55 EIOPA (2018); Fache Rousova, L. and E. Letizia (2019).
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In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the need for reducing counterparty credit risk 
became apparent. This has been addressed by introducing new rules. The European Mar-
ket Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)56 has, in particular, introduced the requirement to 
centrally clear the most commonly used types of derivatives contracts and to exchange 
collateral in the form of margins for both bilateral and centrally cleared transactions. 
These requirements aim to make the financial system safer by protecting participants 
from counterparty credit risk.
This study focusses on the exchange of ‘variation margins’ (VM). These reflect the change 
in market value and portfolio composition of the contracts of a company. Since VM calls 
have to be typically paid at a  short notice (e.g. overnight or even intra-day), the cash 
position plays a central role as cash is the most widely used instrument to meet these 
calls owing to its fungibility (regardless of whether the contracts are centrally cleared or 
not). However, despite the rapid increase in insurers’ holdings of IRS, the aggregate cash 
position of EEA insurers has remained stable since the beginning of 2018 (see Figure 1).
Against this background, this article investigates the liquidity risk faced by EAA insurers 
from the need to pay VM on their IRS exposures. Using Solvency II data on contract level, 
we first apply a parallel positive shift to the level of interest rates, calculate the corre-
sponding variation margin calls on insurers’ portfolio of interest rate swaps and compare 
them to different liquid assets available to insurers. In this way, we derive any potential 
liquidity short-falls. To assess the sensitivity and robustness of our results, we consider 
a range of interest rate increases and various measures of liquid assets.
Overall, we observe liquidity shortfalls for almost all combinations of interest rate shifts 
and liquid assets. Considering all set-ups, the aggregate estimated liquidity shortfalls for 
the EEA insurers in our sample implied by the variation margins calls range between EUR 
1bn to almost EUR 90bn. These estimates are sizeable compared to the overall Solvency 
II value of plain vanilla interest rate swaps held by the companies in our sample (i.e. Q4-
2018), which totalled EUR 22.5bn. By the same token, they are sizeable compared to the 
initial liquidity positions of these companies (EUR 21bn – EUR 740bn) and also to their 
average open positions in the repo market (EUR 50bn of cash borrowing and EUR 15bn of 
cash lending on average during 2018). On the other hand, the figures are small compared 
to the overall size of total investment of the companies in our sample, which stands at 
around EUR 4.8trn.
This article is structured as follow. Section 2 describes the data and the methodology 
used in this study. Section 3 presents the results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
METHODOLOGY
This section describes the regulatory background for margining practice, the data used, 
the pricing of the IRS positions and the set-up of the analysis.
REGULATORY BACKGROUND FOR MARGINING PRACTICES
Recently introduced regulatory requirements have changed the risks associated with de-
rivatives transactions from counterparty credit risk to liquidity risk. The European Market 
56 ADD reference to EMIR.
EUROPEAN INSUR ANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS AUTHORIT Y
92
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) requires the most commonly used types of derivatives 
contracts (incl. IRS)57 to be centrally cleared58. (Re)insurers that have a gross exposure of 
more than €3 billion in OTC interest rate derivatives will be mandated to clear59. Coun-
terparties below this threshold are exempted from clearing obligations, but could be 
still required to meet them bilaterally. Non-centrally cleared derivatives are subject to 
specific requirements on margins60. Bilateral counterparties above specific thresholds are 
mandated to exchange daily variation margins and to post initial margins to each other.
Whereas all counterparties are subject to exchange of variation margins since March 
2017, there is a phase-in scheduled for the obligation to exchange initial margins61. As 
of the 1 September 2019 the requirements apply to all cases where both counterparties 
have, or belong to groups each of which has, an aggregate average notional amount of 
non-centrally cleared derivatives that is above €750 billion; this threshold will be lowered 
to €8 billion from the 1 September 2020. Regulation admits the possibility of exchanging 
non-cash variation margins for non-centrally cleared derivatives. Unlike for cleared de-
rivatives, the regulation allows to collateralise the exposure from variation margin calls 
with non-cash collateral. Although the evidence on non-cash variation margin payments 
is scarce, this option could be attractive for asset rich but cash poor insurers.
The above margining requirements only apply to new trades concluded after the appli-
cable phasing in deadlines. It will therefore take time before new trades replace all the 
legacy trades which are not covered by the requirements.
DATA
This study employs quarterly reporting data for solo undertakings in Q4-201862. This was 
the most recent data at the time when the analysis has been implemented. The sample 
includes derivatives held directly, not considering exposures via collective investment 
funds.
57 The clearing obligation under EMIR comprises certain classes of interest rate and credit OTC derivatives, 
which have to be cleared by authorised or recognised CCPs. For instance, (a) fixed-to-float interest rate swaps 
denominated in EUR, GBP, JPY, NOK, PLN, SEK and USD and (b) several series of credit default swaps denominat-
ed in EUR are subject to the clearing obligation. The details of the derivatives under the clearing obligation are 
listed in “ESMA’s Public Register for the clearing obligation under EMIR. ESMA Public Register for the clearing 
obligation under EMIR; available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/public_register_for_
the_clearing_obligation_under_emir.pdf, last updated: 6 December 2018
58 As a result of the clearing obligation, counterparties (including (re)insurers) need to gain access to a quali-
fied CCP, either becoming a direct clearing member, or more commonly becoming a client to a clearing member 
which also provides indirect clearing service. Once clearing arrangements are in place and contracts are being 
cleared, counterparties become subject to the requirement to post cash to cover the CCP from the replacement 
costs in the case of their own default (initial margins) and following the daily revaluation of their positions (vari-
ation margins).
59 EMIR Refit introduced article 4(a) introduced the category of small financials, i.e. counterparties with gross 
notional below the clearing threshold as specified in article 10(4)(b). Small financials are not subject to the 
clearing obligation, but remain subject to both the reporting obligation and the risk mitigation techniques for 
derivatives not cleared by a CCP under article 11.
60 For detail of risk mitigation techniques applicable to non-centrally cleared derivatives see EMIR Article 11 
and the related Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/2251: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R2251&from=EN 
61 For details on the phase-in schedule see article 36 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/2251. 
62 The Solvency II Directive (amended by the Omnibus II Directive), became fully applicable to European (re)
insurers on 1 January 2016. Since the implementation of the Solvency II, (re)insurance solo undertakings and 
groups are required to report to national competent authorities on an annual and quarterly basis, for both 
prudential and financial stability purposes. This information is stored in EIOPA’s Central Repository, i.e. the 
database that collects all data from Quantitative Reporting Templates (QRTs). Aggregated information derived 
from EIOPA’s Central Repository is also made available on EIOPA’s website. Besides, the SII data has been used 
by EIOPA for the conduct of its tasks. This is, however, the first time that the dataset has been used for joint 
research and policy making purposes within the ESFS framework.
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Out of the 1,970 solo insurance companies that submitted (list-of-derivatives) data in Q4 
2018, 224 reported positions on interest rate swap (IRS) derivatives. Those companies 
reported 43,429 individual contracts, for a total a notional amount of EUR 1.8 trillion.
After data cleaning (see Annex), the data set contains 34,689 contracts by 170 compa-
nies. The sample is dominated by large and very large63 life insurers. These companies 
held 4.8 Trillion euro in total investments64, i.e. 46% of the total of 10.5 trillion held by 
EEA insurers as of 2018 Q4.
Further details on the data cleaning and composition of the sample are included in the 
Annex.
RE-PRICING METHODOLOGY
In the section, we describe how we evaluate and compare the change in IRS positions 
values before and after the shift of the level of the interest rate. In a first step, we invert 
the pricing formula to extract the fixed rate (this is not reported under SII) from the 
market value of each IRS contract reported by insurers. In a second step, we calculate the 
market value of each derivative contract after the shift of the level of the interest rate.
Our analysis is focused on plain vanilla IRS. This is a contract in which one party agrees 
to pay (receive) cash flows equal to interest at a predetermined fix rate on notional prin-
cipal for a certain number of years. In return, it receives (pays) an interest at a floating 
rate. An IRS is worth zero at origin when it is negotiated. After some time its value may 
be positive or negative depending on interest rate movements and the direction of the 
exposure.
To calculate the market value of an IRS, several pieces of information are needed: the 
discounting curve, and the direction of cash flows, their size, their payment schedule.
We use the EIOPA monthly risk-free term structure of spot rates65 as discounting curves. 
However, to be consistent with market valuation, the EIOPA rates are considered only up 
to the last liquid point, after which the curve is assumed to be flat.66 The specific curve 
used depends on the contract’s currency.
The type of IRS contract determines which of the two parties is the fixed-rate payer (and 
floating rate receiver), i.e. the side in the swap. In principle, if an insurer is a floating rate 
payer and fixed rate receiver (i.e. “receives fix”) it, uses the IRS to extend the duration 
of the assets, most likely to closer match the duration of the liabilities (i.e. to hedge the 
interest rate exposure on the liabilities side). Differently, if an insurer is a fixed rate payer 
and floating rate receiver (i.e. “pay fix”) it, uses the IRS to hedge the interest rate expo-
sure on the asset side.
63 To classify companies according to their size we rank of all companies in the QRT data according to their 
total assets. We denote as large companies, those that have total assets above EUR 1.6 billion, and very large 
those above EUR 8 billion in total assets.
64 Rather than “total assets”, in the insurance context “total investments” is typically a figure widely used. For 
example, it is used as the denominator for calculating statistics such as the split of investments. In Q4-2018 total 
assets is 11.2 Trillion EUR, while total investment is 10.5; these two figures are very close.
65 We use the EIOPA monthly risk-free term structure of spot rates without Volatility Adjustment (VA) and with 
the Credit Risk Adjustment (CRA) added back.
66 This is different from the approach used for the calculation of capital requirements under SII regulation, in 
which case the curve converges to the ultimate forward rate defined in the SII regulation after the last liquid 
point.
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The size of cash flows depends on three variables: the fixed and floating rates, and the 
notional amount. The fixed rate is not reported under SII. We obtain it by inverting for-
mula that equates the market value (SII value) of the IRS observed in the derivatives 
template (S.08.01) at the reporting date. If its value is outside a tolerance level (-5 to 10%) 
then it is set to a default value of 2%, which is approximately the average in the sample. 
In line with the discounting approach we use, the floating rate is derived from the EIOPA 
term structure for a specific currency (amended after the last liquid point). The notional 
amount is available from SII reporting and is used to compute the cash flows to be ex-
changed at interest payment dates.
The maturity and the swap payment frequency determine the total number of cash flows 
and the schedule when they are exchanged. In line with common market practice, the 
payment frequency is assumed to be twice per year and both legs are assumed to have 
the same payment frequency. The maturity determines the time span over which cash 
flows are exchanged.
We apply the pricing methodology where the IRS is evaluated as a portfolio of forward 
rate agreements (FRAs). The steps are the following: a) calculate the present value of the 
cash flows of the fixed leg, b) calculate the present value of the cash flows of the floating 
leg and finally c) obtain the value of the IRS as the difference of the two legs. The im-
plementation of the pricing formula in our paper is a simplification of most widely used 
formulas.67 First, it allows only for parallel shifts of the risk-free rate curve. Second, our 
implementation uses the EIOPA’s term structure to derive both the discount factor and 
the floating rates. These approximations would not be sufficiently accurate for trading, 
but our model provides a  materially correct assessment of changes in market values 
under shifts in interest rates.
SET UP OF THE ANALYSIS
In this section, we describe how we analyse whether insurers’ liquidity is sufficient to 
cover variation margin calls following the re-pricing of their IRS portfolio. An insurer 
receives a variation margin call when the market value of its IRS derivative portfolios 
decreases. One company may receive and send several margin calls depending on the 
number of counterparties and portfolios. To assess if it holds sufficient liquidity to meet 
such calls we make several assumptions regarding
1. the type and size of market movement;
2. which contracts contribute to the margin calls;
3. how contracts are aggregated and netted in portfolios;
4. which assets can be employed to cover such margin calls.
We consider parallel upward shifts of the reference curves. Typically, insurers set up IRS 
positions so to receive the fixed rate and pay floating. They are therefore likely to be 
more vulnerable to margin calls in the case of an increase in interest rates. In our exer-
cise, the risk free rate curves for all currencies68 shift simultaneously and for the same 
amplitude. We consider parallel shifts of 25 50, 75 and 100 basis points (bps). Historical 
data (see Table A2.1) show that a movement of 25bps in a day is not unprecedented; we 
therefore depict a 25bp increase a “one-day correction”. Larger movements may be more 
unlikely to observe in a single day, but can represent a continued period of market tur-
67 See for example Hull, J. Options, Futures and other derivatives (8th edition, pp 160-164)
68 Curves are identified by the currency of the contract, i.e. we assume to have only one curve for each curren-
cy.
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moil over several days; we in particular focus on a movement of 75 bps, which we define 
as a “prolonged market turmoil”.
Table A2.1. Quantile distribution of changes in 1Y EUR OIS rate during periods of 1,5 and 10 
days between January 2005 and July 2018 as an example of floating rate dynamics.
1y OIS rate changes [bps] 1 day 5 days 10 days
min -26 -48 -90
25th percentile -1 -2 -3
median 0 0 0
75th percentile 1 2 3
max 27 35 37
Source: Bloomberg
We assume that all derivatives contracts in insurers’ portfolios are collateralised by vari-
ation margins. We do not distinguish between cleared and uncleared trades for two rea-
sons. Firstly, in Solvency II reporting it may be difficult to distinguish these two groups 
because of data reporting requirements and data quality issues. Secondly, for cleared 
contracts insurers would receive the margin call from the clearing member, with timing 
and modality more similar to bilateral trades.69
We consider the two extreme cases of no and full netting. Variation margins are comput-
ed on a portfolio basis and positive and negative contributions within a portfolio offset. 
A pair of counterparties may have several portfolios (also referred to as netting sets), but 
usually contracts of a certain type (e.g. interest rate derivatives) in the same currency are 
grouped together in one portfolio. The information on the composition of the netting 
sets is however not available in Solvency II reporting. Therefore, we opt for the two ex-
treme cases. On the one hand, the full netting configuration represents an insurer trading 
only one type of contract with one counterpart. This is realistic as many insurers engage 
with only few counterparties and they typically choose few types of highly standardised 
contracts. The no netting configuration, on the other hand, represents an insurer, which 
has a range of portfolios with several counterparties and, therefore, margins cannot off-
set. While this is somewhat less realistic assumption from the perspective of the number 
of counterparties, this configuration could be relevant in case of intra-day or overnight 
variation margin calls, when the timing of a margin payment and margin reception may 
differ. In our analysis, we present results as a range between these two extreme config-
urations.
We employ cash, bond and money market fund shares holdings to define the available 
liquidity (see Table A2.2). Cash is the preferred asset to cover variation margin calls, pri-
marily because it can be transferred between counterparts very quickly. One approach 
is to consider the entire cash available. Another is to consider only a part of the cash 
available. This second case is intended to cover the situations when other instruments – 
not included in our analysis – would also generate margin calls. For instance, interest rate 
shocks tend to be accompanied by FX shocks, which may generate additional margin 
calls on FX derivatives, the second most prominent derivative class in insurers’ portfolios. 
Highly liquid bonds can be accepted to cover variation margin calls under a wide range of 
bilateral agreements, even though they may be less preferred than cash by the receiving 
counterpart. Furthermore, insurers can use such bonds as collateral in repurchase agree-
ment transactions (REPOs) or they may liquidate them to obtain cash to cover margin 
69 For more detail on the clearing configurations for EEA insurers see the forthcoming ESRB publications.
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calls (see cash and bond positions). Finally, insurers tend to invest in other highly liquid 
instruments such as money market funds, which can be quickly redeemed. Therefore, 
our broadest definition of liquidity considers also these instruments (last column in the 
table). Also, equity is very often a liquid asset, but we do not consider it in our analysis as 
it is generally not used as a collateral in derivatives transactions.
Table A2.2: Liquid assets
Instrument
Cash positions Cash and bonds positions
Cash, gov. 
bonds and 
MMF shares 
position
Cash, gov. 
and corp. 
bonds and 
MMF shares 
position
narrow cash broad cash cash & AAA 
bonds
cash & AAA/
AA bonds
Cash and cash 
equivalents
Rescaled X X X X X
AAA-rated gov. bonds X X X X
AA-rated gov. bonds X X X
Money market funds 
(MMF) shares
X X
AAA-AA corporate 
bonds
X
median [€ mln] 
average [€ mln] 
total [€ mln]
35
124
21,084
106
297
50,469
347
1,148
195,226
668
3,541
601,979
946
4,357
740,634
1,489
5,925
1,007,222
Source: Solvency II QRT
Reference date: Q4 2018
Notes: Every column indicates the instruments included in the liquidity position of the corresponding test. Cash and 
equivalents refers to the sum of two categories, namely coin and notes (CIC71) and cash equivalents and transferable 
deposits (CIC72). In first narrow cash position, we rescale the amount from Cash to the share of IRS in the derivatives 
portfolio following BoE FSR. For government and corporate bonds with rating AAA (CQS0) and AA (CQS1) we exclude 
encumbered securities and in the case of 100bps and 75 bps increases we apply a haircut of 10% and 7%, respective-
ly, assuming portfolios have weighted average duration of approximately 10 years. Money market funds shares are 
estimated from the list of collective investments (CIC43). A tick (x) indicates that the instrument has included in the 
position.
RESULTS
In this section, we present our results on the impact of margin calls on insurers’ liquidity. 
We show several estimates that take into account the different assumptions we present-
ed in the previous section regarding netting, definitions of liquidity and interest rate 
shifts. Once we estimate the margin call for each company, we check when the margin 
exceeds the available liquidity. Further, we calculate the shortfall as the amount of mar-
gin not covered. On aggregate, this measure helps quantifying potential spillovers to 
the rest of the financial system. Finally, we elaborate on the key characteristics of the 
companies with liquidity shortfall.
3.1. SECTOR WIDE RESULTS
Overall, we observe shortage of liquidity, regardless of the amplitude of the interest shift 
and the definition of liquidity. In Table 3, we show the number of companies which are 
short of liquidity in all specifications of the exercise from the most severe situations (up-
per left corner: large shift and narrow definition of liquidity) to the less severe ones (low-
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er right corner: small shift and wider definition of liquidity). The netting configuration 
plays a substantial role: in case of no netting the number of cases of liquidity shortage 
increases by 30% on average across specifications.
It is particularly relevant to consider the results for cash in combination with the small 
interest rate shift. We have seen such rate movements in one day happening in the past 
and should they repeat, cash is likely to be the only instrument to cover the overnight 
margin calls.
More specifically, we find that cash is not sufficient to cover margin calls for 10% to 14% 
of insurers using IRS, even in the scenario of 25bps shift and the broad definition of cash. 
These percentages reach up to 18% to 31% in the 100bps increase scenario, and triples on 
average in all scenarios when considering the narrow cash.
Most insurers can, however, cover their variation margin calls using highly liquid bonds 
or MMF shares. In the case of 25 bps shift the AAA-rated government bond holdings 
together with, only 4-2% of the undertakings cannot cover their margin calls. This figure 
declines to 1-0% when also AA-rated corporate bonds (MMF shares) are included in the 
available liquidity. When interpreting these figures it is important to bear in mind that 
using securities like high-rated bonds or MMF shares to cover variation margin calls is 
not always a viable solution. For example, one of the fastest ways of how insurers could 
get cash to cover variation margin calls is to use the repo market, where they could swap 
securities for cash. However, we found that only 21 insurers in our sample are currently 
borrowing cash in the repo market and, therefore, it can be difficult for other companies 
to access the market on a short notice and particularly so, when markets are in distress. 
Nonetheless, in the case of a prolonged market turmoil over several days (e.g. increases of 
75 and 100 bps in our set-up), insurers may have enough time to liquidate the bonds and 
MMF shares, or successfully perform a collateral upgrade.
Table A2.3: Percentage and number of insurers short of liquidity.
Up-
ward 
par-
allel 
shift 
[bps]
Cash positions Cash and bonds positions Cash, bonds and 
MMF shares 
positions
Cash, gov and 
corporate 
bonds and MMF 
shares positions
Cash available 
for IRS
Cash
Cash and AAA 
bonds
Cash and AAA/
AA bonds
No net Net No net Net No net Net No net Net No net Net No net Net
100
40% 30% 24% 18% 6% 4% 4% 3% 2% 1% 2% 1%
68 51 40 31 11 7 6 5 3 2 3 2
75
35% 25% 22% 17% 5% 4% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 0%
60 42 37 29 9 7 4 4 3 2 2 0
50
29% 21% 18% 15% 5% 4% 2% 2% 1% 1% 0% 0%
50 36 31 26 9 7 4 4 2 2 0 0
25
24% 17% 14% 10% 4% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 0% 0%
40 28 24 17 6 3 4 3 2 2 0 0
Source: Solvency II QRT, Authors’ calculations 
Reference date: Q4 2018
EUROPEAN INSUR ANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS AUTHORIT Y
98
Considering all test set-ups, the estimated liquidity shortfalls implied by the variation 
margins calls range between EUR 1bn to almost EUR 90bn (see Table A2.4). These esti-
mates are sizeable compared to the overall Solvency II value of plain vanilla interest rate 
swaps held by the companies in our analysis sample, which totalled EUR 22.5bn. By the 
same token, they are sizeable compared to the initial available liquidity of these compa-
nies (EUR 21bn – EUR 740bn depending of the definition of liquidity) and also to their 
average open positions in the repo market (EUR 50bn of cash borrowing and EUR 15bn of 
cash lending on average during 2018). On the other hand, the figures are small compared 
to the overall size of total investment of the companies in our sample, which stands at 
around EUR 4.8 trillion.
Table A2.4: Total liquidity shortfall (EUR billion)
Up-
ward 
par-
allel 
shift 
[bps]
Variation 
Margin
Cash positions Cash and bonds positions Cash, bonds 
and MMF 
shares 
positions
Cash, gov and 
corporate 
bonds and 
MMF shares 
positions
Cash available 
for IRS
Cash Cash and 
AAA bonds
Cash and 
AAA/AA 
bonds
No 
net
Net
No 
net
Net
No 
net
Net
No 
net
Net
No 
net
Net
No 
net
Net
No 
net
Net
100 98.4 53.7 86.9 45.3 78.4 39.4 45.9 22.3 23.2 19.8 20.8 18.6 4.8 2.6
75 75.6 41.3 64.6 33.2 57.2 28.6 32.5 15.4 15.9 13.9 14.5 13.0 0.5 0
50 51.7 28.2 41.4 20.8 35.7 17.9 18.3 8.0 9.0 7.7 7.8 7.1 0 0
25 26.4 14.5 18.1 9.3 15.1 8.0 5.3 1.9 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.2 0 0
Source: Solvency II QRT, Authors’ calculations 
Reference date: Q4 2018
To narrow down this range, we focus on the increase of 25bps in combination with 
cash positions (and no netting), which results in a cash shortfall of EUR 15 bn. This is 
a large shortfall compared to the initial cash position of the companies which fall short 
of liquidity (EUR 5 bn, i.e. 300% of it) and also to cash positions of all companies in our 
analysis sample (EUR 50 bn).70 In addition, the cash shortfall represents 1.7% of total 
investment of the companies experiencing capital shortfall. Since other means of trans-
forming assets into cash such as an outright sale of securities may take several days, 
these companies would not be able to meet variation margin calls in cash already under 
the 25bps shift scenario and could become a potential source of risk in the system, with 
negative repercussions to their counterparties, typically banks.
Looking at larger interest rate shifts, the cash shortfalls increase significantly. This can 
be interpreted as the potential demand for cash by insurance companies, which spread 
across different markets. For instance, the shift of 75bps and 100bps under the netting 
assumption implies cash shortfalls in the range of EUR 28bn to EUR 45bn. Since such 
sizeable shifts are more likely to occur over a number of days rather than in one day, 
insurers may obtain cash through several channels, besides the repo market. One way, 
for instance, would be an outright sale of bonds, which has typically a settlement time of 
70 One limitation of our study in this respect is the assumption that variation margin calls would be paid out of 
the cash holdings available at hand, while the insurance companies could also receive significant cash flows from 
premium payments and investment portfolios (e.g. coupons on bonds). We however argue that the majority of 
these “scheduled” payments into the company is already pre-planned for cash outflows (e.g. reinvestments of 
coupons in newly bought bonds) and payments to policyholders.
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two days71. Therefore, the cash shortfalls in this case could be interpreted as the potential 
demand for cash from insurance companies, spread across the repo, bond, MMFs and 
other markets.
Looking at the results with liquidity positions broader than cash only, the short-falls 
decline but remain non-negligible for larger IR shifts. Specifically, we estimate liquidity 
shortfall of around EUR 13-22bn under the assumption of 75bps and 100bps shifts and 
allowing for netting. These figures are comparable to the cash short-falls estimated under 
the smaller shift of 25bps. However, larger shifts may occur in a time span longer than 
one day. Therefore, the negative spillovers to other counterparties from this type of li-
quidity shortfall – ceteris paribus – could be more limited.
Considering other types of securities in the liquidity positions further decreases short-
falls in all scenarios. For example, adding also MMF shares and AAA-AA corporate bonds 
to the liquidity positions, shortfalls reduce to zero in the case of the 25 bps increase; but 
in the 100 bps increase scenario still 3 and 2 undertakings, respectively in the no netting 
and netting case, fall short of liquidity. Corporate bonds add a lot to the liquidity posi-
tions, but not enough to offset the variation margin required considering the initial large 
exposure towards IRS.
KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMPANIES FACING LIQUIDITY 
SHORT-FALL
Considering the results of 25bps shift in combination with the broad cash position, most 
liquidity shortages are due to small cash positions rather than high IRS exposure. To 
obtain this insight, we split companies facing liquidity short-falls in four groups based 
on the combination of the relative size of the IRS exposure and cash positions (labelling 
those with low cash as companies with high cash risk) and report their concentration in 
each of these groups in the light blue boxes in Figure A2.2. The results reveal that more 
than 80% (i.e. 21%+63%) of companies facing a liquidity shortage under this scenario are 
characterised by high cash risk rather than high IRS exposure, which is twice as higher 
frequency than in the full sample (40% = 36% + 4%)
On the other hand, three out of the four companies facing liquidity short-fall under the 
75bps shift and broad liquidity definition (cash and bonds) have a relatively high IRS ex-
posure (see dark blue boxes in Figure A2.2). This suggests that in a prolonged period of 
market distress associated with a more significant rate increase, the size of interest rate 
exposures rather than the liquidity position of a company is the main problem. In both 
cases, looking at the investments, the overall picture does not change.
71 Settlement can be faster under bilateral agreements, paying higher fees to the settlement bank.
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Figure A2.2: Characteristics of the companies facing liquidity short-fall: low liquidity positions or high IRS exposure?
Based on number of Undertakings
17% 50% 21% 25%
0% 0% 63% 25%
Full sample
% failures for 75 bps - netting - cash & 
AAA/AA bonds positions
% failures for 25 bps - no netting - full cash position
4%11%
49% 36%
Cash Risk
IRS 
Exposure
Low
High
High
Source: Solvency II QRT, Authors’ calculations 
Reference date: Q4 2018 
Notes: Companies with high (low) “cash risk” are those with less (more) than 1% of cash out of total investments. Companies with high (low) IRS exposure are 
those for which the IRS notional amount over total investment is higher (lower) than 50%.
Companies facing liquidity short-fall are either large (25%) or very large (75%), (inner 
circles in Figure A2.3). These companies are also over-represented in the original sam-
ple with similar proportions. We do not observe liquidity shortages among medium size 
companies which represent 6% of the full sample. Figure A2.3 also shows that most of 
them are life companies, 75% in the 25bps scenario (middle circle) and 100% in the 75 bps 
scenario, even though life insurers represent 50% of the full sample. The percentage of 
non-life companies facing short-falls with 25 bps increase mirrors that in the full sample 
(around 21%), while a very low percentage (4% form 26% in the full sample) are composites.
Figure A2.3: Characteristics of the companies facing liquidity short-fall: size and type of business
X-tra large
Medium
Large
Small Life
Composites
Non-life
Reinsurance
Source: Solvency II QRT, Authors’ calculations 
Reference date: Q4 2018 
Notes: Outer circle: full sample, middle circle: less severe scenario (25 bps up, cash, no netting), Inner circle: prolonged market turmoil (75 bps up, cash and AAA/
AA bond, netting).
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As a final remark, we note that country concentration of companies facing liquidity short-
fall may pose financial stability concerns. Twenty-two (out of twenty-four) undertakings 
facing liquidity short-fall in the 25bps shift scenario are concentrated in a limited number 
of countries. We find that the total investment of the companies facing liquidity short-
fall amounts to EUR 888bn, which is 35% of EUR 2,546bn, i.e. the total investment of all 
the insurers in those countries. For the individual countries, this figure ranges between 
6% and 64%.
CONCLUSIONS
(Re)insurers have long term liabilities with typically stable liquidity needs. Therefore, (re)
insurers can act as shock absorbers under normal market conditions. Margin require-
ments however introduce a change in the short term behaviour of (re)insurers which can 
impact the functioning of financial markets, by for example reducing the shock-absorp-
tion capacity of (re)insurers’ portfolios in a crisis.
Margining practices for (re)insurer’s derivative portfolios may have second-round effects 
on financial stability, via the following channels:
a) Repo markets. To cover the margin calls, some (re)insurers may have to rely on fund-
ing through repo markets. Banks’ ability or willingness to provide liquidity via repos 
can be limited, for instance around year end or in stressed market conditions.
b) Fire sales. The need to meet variation margin calls quickly could lead (re)insurers 
to liquidate assets. Depending on market conditions, this could in turn affect other 
investors by moving prices and hence form a feedback loop reinforcing the price fall.
c) Money market funds (MMFs). If (re)insurers collectively withdraw their investments 
from MMF to cover margin calls, they could liquidity knock-on effect on other sec-
tors.
Considering future research, the analysis could be further extended in a number of ways. 
Firstly, other derivatives classes, in particular FX, could be also considered. Next, netting 
between the VM payable and receivable could be considered per counterparty. Finally, it 
would be worthwhile to repeat the exercise at a later stage e.g. when a significant share 
of the grandfathered legacy transactions have also become subject to the margining 
requirements.
Our results suggest that there may be a potential liquidity risk stemming from the use 
of derivatives and in particular IRS activities by (re)insurers. The risk is driven by two 
factors: i) high IRS exposure and ii) high cash risk (i.e. insufficient holdings of cash and 
liquid assets). About 10% of all (re)insurers in the EU use IRS; typically large insurers and 
life insurers. The analysis concludes that some insurers have not yet adapted their asset 
allocation to the (new) requirements coming from the use of derivatives and the margin-
ing practices, which have been phased in recently.
The results can be used to inform policy makers. This will become particularly relevant in 
the near future – once the margining requirements become fully applicable to the entire 
portfolio of insurers derivatives transactions72.
72 The margining requirements only apply to new trades concluded after the applicable phasing in deadlines. 
It will therefore take time before new trades replace all the legacy trades which are not covered by the require-
ments.
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ANNEX
DESCRIPTION OF SII 
DATASET
The following are the data used in the 
analysis:
The IRS contract information [Maturi-
ty date, notional amount, SII market 
value, currency and transaction type: 
FL-FX, FX-FL,] is taken from the template 
“Open derivatives” (S.08.01). This template 
contains an item-by-item list of derivatives 
held directly by the undertaking (i.e. not 
on a look-through basis), classifiable as as-
set categories A  to F  in the Regulation73. 
This template is made of two tables: one 
with information on the position held and 
the other with information at the deriva-
tive level. In SII QRTs, interest rate swap 
contracts are categorised with CIC D1.
Information to determine insurers’ liquid 
assets such as [monetary amounts of 
AAA and AA government and corpo-
rate bonds (unencumbered), money 
market funds and cash] is take from the 
template “List of assets” (S.06.02). This 
template contains an item-by-item list of 
assets held directly by the undertaking 
(i.e. not on a  look-through basis). The as-
set categories referred to in this template 
73 The asset and derivatives categories referred to 
in this template are the ones defined in Annex IV – 
Assets Categories of the SII Regulation and refer-
ences to CIC codes refer to Annex V – CIC table of 
the SII Regulation. COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING 
REGULATION (EU) 2015/2450 of 2 December 2015 
laying down implementing technical standards with 
regard to the templates for the submission of infor-
mation to the supervisory authorities according to 
Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council Amended by: Official Journal No 
page date M3 Commission Implementing Reg-
ulation (EU) 2018/1844 of 23 November 2018, No 
L  299,Page 5 and Date 26.11.2018 https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX-
:02015R2450-20181216&from=EN
are the ones defined in Annex IV – Assets 
Categories of the SII Regulation and refer-
ences to CIC codes refer to Annex V – CIC 
table. This template is made of two tables. 
One with information on the position held 
and the other with information at the as-
set level.
Information on insurers repo activity is 
taken from the template “Security lend-
ing and repos” (S.10.01). This template 
contains an item-by-item list of securi-
ties lending transactions and repurchase 
agreements (buyer and seller) contracts, 
held directly by the undertaking (i.e. not 
on a  look-through basis), which includes 
also the liquidity swaps referred to in arti-
cle 309 (2)(f) of the Delegated Regulation 
(EU) 2015/35. The information has to in-
clude all contracts in the reporting period 
regardless of whether they were open or 
closed at the reporting date. For contracts 
that are part of a roll-over strategy, where 
they substantially are the same transac-
tion, only open positions are reported. 
A repurchase agreement (repo) is defined 
as the sale of securities together with an 
agreement for the seller to buy back the 
securities at a later date.
Other information such as type of com-
pany (i.e. Life, Non Life, Composites and 
Reinsurance) and country location is tak-
en from the template “Basic information” 
(S.01.02) and insurers Total Assets from 
the Balance sheet (S.02.01) template.
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PREPARATION OF THE DATA
This section describes the steps taken to arrive from raw data as described in the 
previous section to a clean dataset.
Since the start of the data collection in 2016, various automatic data validation and qual-
ity checks have been implemented into the EIOPA Central Repository. Over time, the 
overall data quality has been increasing steadily. Nevertheless, we have encountered 
a number of data quality issues which made us exclude a number of observations. Fur-
ther details are described below.
We perform data cleaning at two levels: first, at the level of individual contracts and sec-
ond, at the level of companies. With regard to the tests on individual contracts, we focus 
on those entries that are key for the later calculations of the variation margins. These 
are: Transaction type, notional amount, solvency II value, currency and maturity date. An 
overview of the data quality checks is outlined in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Overview of data cleaning steps
Action
Number of 
contracts
Notional value 
(Trn EUR)
Initial dataset 43,429 1.811
Data cleaning at the level of transactions
Transaction type: error/blank Exclude
Notional =< SII value Exclude
SII value: 0 or empty Exclude
Maturity date: 0 or empty Exclude
Notional: 0 or empty Exclude
Notional outside 1 – 1TRN EUR Exclude
Currency: not valid or empty Exclude
Data cleaning at the level of companies
Credibility checks Exclude 7,272 0.13
Other data reporting issues Exclude
Final dataset: 34.689 1.651
Next, we perform ‘credibility checks’ on the remaining transactions at company level; 
i.e. if more that 40% of the contracts for a company have been excluded during previ-
ous data checks, the remaining 60% of observations for this company are also dropped. 
In other words, the company is dropped from the final sample. If not excluded, these 
companies (remaining with fewer positions) would mechanically be in a position to more 
likely pass the test, for the reason that they have lower data quality. We prefer to exclude 
these undertaking from the analysis sample.
In a final step, we drop observations for further 4 companies due to inconsistencies in 
their SII reporting and for 11 which would not be impacted by the change in the interest 
rate as they have no exposure to interest rate risk; i.e. use only FL-FL IRS.
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Table 2: Companies in th0e sample by size and type
Sample by size (EUR): Number
Very large (>8 bn TA) 123
Large (>1.6 bn TA) 36
Medium (>0.2 bn) 10
Small 1
Total 170
Sample by type: Number
Life undertakings 85
Non-Life undertakings 39
Composites 42
Reinsurance undertakings 4
Total 170
Source: EIOPA SII QRT data  
Reference date: Q4 2018
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GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU
In person
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct Information Centres. 
You can find the address of the centre nearest you at: http://europa.eu/contact
On the phone or by e-mail
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. 
You can contact this service 
– by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
– at the following standard number: +32 22999696 or 
– by electronic mail via: http://europa.eu/contact
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU
Online
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: http://europa.eu 
EU Publications
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at:  
http://bookshop.europa.eu. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe 
Direct or your local information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact)
EU law and related documents
For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1951 in all the official language 
versions, go to EUR-Lex at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu
Open data from the EU
The EU Open Data Portal (http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data) provides access to datasets from the EU. 
Data can be downloaded and reused for free, both for commercial and non-commercial purposes.
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